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Security assistance to the Third World will remain a vibrant topic in the American political dialogue for
the foreseeable future. While specific issues are fraught with political, economic, ethical, and emotional
overtones, analysis of the military dimension is inseparable from the decision making process. The mili-
tary analyst's charter is to provide decision makers with comprehensive assessments of arms transfer alter-
natives, probing their contributions to recipient force structure modernization and forecasting their
impacts on regional military stability.
In this pursuit, some form of quantitative analysis is inescapable, be it as simple as the tabulation of
military inventories or as complex as a sophisticated war gaming model. No matter the complexity of the
technique employed, its processes must be transparent to the decision maker and its content malleable to
his priorites and perceptions. At the same time, the technique must be slaved to the objectives and com-
ponents of the analytical question, not vice versa. To assist arms transfer policy making, the assessment
of potential capabilities to conduct definable operations in a specific environment is vital. To do less is to
leave critical stones unturned.
Simple tabular techniques have a place in the panoply of military analysis, but their results can rarely
be translated into militarily relevant conclusions. The systematized aggregation of performance and force
propagation characteristics is an elemental attribute of any model which purports to assess combat capa-
bilities. The objective of this research effort has been to develop a methodology wliich captures these
facets and aggregates them according to their relative utilities in generating potential combat outputs.
Using air weapon systems (125 aircraft) and the Middle East/North African region (22 countries) as a
developmental test bed, the study began by evaluating the assets and liabilities of earlier aggregational
methodologies. Factor analysis stood out because of its ability to consolidate multiple variables into
common attribute performance measures. However, its combinational logic is haphazard when applied at
the weapon system level, and its output measures are not legitimate candidates for aggregation at the force
level. Multi-attribute utility technique produces a judgment based combinational matrix but is adminis-
tratively unweildly and naturally applicable only to ratio level data. The weighted linear aggregation tech-
nique developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation incorporates expert judgment and processes data
of any measurement level but cannot accommodate multi-variable attributes and is insensitive to per-
formance variations within broadly defined subsystem categories. Whatever its strengths or weaknesses,
each methodology demonstrated the criticality of solid and comprehensive data input to the production of
meaningful results.
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To guide the data collection process, a matrix was developed the key elements of which constitute
the components implicated in assessing force air combat capability. Two essential elements, air weapon
system performance and force propagation potential, were positioned at the apex of the framework. They
were divided into the subcomponents which define their basic dimensions. Along with the various cat-
egories of subsystem, the air weapon system performance group included a family of factors which relate
the subsystems in terms of configuration and combat utility. On the force propagation side of the ledger,
inventory, mission allocation, and sortie generation subcomponents were identified. The importance of
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intangible factors such as operator proficiency and C I support was acknowledged, but their consideration
deferred to other research efforts. Each subcomponent thus identified was further divided into the per-
formance attributes which contribute to its operation. These were in turn subdivided into the variables
which describe those attributes.
Data collection was accomplished using open source data. Certain artifical constraints were estab-
lished to expedite the process. Only fixed wing aircraft with direct combat application in recent or future
Middle Eastern combat scenarios were considered. When data were unavailable, they were estimated
using the most accurate technique which could be supported. In some instances, specific data values are
consequently open to challenge. While the possible inaccuracies are lamentable, they are not fatal to the
evaluation technique itself and can easily be revised in subsequent applications. Since the methodology
aimed to support the development of future arms transfer policies, national air combat inventories were
anchored with known data from the past two years and projected out to 1990. A unique data set was
collected to determine the relative utilities of attributes and subsystems in definable combat roles. A panel
of 25 fighter experts familiar with Middle Eastern air operations was polled to ascertain their views on the
relationships which obtain among attributes and subsystems in four different mission areas. The results
were synthesized statistically and recast as relational variable values to be employed during the weapon
system combinational phase.
Only after an analytical structure had been articulated and supporting data collected was a data
reduction scheme devised, reversing the process followed in some other research efforts. Factor analysis
was employed to create relative index values for attributes described by multiple variables. Targeted at the
attribute level, this rniiiimalist version of the factor analysis methodology purged the indices of extraneous
variable influences. Ratio properties were restored to the indices through the utilization of a zero-valued
control case the factor score for which constituted a threshold from which other scores in the data set
could be scaled. Variables described by nominal values were not included in the factor problems to pre-
clude their distorting influences but were reserved for introduction in the aggregation process.
tu
The computational phase itself was adapted with a few major variations from the linear equations
developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation. The process was initiated at the bottom of the analyt-
ical ladder, combining subsystem attributes. Expert assigned values for nominally described variables were
used to modify the raw attribute scores extracted from the data reduction phase. Attribute scores were
combined in accordance with their relative air combat utilities in each mission area. An analogous proce-
dure was followed at the subcomponent and component levels, with the computations not only consider-
ing relative utility values but also conforming to specific air weapon system configurations. The product
is a set of relative combat potential scores (Air Combat Potential Units) for each of the 125 air weapon
systems in whatever mission roles were appropriate.
Force propagation values were computed in a somewhat different fashion. National aircraft invento-
ries, mission allocations, operational availability rates, maintenance requirements, and maintenance
resources were considered in a series of equations which computed the sortie generation potential for each
possessed air weapon system in those roles to which it would likely be committed. To illustrate the
impact of personnel force quality on sortie generation, an additional force level factor, the relative support
index, was also injected into select force propagation equations. Since the variables on which the support
index was predicated are considered 'soft' surrogates for personnel quality, its general application is not
recommended. However, its profound influence testifies to the requirement for such intangibles to be
considered objectively or subjectively in force propagation and air combat analysis. In the ultimate com-
putational step, air weapon system mission potential and national force propagation potential were mated
to produce an estimate of a country's air combat potential in four mission roles on a single day of flying.
The results of the aggregation phase were reviewed to determine their efficacy both at the air weapon
system and national force levels. The results conformed to intuitive assessments and poignantly demon-
strated the desirability of employing a analytical scheme which aggregated the cumulative effects of system
and force subcomponents on specific mission outputs. To further exercise the model, a phased analysis of
a specific arms transfer proposal (advanced air defense fighters for Jordan) was conducted. The model
showed itself to be responsive to the type of modifications a decision maker might stipulate in evaluating
specific weapon system alternatives, gauging their contribution to force capabilities under varying condi-
tions, and analyzing their impact on regional military balances under differing conflict scenarios.
The air combat potential aggregation methodology proposed in this study is a powerful and flexible
mechanism with which to analyze the composition, benefits, and liabilities of air weapon systems individ-
ually and at the force and regional levels. Its underlying philosphy, analytical framework, and combina-
tional scheme are extendable to other regions, categories of weapons, and analytical problems. But the
present model has its drawbacks. Solely relying on unclassified data sources, values for some critical vari-
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ables had to be estimated. Consequent inaccuracies were inevitable. The linear combinational form used
to aggregate values at each step in the process fails to capture the synergy among subcomponents, partic-
ularly in force level calculations. Unquestionably vital factors such as operator proficiency, CI support,
and the ground air defense environment were not considered in the prototype. These elements need to be
introduced into a fully proficient model or considered in modifying its results. Finally, the prototype as
currently configured is not amenable to 'user-friendly' micro-computer processing. Creation of a respon-
sive micro-based system is eminently feasible but requires additional developmental effort.
Each of these liabilities is surmountable and represents fertile ground for additional effort within the
intelligence community. Utilizing the methodoligical framework and procedures, a classified data base
could be easily created and expanded to include additional aircraft, subsytems, and regions. Analytical
subsets addressing elements of the ground air defense environment could also be introduced into the
model relatively painlessly. Of greater complexity is the development of algorithms which capture the
synergy among system and force components. One possibility is to attempt adaptation of existing air
combat simulations to define an alternative non-linear aggregational scheme. Integration of combat rele-
vant intangibles is a similarly complex challenge. Reliable mathmatical representations might not prove
possible, but the influences of operator proficiency and the like can be reasonably assessed by weapon
system and regional experts and applied subjectively in interpreting model output.
The air weapon system potential model is not a predictor of combat outcomes, but it does provide
the decision maker with finely textured and responsive static indicators of individual weapon system and
force potential. These indicators are essential points of departure in evaluating the military dimension of
security assistance options. With the enhancements described above, the methodology developed in this
research effort represents a productive vehicle for intelligence community participation in the security
assistance policy development process.
v -
PREFACE
This technical note was prepared under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence's Exceptional
Intelligence Analyst Program. It was originally conceived as a wide-gauged historical treatment of arms
transfers to the Persian Gulf/Southwest Asian region, the findings of which could serve as a base for
future forecasting. From the outset, it was recognized that the essential cog in the analytical wheel was
the methodology which portrayed the effects of military equipment transfers on recipient combat capabili-
ties and regional stability. It had been assumed that existing analytical methodologies would be sufficient
to the task.
That assumption proved fallacious and caused a reorientation in study objectives. Development of a
model to index and aggregate combat potential became the focal point of the research effort. Owing to a
variety of factors, not the least of which was my own limited expertise, the field of study was further nar-
rowed to air weapon systems. The temporal emphasis also changed as the study evolved. The develop-
ment of a responsive mechanism to support future decision making emerged as a more compelling chal-
lenge than charting the historical evolution of Middle Eastern air combat capabilities.
The resultant methodological scheme, detailed in this technical report, does not meet all of the goals
originally set out for it. Most significantly, the political dimension of United States' arms transfer policy
toward the Middle East is not addressed; nor are the economic and security advantages and liabilities
inherent in the process considered. These omissions notwithstanding, the proposed methodology delves
much more deeply into the intricacies of air combat potential assessment than had been originally con-
templated and than is available in current assessment systems. I trust this benefit will compensate for the
aforementioned analytical lapses.
Readers will note the methodology is cast as a policy assistance model, and most of the discussions
revolve around its viability in that role. While some might consequently question its pertinence as an
intelligence tool, my long-standing conviction is that policy development and intelligence analysis are
inextricably meshed. In that light, the proposed methodology constitutes one among many tools which
intelligence analysts can employ in assisting arms transfer decision makers. As an an air intelligence ana-
lyst myself, I also believe the methodological structure, if not its content, can be profitably applied by
colleagues assessing a variety of air threats and developments.
I would like to express my warmest thanks to the Intelligence Community Stall for funding the
project, to the Assistant Chief of Staff/ Intelligence, HQ USAF, for allowing me the opportunity to pursue
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it, and to the Naval Postgraduate School for providing a most hospitable research venue. Special personal
thanks are due Dr. Edward Laurance of the Department of National Security Affairs who initially inspired
the project and channelled its course; to Colonel Jack L. Houlgate, HQ USAF, Directorate of Estimates,
who served as a most understanding and efficient project manager; to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Forney
of the Department of National Security Affairs who provided consistent technical and moral support; to
Colonel John Garrison whose counsel on arms transfer issues and practices was invaluable; and to Colo-
nel Michael (Nort) Nelson who served as my mentor in sorting through and consolidating air weapon
system performance attributes. Several non-government entities also helped me over rough spots in the
research and were particularly gracious in sharing perceptions and methodological concepts. These
include Mr. J. E. Gibson and his staff at the Northrop Corporation, Mr. William Vogt of The Analytic
Sciences Corporation, and Dr. Ronald Sherwin and Ms. Joyce Mullen of Third Point Systems Corpora-
tion.
Despite the profound impact these individuals and many like them have had on the conceptualiza-
tion and preparation of this report, I have undoubtedly included some misperceptions or technical errors
in the final version. These are my responsibility alone.
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not represent the official position
of the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, the Intelli-
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ARMS TO THE THIRD WORLD
1.1 Introduction
Arms sales are far more than an economic occurrence, a military relationship, or an arms
control challenge - arms sales are foreign policy writ large. - Andrew J. Pierre in The
Global Politics ofArms Sales.
1.1.1 The Dynamics of International Arms Trade
Few who read a newspaper or watch the evening news would contradict this observation. Arms sales or
grants have become the linchpin of American security relationships with much of the Third World. They
are the cement which holds the Camp David Accords together; they are the nose under the Middle East-
ern oil producers' tent; and they are on the leading edge of efforts to blunt direct or indirect Soviet
advances in the Third World. Arms sales have been pivotal in enticing Third World governments to
switch superpower allegiances and in securing overseas facilities to support force projection requirements.
Important to United States' international security policy, arms transfers are critical, in the absence of
comparable economic allures, to Moscow's overtures to current or potential Third World allies. Most
industrial nations, confronted with ever rising weapons system and imported energy costs, rely on large
scale arms exports to maintain affordable economies of scale for their own indigenous weapons produc-
tion.
With the post-colonial diffusion of international power and the subsequent tattering of Cold War
alliances, the Third World's demand for increasing quantities of high quality weapons has more than kept
pace with the supply. Recognizing superpower reluctance to chance a direct confrontation over Third
World conflicts, emerging regional powers have come to rely on weapons inventories rather than diplo-
2
matic assurances as the best guarantees of their own security. Threats to the security in the non-
industrial world have mushroomed in the past forty years, further stimulating demand. By one estimate,
three-quarters of the conflicts occurring since World War Two have taken place in the Third World, with
inter and intra state wars producing over 15 million casualties. With the post-war profusion of new states,
the potential causes of war have multiplied. The aggregate number of national frontiers to be contested
ttttttttttttttttttttt
For instance. Cahn and Kruzel observe that military exports are vital to sustaining British and French
military production lines, with aerospace industries required to export at least half their production to
remain afloat. See Cahn et al, Controlling Future Arms Trade, pp. 68-69.
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See Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, pp. 275-280, for a thorough discussion of the current




has increased geometrically, as have the other sources of inter and intra-state conflict. The genesis of the
conilicts themselves is imbedded in a crosshatched web of intraregional rivalries, political instability, and
ethnic hostilities and not in the availability of modern arms. Nonetheless, virtually all conflicts in the
Third World have been fought with weapons supplied by the industrial nations.
It is open to debate if the availability of modern weapons stimulates or suppresses the tendency to
violent conflict resolution in the Third World. Indeed, compelling historical and theoretical arguments
can be made on either side of the question. The timely transfer of arms to a threatened state can make
war an unacceptably costly option for an aggressive neighbor. Conversely, a perceived arms buildup by a
potential adversary can provoke a preemptive attack (e.g., Israel in 1967). Modern weapons systems
possess range, mobility, and firepower attributes which magnify the lethality of combat once joined, but
those same characteristics might also foreshorten its duration. Rarely do weapon systems alone dictate
the outcome of Third World conflict. Long term results are more often the product of intangibles such as
military morale, national cohesion and will, and combat strategy. This fact notwithstanding, the acquisi-
tion of modern weapons is a preoccupying security concern of Third World leaders, and their unfetterred
supply is the litmus test of patron constancy. For major arms suppliers, responding to Third World
demands poses a devilish political, military, economic, and ethical dilemma.
1.1.2 The American Dilemma
The American body politic has long sought to harmonize the elements in the arms transfer quandary.
The tenor of arms transfer policies in the Twentieth Century has run the gamut from virtually unbridled
promotion to high-minded prohibition. In the mildly pacifistic and isolationist climate of the 1930's, the
United States Senate's Nye Committee investigated international arms trade and drafted legislation (Neu-
trality Act of 1935), which set up a governmental agency to control the sale of arms and required the
President to apply an arms embargo against any countries involved in conflict. Spurred by the results of
the Nye investigation and popular exposes such as Engelbrecht and Hanighen's The Merchants of Death,
the British Labor Party spearheaded an eventually unsuccessful attempt to prohibit the private production
and sale of arms by companies in the United Kingdom.
Following World War II, the United States, France, and Great Britain undertook to forestall a
weapons explosion in the Middle East through the formation of the Near Eastern Arms Coordinating
Committee (1950), which was charged with implementing multi-lateral standards of restraint adopted in
the Tripartite Agreement of the same year. The Committee was moderately successful in maintaining a







See Starr and Most, 'Patterns of Conflict', pp.39-48 for additional conflict related data.
A fast-paced account of early Twentieth Century attempts to curtail international arms traffic can be
found in Sampson, The Arm's Bazaar, pp. 68-89.
- 2-
the Soviet Union entered the regional arms market.
In a different political clime, the Nixon Administration viewed large scale arms transfers as a cost-
effective vehicle for strengthening international political allies, creating surrogates whose military capabili-
ties would preclude the requirement for direct American presence in unstable regions. Reacting neg-
atively to the 'Nixon Doctrine', Congress attached the Nelson Ammendment to the 1974 Military
Assistance Bill mandating Congressional notification and review of proposed arms packages in excess of
$25 million. A more restrictive approach was adopted in the International Security and Arms Export
Control Act passed in June 1976. It not only reaffirmed Congressional review but prohibited strictly
commercial sales in excess of $25 million and proposed that annual aggregate sales should not exceed the
dollar level reached in 1976. 'Arms controllers' on Capitol Hill had an enthusiastic ally in President Car-
ter whose political and ethical sensibilities had prompted him to include the control of arms transfers as a
plank in his campaign platform. The policy which he promulgated set quantitative and qualitative
boundaries to the export of arms. He proposed a descending dollar limit on agggregate transfers, a pro-
hibition of the insertion of new or significantly higher combat capabilities into a region, and a number of
other measures which would have severely curtailed the role of the American government and arms pro-
ducers in stimulating or responding to Third World demand for arms.
The tenor of the Reagan Administration's arms transfer policy has been more aggressive, substituting,
7
to paraphrase James Buckley, 'a healthy sense of self preservation' for 'theology'. Intent and rhetoric
aside, arms sales since 1981 have still been scrutinized and reigned in by a Congress suspicious of the effi-
cacy of arms transfers and sensitive to domestic political pressures. With the exception of transfers to
Israel and Egypt in compensation for the maintenance of the Camp David Agreement, no major arms sale
has been approved without a lengthy, public, and at times vitriolic debate. The furor over the AWACS
sale to Saudi Arabia was without equal in post-war history. Congressional opposition forced the Admin-
istration to defer plans to upgrade Jordan's air defense capabilities and to abandon a program to further
enhance Saudi Arabian air defense and ground attack capabilities. Most recently, a proposal to supply
air-to-air missiles for fighters the Saudi's had purchased from the United States was the subject of fierce
political controversy.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
See Kemp, 'Arms & Security', pp. 19-20; and Sherwood, The Out ofArea Debate.
The program to establish Iran and Saudi Arabia as the 'twin pillars' of security in the Persian Gulf
after the withdrawal of British forces in 1970 stands as a case in point.
7 Quoted in Pierre, op.cit., p. 62.
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1.1.3 To Trade or Not To Trade
While U.S. arms transfer policy has vacililated in 'Hamlet-like' fashion over the past 50 years, its applica-
8
tion in specific instances is a product of how key decision makers answer four questions. Does a partic-
ular arms package promote regional stability or fracture it? Are prospective recipients suitable targets for
patronage? Are immediate economic benefits to the supplier offset by the potential domestic economic
impoverishment of less well-heeled clients? Can the widespread sale of arms be reconciled with the etliical
principles and political orientation of the American public? Answering these questions is essentially a
political process to which no omnibus analytical regimen can be reasonably applied. Analysis of the mil-
itary dimension of a proposed weapons transfer is an integral component of that process.
1.2 Military Analysis and Arms Transfer Policy
1.2.1 The Role of Military Analysis
Military analysis forms the nucleus around which other, less analytically tractable, considerations can be
arrayed and is a mandatory element in each arms transfer proposal. The fact that the military aspects of
an arms transfer constitute only a portion of the problem set does not derogate from the requirement that
they be portrayed comprehensively and effectively. Indeed, testimony before any congressional commit-
tee, supporting or opposing an arms package, is invariably accompanied by a spate of figures charting the
impact of the proposed transfer on the military capabilities of the recipient and the regional military bal-
ance. The assessment of the strictly military dimension of an arms transfer is not deterministic; neither is
it insignificant.
In this context, the role of transfer related military capabilities analysis is to provide a policy assis-
tance' mechanism to national decision makers. Military analysis must consider the impact of a proposed
transfer on U.S. force posture, costs, and employment plans. More poignantly, it must assess the rele-
vance of the transfer to the regional security situation, answering two questions. How does a given trans-
fer affect the recipient's force posture and war making potential? How do the resultant changes in military
force structure affect the regional military balance? In answering these two questions, attention need be
9
paid not only to the quantities of assets involved but also to their capabilities in definable mission roles.
Judgment is an essential component in arriving at these determinations, but the analysis of aggregated
tablular data simply cannot be avoided in the production of a useable assessment. Once the subject of
tabular data is introduced, eyes role skyward; the spectre of impenetrable models of suspect relevance
descends.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
8 The Shakespearian metaphor is borrowed from Harkavy and Neumann, The Lessons of Recent Wars
in the Third World, p. 21.
a
Richelson et al, Arms Transfer Control Criteria, pp.6 1-62, 64-68.
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1.2.2 Principles of Military Analysis
Analytical obscurity and irrelevance can be averted if some of the guidelines espoused by the
Comptroller General are followed. Even when applied at the aggregate level, a quantitative appraisal
does provide a '. . . useful anatomical description of the extent to which . . . forces have improved or
deteriorated relative to those of a putative enemy.' As a composite index, the aggregated model necessar-
ily masks some relevant distinctions and sacrifices the effects of synergy among its component parts. Its
linear mathmatical form and the inclusion of simplyfing assumptions make these losses inevitable. Thus,
its output cannot be applied independently but must be integrated with substantive non-quantitative
analysis before conclusions can be drawn. Not rigorously scientific despite superficial appearances of pre-
cision, the output of a quantitative model is highly dependent on the variables entered into it, the
assumptions made concerning them, and its mathmatical form. To be usefully applied, the model's input
data must be valid and accesible, its assumptions explicit, and its workings transparent. Finally, expert
judgment must play a key role not only in interpreting and leavening a model's output, it must also be
embodied in the formulation of the model itself.
From a substantive perspective, a militarily-oriented policy assistance model must comprehensively
capture the essential combat related properties of the systems being analyzed. When the nature of modem
weapons systems is regarded, the relative combat contribution of key subsystems (e.g., air-to-air missiles,
radars) is essential in the determination of overall capability. The ability to compare combat potential
within a weapon system category and across alternative mission areas is a necessary attribute, as is the
requirement to aggregate combined weapon system capabilities at the force level. While aggregation
inevitably compromises precision, the trade-offs need to be niinimized and explicitly defined. Similarly,
the analytical procedures chosen must be scrutinized to determine their inherent proclivities to generate
1
2
systemic and random error within the context of analytical objectives.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
See USGAO, Models, Data, and War: A Critique of the Foundations of Defense Analysis, pp. 1-24,
54-55, and 148, for a discussion of the application of aggrcnatcd quantitative models and the rules
which should govern them in the defense analysis process. While the GAO studies focuses on U.S.
defense policy making, its lessons are equally applicable to the arms transfer problem.
See comment in Leiss et al, Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries, p. 1 74, which asserts that
associated weapons subsystems are the key features which '. . . distinguish the military end use of a
modern fighter-bomber. The principle is just as legitimately extended to other classes of weapon
system.





Acceding to this list of demands is a tall order, infrequently met. Regardless, the need for a systematized
military analysis tool to support arms transfer and international security decision making is well estab-
lished. A myriad of quantitative assessment techniques have been developed over the past 25 years by
governmental agencies, commercial entities, and academic groups to meet the demand. None has
achieved universal acceptance. The goal of this research is to propose a militarily focused aggregational
methodology which capitalizes on the ground already covered and which adheres as closely as possible to
the spirit, if not the letter, of the idealized principles described above. While all of the principles merit
rigorous application, four can be singled out as receiving particular emphasis in the evolution of this
methodology. First, the derivation of input data and the internal workings of the methodology are trans-
parent. The sources, characteristics, and validity of each data element are described, as are the processes
to which they are subjected. While this feature prolongs the descriptive process, it permits informed
judgment on the methodology's utility. Second, the judgment of weapon system and intelligence experts
was sought at each phase of the development process and integrated into methodology design and opera-
tion. Third, the focus throughout is on mission-specific combat output potential, not on the analysis of
weapon system inputs. While inputs such as weapons inventories or system characteristics constitute
necessary starting points, the combat capabilities which they engender are the determinants of military
potential. Fourth, the limitations inherent in the methodology and the data which it considers are clearly
identified to facilitate realistic integration of systemic outputs in subsequent case oriented analyses.
Two additional considerations, inferred from previously identified principles, also warrant mention.
Methodological transparency is essential but not sufficient. The user of a policy assistance tool must also
be able to manipulate it to satisfy specific lines of inquiry, rather than just being presented with static
results. Consequently, a research objective is to develop a methodology with which a potential user can
interact, performing iterative (sensitivity) analysis under varying conditions, priorities, and assumptions.
Finally, in those instances in which methodological simplicity conflicts with substantive accuracy or rele-
vance, substantive concerns take precedence wherever possible.
1.3.2 Limitations
Within the framework of these overarcliing objectives, some practical limits need to be drawn. The
essence of the analytical process is theoretically unconstrained to a specific region or weapon system cat-
egory. For developmental purposes, application of the methodology was restricted to the Middle Fast,
North African retdon. This region was the recipient of 55% of the dollar value of all arms shipments to
ttttttttttttttftttttt
13 Twenty-two countries were included on the regional set: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran.
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the Third World in 1983, continuing the trend established in the mid-1970's. The countries of the region
are among the relative handful in the Third World with sufficient financial resources or super-power
patronage to acquire significant inventories of modern weapon systems. Additionally, virtually all major
systems in their inventories, with the exception of Israel's, are acquired internationally, and the subject of
security assistance to the region dominates arms transfer policy debates within the U.S. political system.
Finally, the series of recent and ongoing conflicts in the area provide some limited data on the combat
application of these weapons systems as well as suggesting a military development pattern for other
regions potentially embroiled in protracted conflict.
The investigation will also be limited to consideration of air weapons systems. Anthony Cordesman
observes that airpower '. . . is the critical form of military power in the (Persian) Gulf, because of the
regional geography, limited lines of communication, and the limited sustainability of ground forces.
Another experienced military observer comes to the same conclusion but extends its application to the
rest of the region, noting that the effective use of airpower will be the determining element in the first
rounds of any future Middle Eastern combat. At a more practical level, aircraft transfers and invento-
ries are highly visible, so relatively reliable data concerning them are readily available. Their visibility and
cost propel them into the forefront of security policy concerns from both the supplier and recipient per-
spectives, enhancing methodological relevance. Finally, aircraft are the category of weapon system in
which the author has the most practical expertise, such as it is. It should be noted that, although the field
of inquiry for development of this prototype has been narrowed considerably from the outset, the princi-
ples underpinning it are extendable to other regions and weapons classes.
1.3.3 Organization
The basic philisophical groundwork laid, the remainder of the study will step through the elements
involved in constructing a methodology for evaluating the military impact of air weapons transfers on the
combat potential of Middle Eastern states and on the regional military balance. Chapter 2 will review
some of the more salient techniques applied to the problem in the past, highlighting their advantages and
disadvantages. Chapter 3 will propose a structure within which to conduct the analysis and identify its
key elements. Chapter 4 outlines the data collection process, noting significant impediments and the
methods used to surmount them. The procedure employed to reduce relevant data to analytically man-
ttttttftftttttttttttt
Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Fmirates, Tunisia, the Yemen Arab Republic, and the Peoples' Dem-
ocratic Republic of Yemen. While not necessarily corresponding to a geopolitical definition of the




Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, pp. 484-488.
Kemp, Arms and Security. p4. For an alternative view directed to the Third World as a whole, sec
Elliot A. Cohen, 'Distant Battles'.
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ageable proportions is detailed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 proposes a technique for combining input data
into individual air weapon system and force aggregated combat mission outputs and displays selected
results. Chapter 7 exercises the methodology in generating partial answers to potential arms transfer poli-
cy related questions, and the final chapter identifies some conclusions regarding the methodology and its
potential application in assisting policy development. Throughout, the reader is cautioned to be sensitive
to the limitations of the system, as well as its capabilities. Like any analytical methodology, it can accu-
rately represent only a few of the more important attributes of the phenomena being investigated and does
not assume to '. . .mimic the real world exactly.
ttttttttttttttttttttt





Quantitative techniques have been employed extensively over the past 25 years to estimate the impact of
arms transfers on recipents' military capabilities and regional military stability. In different ways, they
have all been confronted by the same problems: the identification of significant variables, the collection of
reliable data, and the reduction of data to a common plane of comparison. Too often, the last problem
has been solved at the expense of the first and second. This section will review some of the tecliniques
employed historically and evaluate their adherence to the criteria outlined in the previous chapter.
2.2 Counting 'Dollars'
The most common medium of arms transfer analysis has been the comparison of the economic data
associated with the transfer, often in the context of regional and national defense expenditures. Mone-
tary value is certainly not irrelevant. The trigger which activates the Congressional review process is, after
all, a dollar amount. The two primary publications which catalog the international flow of arms, the
Arms Control And Disarmament Agency's World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers and the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's World Armament and Disarmament Yearbook, devote
much of their effort to establishing the valuation of individual and aggregated arms transfers. American
2debates concerning arms transfers are often predicated on package values, at least at the popular level."
Reducing arms transfers to a common dollar measure has considerable merit and historical prece-
dence, but its utility in the military analytical role envisaged here is limited. There is no doubt that dollar
measures capture some sense of the magnitude of a transfer or of the priorities of Third World states.
However, the singular use of economic values as the basis for military analysis has two drawbacks. First





Richelson et al, Arms Transfer Control Criteria, review several of the more notable dollar based arms
race models, pp. 16-47.
Of course, a disconcertingly large proportion of all American policy debates revolve around cost rather
than functional effectiveness.
Cordesman convincingly contends that dollar to manpower ratios, for instance, arc valid indicators of
the extent of force modernization and support infrastructure development in The Gulf and the Search
for Strategic Stability, p. 496. Another study, Ilildebrandt's Military Expenditure, Force Potential, and
Relative Military Power, employs an econometric methodology to translate military economic data into
comparative power outputs.
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opaque. If the contract price is used to value a transfer, intervening variables such as concessionary terms,
offsets, and co-production arrangements influence the product, calling into question its reliability as a
common frame of reference. The assignment of monetary amounts based on an estimate of the analo-
gous value of unit cost establishes a more level measurement plane. However, even this approach suffers
from a fatal flaw when applied to the assessment of military utility. There is simply insufficient correla-
tion between the economic value of arms packages (or expenditures) and their military utility. The allo-
cation of dollars among package elements varies greatly. Better than half of the dollar value of U.S. arms
transfers to Saudi Arabia has been dedicated to infrastructure development, while virtually all of the dollar
amount of transfers to Israel has purchased weapons themselves. Even if this hurdle is cleared, a more
basic problem remains. The most carefully sculpted dollar estimate provides no indication as to the mis-
7
sion adaptability, operational capability, or potential combat output of the system which the dollars buy.
The comparison of the economic value of arms transfers and military expenditures can legitimately detect
trends and relative priorities at the systemic, regional, and national levels; but it fails to capture the mili-
tary impact of weapons system transfers on national force structures and regional military balances.
2J Counting 'Beans'
One often applied solution to the inadequacies of dollar based measures has been the tallying of the
weapons they buy. Certainly, the tabulation of the numbers of weapons systems being transferred and the
inventories into which they are introduced is an essential element in any military analysis. But is it suffi-
cient? The weight of opinion suggests not. Weekly news magazines are replete with charts showing
stacked symbols of various categories of weapon system; so are the briefing screens of many Pentagon and
Congressional conference rooms. At one level of abstraction, categorical quantitative measures such as
these do depict general trends and gross patterns of arms transfer and force development. The condensa-
tion of discrete weapons systems into categorical totals makes for presentational simplicity and permits the
o
application of some statistical techniques against homongenized data sub-sets. However, for the type
military analysis required to assist arms transfer policy makers, they are inadequate. The estimation of
ttttttttttttttttttttt
Laurance and Mullen, 'Assessing and Analyzing International Arms Trade Data', pp. 13-21.
This technique is used by SIPRI in developing its arms flow figures.
Cordesman, Jordanian Arms and the Middle Eastern Balance, pp.30-31.
There is virtual unanimity among scholars investigating arms transfers on this point. See for instance.
Richelson et al, op.cit. p. 2; Baugh and Squires, Arms Transfers and the Onset of War, p.8; Letss et al,
Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries, pp.29-31; arid Sherwin and Laurance, Using Data in
Security Assistance Policy Making, pp. 80-82; among others.
See Leiss et al, op.cit.. pp.35- 116, for various examples of systemic analysis conducted at the weapons
category level. Also, Baugh and Squires, op.cit., pp. 8- 12; arid Lewis, 'Emerging Choices for the Sovi-
ets in Third World Arms Transfer Policy, pp.30-31.
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military utility (output) requires more finely grained data than is conveyed by the tabulation of the num-
bers of a category of weapons (input) which a nation possesses or will receive. Under most categorization
schemes, an F-5E and an F-15E would both be counted as supersonic aircraft. The failure to account for
the immense differences in capabilities between the two would cripple any serious attempt at guaging their
impact on national force posture and regional stability.
More frequently, military and policy analysts concentrate on the analysis of weapons-specific inven-
tories or transfer packages. Certainly more useful information is conveyed, but inventories alone provide
a precarious perch from which to spring to any refined analysis of potential military output. A general
impression of force posture can be estimated by considering the systems' respective roles and generations.
In a vacuum, a listing of weapons tells us little about prospective combat output and its implications for a
regional military balance. Phrased differently, reviewing inventories can determine if a force is being built
up or if acquisitions just reflect a replacement of existing weapons. It does not indicate the thrust of a
force's modernization or mission expansion. If the qualitative differentiation among weapons and their
mission adabtability to the particular employment environment is not considered, any resultant quantita-
tive analysis will fall woefully short of providing the policy maker with militarily relevant assessments on
which transfer decisions can be predicated. As one researcher notes, '. . . a mere enumeration of peace-
time inventories. . . does not constitute an analysis of military capabilities. The assessment of employa-
ble military force structure and realistic regional balances demands a more sophisticated measurement
technique, one that considers the combat relevant qualities of the systems, their effectiveness in an oper-
ating environment, and the level of support a user can provide. Not only do the capabilities of the major
systems themselves have to be considered, but also the contributions to potential combat effectiveness
made by key subcomponents (e.g., missiles, radars). The upgrade of system components can often have
nearly as profound an impact on the performance of a weapon as would its replacement.
Clearly, the estimation of the military impact of weapon systems transfers requires a more sensitive
and flexible technique. While the reduction of arms transfers to a common economic measure or their
consideration by category provide common ground for aggregate analysis, neither conveys the specificity
of militarily relevant information required to project potential combat output. Detailed inventory analysis
provides more granular information, but similarly lacks the performance related detail to permit all but the
most general and speculative of assessments. The inventory approach also suffers from the drawback of
not having a common base on which relative combat potential can be measured among national forces.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
Richelson et al cite the consideration of these four acquisition patterns as being essential to the deter-
mination of the a nation's force posture and its relevance to a regional military Balance; op.cit., p. 64.
Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 131. Similar comments can be found in Sherwin and I au-
rance, op.cit., pp. 82-83; Handel, 'Numbers Do Count', p.259; Lciss ct al, op.cit., pp.1 17-124; Snider,
Arabesque, p. 6; and others.
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Attacking these inadequacies, several researchers have developed alternative approaches which encompass
performance related attributes.
2.4 Factor Analysis
In the mid-1970's, various studies grasped upon factor analysis as a technique well suited to the task of
synthesizing performance characteristics into aggregate measures of weapon system capability. The earliest
of the applications aimed at isolating dichotomous dimensions of aircraft performance characteristics and
then extracting relative values or scores for each weapon on those dimensions. The dimensions were
assumed to represent categories of mission (e.g., offensive, defensive) the execution of which was closely
associated with the characteristics which contributed most significantly to their definition. Later studies
took a more refined approach and developed factor models in which multiple dimensions were extracted
and related not to mission but to system performance attributes (e.g., maneuverability) the relative values
of which could then be combined to represent outputs in given mission areas. No matter the orientation
of the effort , the factor analysis based studies demonstrated the capability to condense values for multiple
performance characteristics into commonly based indices which could be integrated into force level analy-
ses. In this regard, factor analysis deserves further attention.
2.4.1 Description
Factor analysis is recognized as a general scientific method for analyzing data. Originally devised by
Charles Spearman in 1904 as a method of simplifying the complex phenomena determining intellectual
ability, it has been refined and adapted over the years to explore patterns of relationships among data, to
determine the structure of data, to reduce and eliminate redundancy in data, and to define a functional
unity for the transformation of multiple variable values to a common scale. As an exploratory tool,
factor analysis uncovers underlying independent sources of statistical correlation among a body of input
variables. Applied to data sets in which the relationships are unknown or only suspected, it defines a
patterned statistical relationship attributed to an abstract underlying dimension. It falls to the researcher
to categorize the Junctional essence of this underlying order or to suggest uniform causality.
Without delving too deeply into the statistical operation of the factor analysis process, a brief discus-
sion of its characteristics will facilitate evaluation of factor analysis based studies. Two aspects of the
process will be touched upon here, extraction of factors and rotation to a terminal solution. A third, fac-
tor score production will be treated later. Factors, or underlying dimensions, mav be extracted bv several
ttttttttftttttttttttt
Recent literature is replete with exhaustive discussions of the application of factor analysis to social
and political science problems. The followinsj have been drawn on heavily in this capsule treatment:
R. J. Rummel. Applied Factor Analysis and Understandinu Factor Analysis', Dennis J. Palumbo,
Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science, Satn Cash Kacnigan, Multivariate Statistical Analysis -
A Conceptural Introduction and Jae-on Kim and Charles W. Nfueller, Introduction to Factor Analysis
and Factor Analysis
- 12-
methods, with principal components extraction the method used in all of the studies under evaluation.
Principal components analysis ingests a data file comprised of any number of variables and the values for
relevant cases on those variables. The factor procedure first isolates the combination of variables which
account for more of the total variance in the entire data set than any other combination of variables. This
first component, or factor, represents the most inclusive summary of the linear relationships among the
input data. A second component is then extracted which defines the second best variable combination
and which accounts for the proportion of the variance not captured by the first. Thus, the second com-
ponent or factor is orthogonal (i.e., at right angles) to the first. The process continues until sufficient fac-
tors have been extracted to account for the total variance in the data set. A 'loading' is generated for each
variable on each factor which measures the degree to which the variable is involved in the factor. In other
words, a variable loading represents the correlation coefficient between the variable and a given factor. By
comparing loadings for all factors and variables, the researcher can identify those variables most closely
associated statistically with a particular factor or multiple factors.
The initial factor solution is not unique, since other statistically equivalent combinations could well
define a different array of underlying dimensions. Rotation to a terminal solution overcomes this uncer-
tainly by mathmatically rotating the factor matrix to delineate distinct clusters of interrelated variables.
Two rotational methods are commonly employed. Orthogonal rotation maintains the right angle separa-
tion between the vectors which best fit distinct variable clusters. Oblique rotation does not require that
the factors be uncorrelated with each other and more precisely defines cluster boundaries.
2.4.2 Factor Analyzing Air Weapons Systems
2.4.2.1 Defining Factors
The earliest efforts to apply factor analysis to the evaluation of air weapons systems capabilities were
launched by Michael Mihalka, Lewis Snider, and Allan LeGrow. While each study had its unique
aspects, the similarities among them allow their discussion as a group. Mihalka and Snider hypothesized
that fighter aircraft would fall along two dimensions. Mihalka defined these as 'attack' and 'defense', Sni-
der as 'interception/air superiority' and 'tactical support ground attack'. Each selected variables (5 and 12
respectively) which he suspected would define one dimension or the other. True to form, the analysis
defined the expected dimensions. The results of Snider's inquiry, wliich considered 162 aircraft, are
depicted in Table 2.1, with some editorial changes.
tttttttttttttfttttttt
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Mihalka, Understanding Arms Accumulation; Snider, Arabesque; and I,eGrow, Measuring Aircraft
Capability for Military and Political Analysis
- 13-
Table 2.1: Factor Analysis Of Combat Aircraft Siucler
VARIABLE FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2
Production Year . 78 . 18
Primary Mission Speed . 93 . 13
Maximum Speed . 98 . 11
Service Ceiling . 88 . 00
Thrust . 88 . 20
Rate of Climb .86 -.02
Take-off Weight .21 . 74
Payload .22 . 76
Ferry Range -. 01 . 91
Combat Range . 10 . 91
Radius -Internal Fuel . 13 . 90
Radius -External Fuel -.07 . 86
Reviewing the factor loadings, the variables group around those factors which correlate to the most desir-
able capabilities for the respective missions, when Factor 1 is considered the air-to-air mission and Factor
2 the air-to-ground mission. However, an argument can be made that the selection of variables for analy-
sis turned the process into a self-fulfilling prophecy. In particular, regard Factor 2. Three of the variables
(combat range, and the two combat radius variables) tap essentially the same characteristic with only
minor variation. A similar situation exists between ordnance payload and maximum takeoff weight. Not
only does this mode of variable selection tell us little more than we knew about the weapons system mis-
sion adaptability coming in, the asymetrical representation of a functional attribute in this fashion can
severly distort the solution. More importantly, the gerrymandering of input variables produced some
suspicious relative factor scores on each dimension. Soviet SU-7's and SU-20's, which are single purpose
ground attack aircraft with relatively short legs and high top speed capabilities, scored most highly on the
air-to-air dimension, while the F-4E outpaced the F-14 on the same attribute. These results were artfully
rationalized, but the point remains that key mission-related performance variables were eliminated from
consideration not on the basis of functional merit, but because they did not correspond to a predeter-
mined typology.
LeGrow ascertained this deficiency and added variables to the data set which attempted to capture
the effect of weapons on mission capability (number of gun barrels, missile algorithm). He also eliminat-
ed the most redundant variables from the previous set and added ones with more aeronautical relevance
(thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading). Analyzing 29 aircraft, he extracted three factors, as shown in
Table 2.2.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
13 Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis, p. 21 1.
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Table 2.2: Factor Analysis Of Combat Aircraft - LeGrow





















































Reviewing the results, LeGrow noted that the presence of a third factor complicated interpretation and
that the elimination of redundant variables and the insertion of other combat relevant attributes produced
an overall matrix in which the distinctions were no longer as clearcut. For instance, thrust-to-weight ratio
loaded moderately on Factors 1 and 3, while several others (e.g. production year, wing loading, thrust)
loaded heavily on one variable and moderately on others. LeGrow postulated that the combination of
Factors 1 and 3 appeared to best represent air combat capability, with Factor 2 capturing air-to-ground
qualities. While the combination of scores on Factors 1 and 3 produced performance rankings which
were intuitively reliable, the scores generated for the second factor contained some serious anomalies. The
F-16, which has a significant ground attack capability, ranked below the F-5E on that factor, while the
F-14A, an interceptor, was exceeded only by the A-6E and the A-7D. To further test the procedure,
LeGrow considered only aircraft with an air-to-air mission and reduced the number of variables in a sec-
ond factor problem. Again, three factors emerged, but with different and functionally contradictory vari-
able loadings. Regarding LeGrow's results, the volatility of the factor analysis process becomes clear.
The alteration of variables or cases can produce drastically different dimensions, some of which are not
easily abstracted to higher order concepts such as mission output. As he also pointed out, the combina-
tion of multiple factors to produce a mission score is an arbitrary process if only factor analytic results are
considered,
ttttttttttttttttttttt
14 The author believes that LeGrow's third factor would have decomposed into two factors had he
considered a larger number of cases. One factor would have been defined largely by the weapons
related variables, the second by thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading (negative loading). Test runs
on a data base with 86 aircraft tended to confirm this estimate. Thrust-to-weight ratio is directly
related to maneuverability, and wing loading is related to it inversely from an aeronautical perspec-
tive.
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The Analytical Assessments Corporation's (AAC) study team, which included Lewis Snider, applied
a more sophisticated factor analytical methodology to the problem. Most importantly, they increased the
number and aeronautical relevance of the variables under analysis and defined factors which purported to
represent system attributes rather than combat mission outputs. The study aimed to use factor analysis to
determine dimensions of fighter capabilities which would be invariant' regardless of minor alterations in
variable selection, case compostion, or rotation technique. Initially, all aircraft were factor analyzed in a
single model. Explaining the at times unrealistic results produced some inventive but aeronauticaily spe-
cious formulations. The analytical problem was consequently segmented, with separate analyses con-
ducted for interceptors and air superiority fighters and for ground attack and close air support aircraft
respectively. Aircraft were treated both as 'launch platforms' (internal weapons only) and as full weapons
systems (external ordnance included). Delineating mission groupings prior to analysis averted many of the
interpretation problems and spurious results which confronted Snider and LeGrow. It also permitted the
independent analysis of multi-role fighters in each mission area. Furthermore, distinct analyses were
accomplished for air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, the results from which were integrated into the
overall air weapon system model. The result was a smorgasbord of analytical options.
One data set and model will be discussed here. It analyzes interceptors and air superiority fighters as
weapon systems with capability scores for air to air missile systems included. This analysis was selected
because it is the most sophisticated of variable combinations evaluated which also vividly illustrates the
pitfalls of attempting to stretch a technique past its limits. Fifteen variables observed for 69 interceptor
and air superiority fighters were analyzed, with five factors extracted. The names assigned these factors
and the variable loadings derived are depicted, with minor stylistic editing, in Table 2.3. Only loadings of
0.5 or higher are shown to highlight the factors.
Before discussing the results, some observations on the variables themselves are warranted. First,
year of production is intended as a surrogate representing relative technological sophistication or moder-
17
nity. While this contention is superficially pleasing, its underlying assumption is invalid. Consider, for
instance, three U.S. aircraft, all of which were flown for the first time within four months of each other in
1972. The F-15 is a leading-edge high technology fighter; the F-5E is a considerably less sophisticated
export aircraft; and the A-10A is a technologically austere ground support lighter. When aircraft have
different design and cost goals, knowing the year of production conveys little as to their relative techno-
ttttttttttttttttttttt
See the convoluted explanation as to why the F-14 scored lower than the F-5 as an interceptor air
supenority fighter as an example, pp. 123- 124.
In all 18 analyses were conducted at the air weapon system level, with six for missiles. Factor rota-
tion techniques were varied to control for systemic bias. These are presented in toto in Richelson et
al, op. cit., pp. 144-192.
17 The same variable was also used by Snider and LeGrow.
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logical sophistication. The materiality of the variable diminishes even more when generational compari-
sons are made between aircraft produced by different nations, whose own technological capacities are far
from even at the same point in time. Secondly, the variable 'Mission Potential' was constructed by mul-
tiplying the combat radius of an aircraft by its mission speed. Intended to illustrate the point that high
speeds can reduce combat endurance, the combinational form has no aeronautical precedent and ignores
the fact that mission speed is one of the factors, along with ordnance load and flight profile, which is
involved in the determination of combat radius in the first place. Third, the 'missile guidance' variable
was derived from a separate factor problem in which the attribute was described by two dichotomous
variables, 'infra-red guided' and 'semi-active radar homing guided', which were assigned nominal valua-
tions (0 or 1). Logically, these varied inversely for any given case, defining a factor with high (.98) posi-
tive and negative loadings. In the factor scoring process, which will be described below, the dichotomous
loadings cancelled each other out producing 'missile guidance scores' which were predicated on the values
for all variables except the guidance value.
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Glancing at Table 2.3, the effects of these variable selection anomalies can be seen. Mission potential
loaded significantly on the energy and endurance factors, a predictable situation since the variable was
created by multiplying combat radius times combat speed. Otherwise, the results arc largely non-
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contentious, showing predictable statistical affinities among variables. The missile and gun variables
define factors representing the air-to-air missile suite and gun armament respectively. Wing loading shows
1
8
a negative relationship to the maneuverability factor, as it should. However, wing loading also has an
even higher positive loading on the energy/technology factor, an observation requiring clarification. While
the resultant variable groupings could have been postulated intuitively, the addition of the statistical
dimension offers the opportunity to create multi-variable indices which reflect the relative capability of
each aircraft on each combat related attribute.
2.4.2.2 Extracting Factor Scores.
The key utility of factor analysis in this context is its ability to generate scores for each case on the
underlying dimension or factor. Unfortunately, its promise fades when it is employed in tlus role at the
air weapon system level. The scoring process entails two salient features. The absolute values of all vari-
ables in the set weighted proportionately to their involvement (positively or negatively) in the factor are
considered in the solution and are summed to yeild the factor score for a case. The operative assumption
is that each factor is a linear combination of the case values for every variable in the problem set. Thus, a
variable which is largely unrelated statistically (and perhaps not at all functionally) to a factor has a defi-
nable impact on the score. Secondly, the absolute values for the variables are converted to standardized
scores with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one before the scores are rendered. Consequently,
some scores are negative values even when all variables load positively on the factor; and all scores are
measured on an interval scale.
From a technical perspective, the factor score coefficient matrix (F) is derived from the rotated pat-
tern matrix (A) according to the formula:
F = (ATA) _1AT
Score coefficients are consistent with the weight and direction of the factor loadings. Variables with high
factor loadings receive higher score coefficients relative to their loadings within the confines of the entire
problem set. Weaker loadings produce coefficients which tend toward zero, and negative loadings generate
negative coefficients. A factor score (f) is then developed for each case by summing the products of the
factor score coefficients (F) of all variables in the factor problem and the standardized values of each case
(z) on those variables. In equation form, the factor score for a case (fi) in a three variable factor problem
would calculated bv the equation:
ttttttttttttttttrtttt
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In earlier tables which did not include the missile variables, wing loading loaded positively on the
factor asserted to represent maneuverability, a questionable relationship aeronautical!) - .
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If the alternative regression method of extracting score coefficients is used, tests indicate variables
with the weakest positive loadings will also be awarded negatively signed score coefficients.
This description and equations are adapted from the examples offered in Nie et al Statistical Package










The problems stemming from the first characteristic can be deduced from a review of the data in
Table 2.4, which is an unblanked version of Table 2.3.






































































































Looking at the factor which allegedly captures air-to-air missile capability, the missile performance vari-
ables load positively. However, all-weather capability has a moderate negative loading, as does thrust-to-
weight ratio. Thus, the score for a missile mounted on an technologically superior aircraft would be less
than the score derived for the same missile mounted on an inferior platform. This scoring quirk is partic-
ularly nettlesome when one considers that all radar guided missiles are dependent on an air-intercept radar
(an attribute of an all-weather system) for their guidance. A similar relationship prevails for gun effec-
tiveness, the score for which would be diminished by the value of an aircraft's all-weather capability,
combat ceiling, missile launch envelope and others. Scores for the maneuverability attribute would be
diminished as a result of a later production year (modern technology surrogate) while being enhanced by




If the weak negative loadings for two other energy/technology variables, production year and rate of
climb, are considered, the situation deteriorates further.
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Observations of this type could be made indefinitely. The essential point is that factor scoring con-
ducted at the weapon system level forces the inclusion of functionally irrelevant data in the computation
of values for discrete attributes. A defense of this characteristic has been advanced which contends that it
22
captures the tradeoffs which must be made between some attributes in aircraft design. While this con-
tention might seem logical in a very narrow sense (e.g., maneuverability or speed being reduced to permit
greater payload in a similar generation of aircraft), it ignores the advances which permit simultaneous
improvements in multiple attributes. More poignantly, it is largely invalid when applied across subsys-
tems, many of which are aircraft non-specific and which are developed independently of each other. Most
U.S. aircraft can carry a version of the AIM-9 and are fitted with an M61A1 cannon. The two subsys-
tems are technologically unrelated, and any scoring system which diminishes the value of one because of
23
the presence of the other is flawed.
The flaw in the 'vertical' (i.e., intra-factor) scoring process has a horizontal analog. The AAC study
and others compute total system capability as an unweighted linear combination of factor scores denomi-
nated by the number of factors involved. Consequently, the value which describes the capability of the
aerial gun has the same relative weight in the computation for air-to-air effectiveness as does energy or
maneuverability. Not only is this supposition counterintuitive, it is roundly contested by the results of an
aircrew survey that established that an aerial gun has a relative utility of .067 in an air superiority role and
.043 in an interception role. An unweighted linear computation of factor scores overrepresents the role
of the gun by more than 200%. The combined influence of these two scoring traits produces relative val-
ues at the air weapon system level which obscure more than they illuminate.
2.4.2.3 Using Factor Scores.
The mathmatical process by which factor scores are measured presents another, although far less intimi-
dating, problem. Because factor scores are computed on a standardized scale, some have negative values.
While these values accurately portray the distance between cases and can be used in direct comparisons of
cases on a given factor, they are not conducive to further combination. Earlier researchers attacked the
problem by adding a constant to the set of scores which raised the lowest negative score to a desired
threshold (e.g., 0.1 or 1). LeGrow demonstrated that the use of a constant in this fashion preserved the





See Snider, op.cit., p. 55, for one such assertion.
A statistical consideration concerning subsystems is also relevant. Since the input variable values for
any aiven subsystem would be entered multiple tunes reflecting their fitting to several aircraft, they
would constitute what Rummel terms an 'a priori' factor, detracting from the patterned variation
essential to the derivation of meaningful factor groupings.
Supporting survey results, seven percent of the Israeli air kills over Lebanon in 1982 were aclucved
by gun shots. See, Lambeth, Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War, pp. 10-11; and
Cams, 'Military Lessons of the 1982 Israel Syria Conflict', p.268.
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valid ratio relationship existed in the fust place was incorrect, the observation that the addition of a func-
tionally irrelevant constant created a pseudo-ratio relationship of arbitrary significance stands.
The AAC study took a more elaborate approach to raising negative values above zero by applying
the expression for calculating a T-score (10*Z+50) to the raw factor score but acknowledged that the
transformed scores still lacked true ratio properties. Consequently, the ratio of capabilities between two
systems could only be inferred. Some examples were offered which asserted that meaningful comparisons
between alternate weapon systems packages could still be made as long as the limitations of the data were
recognized.
2.4.2.4 Factor Analysis Summary.
Factor analysis constitutes a powerful tool for reducing large bodies of data to statistically valid composite
indices. Applied to the evaluation of combat aircraft, it produces results which do not always embody a
commensurate degree of operational validity. As demonstrated above, comprehensive variable selection is
crucial, and factor results can prove erroneous if the variables considered do not represent the bulk of a
system's aeronautically and operationally relevant attributes, to include those of its subsystems. Addi-
tionally, factor results are sensitive to relatively minor variations in variable and case composition, so their
ability to define 'invariant' dimensions for fighter performance over differing spatial and temporal domains
is suspect. The extrapolation of the raw factor analysis output to operationally pertinent composite indi-
ces is crippled by three characteristics when applied at the system level. Functionally irrelevant informa-
tion is included in generating factor scores. The combination of scores for multiple factors into a com-
posite is arbitrary and often produces illogical results. Finally, the composite indices created from factor
outputs are interval level measures which lack the mathmatical properties to permit their aggregation at
the force level.
2.4.3 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
To overcome several of these deficiencies and to account for intangibles such as operator proficiency and
support capability, LeGrow explored three alternate techniques for creating composite indices of fighter
capabilities: paired comparisons, successive intervals method, and multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT).
After experimenting with each, he concluded that MAUT was the '. . .only technique comprehensive
enough to deal with capability as more than just a combination of performance characteristics.' Follow-
ing his lead, Lowell Jacoby applied MAUT to an assessment of ship sea denial capabilities. The fact
ttttttttttttttttttttt
25 See Richelson et al, op.cit., pp. 218-220 for a discussion of methods of dealing with the level ol
measurement problem. While this author has no quarrel with their methodology, he takes exception
to their contention that interval nature of factor scores is the 'most serious drawback' to their use at
the systems level.
See LeGrow, op.cit., pp. 119-137 and Jacobv, Quantitative Assessment of Third World Sea Denial
Capabilities, pp.58- 154. The discussion of MAUT here is taken from these two publications and
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that MAUT permits the consideration of multiple variables, produces ratio measurement scales, and
involves expert judgment in defining combinational rules marks it as having significant promise in the
analysis of air weapon system capabilities.
2.4.3.1 Description.
MAUT is a general approach for combining the utility values of multiple attributes into a single measure-
ment of utility under a specified set of circumstances. A panel of experts is requested to develop a scale
for each variable which reflects the relative utility of the variable's absolute values in a given scenario.
Through this process, the absolute values of multiple variables are transformed to a common measure-
ment scale (utils). Each util scale runs from to 1. As the first step in the development of the utility
function curve, judges are requested to identify the absolute value at which the variable under considera-
tion has no utility and the absolute value at which its utility in the postulated scenario peaks. These
absolute values anchor the opposite ends of the utility function curve. Judges are then requested to match
successive increments of change in a variable's absolute value above the lower anchor point to corre-
sponding increases in utility up to the maximum useful value which is assigned a utility score of 1. A
utility curve is constructed by connecting these discrete points. Through this procedure, a 'natural' zero
point is established, and the utility scores are assumed to have ratio properties. The absolute value for
each variable is converted to a util value by imposing it on the respective utility function curve. Their
values now transformed to commonly based ratio measures, the variables can be combined to define the
relative value of multi-variable attributes and multi-attribute systems.
The combinational rules which govern aggregation at the attribute and system levels are also the
product of expert judgments as to the relative importance (weight) of the attribute's or system's compo-
nents. The technique assumes that the experts will make rational choices in developing utility scales and
identifying combinational weights, seeking to maximize expected gains and minimize expected losses at
each step in the process. Effective application of the technique is dependent on a clear statement oi the
inquiry's purpose and operative scenario, the selection of variables which capture the pertinent aspects of
the phenomena under investigation, the expertise of the judges, and their access to sufficient information
concerning the variables, attributes, and systems which they are evaluating.
2.4.3.2 Application
To test the theory, LeGrow devised a scenario to score fighter aircraft in a Middle Eastern air superiority
engagement. lie identified three relevant components and the variables which defined them. These are
shown in Table 2.5.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
from critiques contained in Richelson et al, op.cit., pp. 88-101, and Sherwin and Laurance, op.cit.,
pp. 95-101J.
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A two judge panel devised utility function curves for each variable and specified weightings for each within
its component. A sample utility curve for maximum speed is shown in Figure 2.
1
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Regarding this curve, an application question arises. While there is no doubt that speeds in excess of
Mach 1.8 are of diminished utility in air superiority engagements, would an aircraft with the technical
potential to exceed Mach 1.8 then be assigned a lower utility score derived from the downward sloping
end of the curve? From the scoring tables in the Appendix, it appears that this was the case. If so, the
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score extraction ignores the fact that an aircraft which has a maximum speed capability of Mach 2.5 can
also usually operate at Mach 1.8. The same problem also appears to affect the extraction of utility scores
for the range value. One other problem area emerged in reviewing LeGrow's individual utility curves.
The utility function for national technical capacity was developed with a list of countries along the y-axis
which were then assigned utility values. With no absolute measures of technical proficiency to govern the
assignment of utility values, the utility function curve was defined by intervals between the countries
arrayed at the bottom. The approach appears to be a misapplication of the utility concept, since the
cost-benefit rationale which is supposed to govern curve development is abrogated. In a broader perspec-
tive, MAUT does not appear adaptable to the analysis of problem sets which include nominally or ordi-
nally measured variables.
These observations aside, LeGrow combined the extracted utility values in accordance with the
intervariable weightings assigned by the judges and then multiplied the platform and payload sub-totals to
generate a final weapon system score independent of country. The aircraft and their utility values are
depicted in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Fighter Utility Scores - Air Superiority










Unfortunately, utility scores show some of the same vagaries that plagued factor scores. The utility value
for the MiG-19 identifies it as more capable than all fighters except the latest U.S. fighters and the Mirage
IIIC and almost 50 percent more capable than the F-4E. The F-4E sits lowest in the group, a ranking
not merited by its weapons suite or combat avionics. Three factors seem to have forced these unsuitable
results: insufficiently comprehensive variable selection, the above noted scoring idiosyncracy. and using a
multiplicative combinational technique at the system level.
While Jacoby's study considered sea denial ships rather than aircraft, a partial review of his findings
illuminates some other features of the mult-attribute utility technique. Proceeding from LeGrow's
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exploratory effort, Jacoby launched a full-fledged MALT inquiry. Most significantly, he employed mul-
tiple independent judges to enscribe the initial utility function curves rather than tasking two judges to
develop consensus curves. The profound differences of opinion among 1 1 judges concerning one variable,
range at maximum sustained speed, are exhibited in Figure 2.2. Similarly fragmented results were
obtained for virtually every variable (15) in the problem set 27
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This significant and largely unpatterned variation in responses presented an interpretation and appli-
cation challenge and illustrates one of the drawbacks of employing MALT in this type of investigation.
Jacoby tested two methods for condensing multiple utility assessments. Just one will be discussed to
illustrate the problem. One alternative is to mathmatically synthesize a single utility function curve from
28
the curves described by the judges. He found tlus technique to be fraught with mathmatical complexity
and prone to error. For illustrative purposes, the composite utility function curve derived from the curves




Jacoby also considered the same variables under two different employment scenarios, causing each
judge to create as many as 30 utility function curves.
The other method is to score each case on each of the initial utilitv curves, sum the results, and
determine an average utility score. This is the method finally used by Jacoby. I ike many of the
MALT-related procedures, this solution is extremely time and manpower intensive when regarding a
large number of systems and employment scenarios.
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Given the range of disparate opinion, the measurment validity of the composite curve is suspect.
Perhaps more significantly, the wide range of responses reveals the daunting intellectual challenge con-
fronting a panel of experts in determining precise value/utility matchups in a multi-faceted inquiry of this
type. Each judge is required to make what amount to hundreds of discrete judgments which are consis-
29
tent within the variable being scored and across the family of variables. Individual judgments arc also
predicated on the respondant's access to sufficient data concerning the variable and his interpretation of
the scenario under which it is scored. Differing scenario interpretations probably contributed to much of
the variance, even though Jacoby took great pains to detail the operating environment. The entire
MAUT-based sea denial study constitutes a significant contribution to the field of military analysis and
should be reviewed in toto by those considering application of the teclinique. However, for the purposes
of this inquiry, it discussion will terminate here with the identification of those attributes relevant to the
inquiry at hand.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
29 As a rcspondant to two MALT surveys, the author has first-hand experience with the the difficulty
of maintaining even meager consistency. The effort is so energy and time consuming that the poten-
tial for obtaining a broad^sample of rigorously derived judgments is slim.
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2.4.3.3 Multi-Attribute Utility Technique Summary
The most rewarding asset of applying MAUT to the analysis weapon systems' combat capability is that it
incorporates informed expert judgment in all phases of the assessment process, an essential attribute of
any reliable methodology. In particular, it offers an attractive solution to the combinational dilemma
identified by LeGrow in aggregating individual factor scores. Additionally, it produces ratio level values
measured from a common base which can be inserted in subsequent force level capability calculations.
Conversely, MAUT suffers from a number of conceptual and structural liabilities. It does not legitimately
scale nominally measured variables. Its implementation is cumbersome and prone to random judgmental
influences which are well nigh impossible to isolate. Available methods for synthesizing disparate judg-
ments are unsatisfying. While not a liability per se, MAUT's results are largely determined by the selec-
tion of input variables and the validity of the data which describes them, a trait it shares with virtually
every other approach. Multi-attribute utility technique resolves several of the more pronounced deficien-
cies identified in other quantitative methodologies but introduces some of its own.
2.4.4 TASCFORM Force Modernization Model
The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC) developed a third quantitative methodology which incorpo-
rates the performance characteristics of air weapons systems into combat relevant capabilities indices
which can be evaluated on their own or aggregated into force level assessments. The air weapons assess-
ment model, TASCFORM : -AIR, is a subset of a family of analytical models which address the subject
of general purpose force modernization. The original models were developed in support of the Office of
Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and have subsequently been applied to specific
research questions in support of it and other government agencies. The TASCFORM methodology is
not a statistical technique as such. However, it incorporates many of the same attributes addressed by the
methodologies discussed above while maintaining the flexibility to consider meaningful attributes which
are not amenable to interval or ratio level measurement. Consequently, its array of variables more com-
prehensively defines the combat relevant attributes of an air weapon system than earlier efforts. It com-
binational philosophy is predicated on mission specific expert judgment and can be expanded to account
for the effect of difficult to quantify factors such as operator proficiency, maintenance and logistic support,
and command, control, communications and intelligence (C I) support.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
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See, for instance, Congressional Budget Office, Tactical Combat Forces of the United States Air
Force, pp. 31-50; and Assessment of Egyptian'Middle Fast Tactical Aviation Modernization (Classi-
fied). A detailed description of the TASCFORM-AIR methodology is contained in Vogt, The
TASCFORM Methodology: A 'Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization, pp. 2-1 to
2-55. TASCFORM is a trademark of The Analytic Sciences Corporation.
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2.4.4.1 Description
The TASCFORM process follows a hierarchical path. A basic airframe system figure of merit is com-
puted considering the values for four attributes (payload, range, maneuverability, speed) indexed to the
value for a baseline system (the F-4B), weighted according to expert assigned values, and summed for
each mission category. In all, three mission areas (air combat, surface attack, anti-submarine warfare)
encompassing 13 distinct employment roles are evaluated for 112 fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Basic
airframe scores are then modified through a series of calculations which account for the contribution of
subsystems (target acquistion, navigation) and associated attributes (countermeasurcs susceptibility, sur-
vivability) to mission performance. A final weapon system step adjusts performance indices to account
for the systems' relative obsolence and sortie rate production potential. Finally, force level projections can
be accomplished by allocating candidate inventories across mission areas and multiplying them by the
corresponding performance indices. If desired, the resultant force level measures of merit can be further
modified to account for the effect of intangibles such as C I, relative aircrew proficiency and the like in
producing a final Equivalent Force Performance measure of merit. In all, TASCFORM-AIR represents a
comprehensive, powerful, and operationally sensitive technique for quantitatively assessing the qualitative
aspects of force modernization. While designed initially to address the US/Soviet force balance, it is
equally applicable to assessments of the force structure and military balance aspects of arms transfer policy
support.
2.4.4.2 Application
The full TASCFORM computational skein is too extensive to unravel in this overview. Just a few of its
features will be highlighted to set the stage for further methodological development. As noted earlier, the
initial calculation is anchored at the airframe level and considers payload, range, maneuverability, and
useful air speed indexed to the corresponding value for the F-4B. A single variable is designated to repre-
sent each attribute. For instance, maneuverability is pegged to the indexed value for specific excess power
(P ). Herein lies the first deficiency in the approach. The selection of a single variable might well discard
relevant information concerning an attribute which encompasses two or more dimensions. To use the
manueverability example, P accounts only for energy maneuverability (acceleration), so the factor of lat-
eral maneuverability (rate or radius of turn) is lost. Indexed values are modified by avionics and weapon
system attributes to reflect their 'tactical impact' on basic airframe performance. The concept is solid, but
execution is less precise than need be in two areas. Target acquisition capability is divided into four cat-
egories (clear day, clear night, limited all-weather, good all-weather) winch are assigned subjective values
(1.0, 1.0, 1.2, 2.0). This approach prohibits measurement of the very significant capability differences
which obtain among target acquisition systems within these categories. For instance, the F-4E's
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AN/APQ-120 radar and the AN/APG-70 being developed for the F-15E would receive equivalent scores;
but there is no doubt that the actual performance capabilities of the two systems vary considerably. A
similar situation prevails in the air-to-air missile category where differentiation is only made between gui-
dance type and engagement mode (visual range or beyond visual range). Again, the combat relevant dif-
ferences between missiles such as the all-aspect infra-red guided AIM-9L and the rear hemisphere only
AA-8 are not captured. Similar observations could be made concerning the survivability and sortie rate
attributes.
2.4.4.3 TASCFORM Summary
TASCFORM-AIR establishes an indisputably superior framework for the aggregation of combat relevant
attributes into mission specific outputs. It incorporates expert judgment into a clearcut, flexible, and
transparent combinational process and permits the consideration of important but intangible variables. As
opposed to the other analytical models, it addresses the critical role target acquisition systems play in
modern air warfare as well as permitting adjustments for employment related factors. On the debit side of
the ledger, TASCFORM fails to make sufficiently granular assessments of the differences between specific
subsystems in some cases. In the same vein, its reliance on single variables to describe primary system
attributes sacrifices a measure of descriptive and operationally relevant information, perhaps unneccessari-
ly. The negative aspect of this last feature might be partially offset by the implementational flexibility it
offers.
2.5 Methodologies Summary
Regarding the sampling of military analysis methodologies which might be used to assist arms transfer
decision making, it is obvious that the dollar valuation and inventory approaches are inadequate on their
own to generate sufficiently informative assessments of the impact of an arms transfer on a nation's force
posture in a vacuum or in a regional context. They simply do not measure or aggregate information reli-
ably linked to combat capabilities.
Factor analysis is capable of aggregating many of the essential elements but is volatile and unreliable
when applied at the weapon system level. The forced inclusion of irrelevant data in producing specific
attribute indices is factor analysis' greatest weakness, followed by its inability to process nominal data
without output distortion. Additionally, a pure factor solution provides no operationally legitimate
rationale for combining values for multiple attributes into a single system index, and the values themselves
lack the ratio properties required for force level aggregation.
Multi-attribute utility theory's greatest strength is its inclusion of expert judgment in all phases of the
evaluation, providing a particularly effective scheme for combining values for multiple variables and attri-
->(
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butcs into a single measure of effectivess under a given scenario. However, it does not legitimately
accommodate nominally described variables, and its administration is prohibitively cumbersome when
applied to a subject with more than a handful of attributes and scenarios.
The TASCFORM methodology is functionally comprehensive, situationally flexible, and operation-
ally transparent and makes effective use of expert judgment. Variable input is unconstrained by measure-
ment scales, and system output is well suited to modification and higher order aggregation. Its most pro-
nounced drawback is a proclivity to over-simplify input data, masking significant performance differences
within generic categories.
In essence, no one methodology provides a holistic solution to the problem of incorporating qualita-
tive information into quantitative military assessments. The common thread which connects them is a
requirement for comprehensive mission relevant variable selection and thorough data collection and prep-
aration. Since the application of any aggregation technique will succeed or fail on the basis of these fun-
damental operations, variable selection and data collection will be addressed in the next two chapters.
Subsequently, data reduction and aggregation techniques which capitalize on the strengths of the afore-




3.1 Structuring the Problem
3.1.1 Defining Components
Before individual measurement variables are considered, it is prudent to structure the research question
more elaborately, identifying key components and their subcomponents. The importance of this step
cannot be understated since even, "a highly sophisticated statistical analysis can rarely if ever compensate
for a poorly conceived project or a poorly constructed data collection instrument.'' The problem at hand
is to develop a measurement technique which assesses the impact of air weapons system acquisition on
the air combat potential of Middle Eastern air forces. To structure or opcrationalize the problem, at least
two major components must be meshed:
• The performance potential of pertinent air weapon systems (aircraft plus specific subsystems) in
definable employment categories (air weapon system combat potential).
• The numbers of possessed air weapon systems a national air force could be reasonably expected to
employ in identifiable classes of combat operations at given points in time (force propagation
potential).
A crucial challenge is the identification of attributes and supporting variables which most compre-
hensively but efficiently capture essential combat related capabilities. The two main analytical branches
described above must be supported by a network of functional subcomponents. In defining these second
level focal points, an insensitivity to the texture of the subject and the operative rclationsliips between its
parts can be debilitating. The omission of elemental attributes can undermine a model's relevance as was
noted in the previous chapter. Consequently, variables must be selected with a keen eye toward the tech-
nical complexities of the phenomena they seek to describe. As one research guide admonishes, 'good,
2
basic knowledge' of the subject area is a mandatory prerequisite.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
See Blalock, Social Statistics, p. 7.
2 Manheim and Rich,Empirical Political Analysis, p. 235.
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3J .2 Air Weapon Systems Subcomponents and Attributes
With this injunction in mind, the air weapon system subcomponents displayed at the second level in Fig-
ure 3. 1 are offered as an intermediate framework to guide the evolution of this inquiry. The listed sub-
components are believed to define the predominant non-human elements which comprise an air weapon
system. Looking to the left side of the second row in Figure 3.1, the first subcomponent is concerned
with the combat potential inherent in the airframe itself. The term airframe will refer in this study to a
basic aircraft, less avionics, target acquisition, and weapons systems. The next subcomponent addresses
target acquisition and combat-significant avionics systems, while the third is comprised of aerial weapons.
Defining the last two subcomponents distinct from the airframe provides an added bonus. Since few tar-
get acquistion systems and even fewer weapons are airframe unique, their segregation at this juncture
allows the construction of individuallly tailored air weapon systems configurations during the computation
process. The function of the fourth subcomponent is not self-evident. With airframes and their subsys-
tems treated separately, a mechanism is required to meld the potential represented by the subcomponents
into a specific weapon system employed in a particular combat role. This relational task is the province
of the last of the air weapon system's subcomponents.
At the next rung down the analytical ladder, a basic step is the identifcation of those attributes which
define the relative performance potential of a weapon system subcomponent. Several air combat oriented
publications and studies suggest a variety of candidates. The most operationally relevant of these were
flagged as key subcomponent performance attributes.
Airframe. A USAF Tactical Air Command Fighter Weapons' School manual pinpointed two
attributes essential to airframe performance: speed and maneuverability. Gunston and Spick's
Modern Air Combat suggested a third: combat persistence or endurance. The fourth, vulnerability
to engagement, was derived from discrete concepts found within these two documents and the
TASC study. 5
Target Acquisition and Avionics Systems. Isolating attributes for this subcomponent is made some-
what nebulous by the variety and different purposes of the systems involved. However, two generic
attributes appear common: the performance capacity of the system measured on whatever scale is
germane and the system's vulnerability to degradation or incapacitation.
ttttftttttttttttttttt
This structure draws heavily on ideas outlined in The Analytic Sciences Corporation s
TASCFORM-AIR model and on notes pertaining to the calculation of'measures of air combat merit
prepared by operations analysts at Northrop Corporation's Aircraft Division.
For the purposes of this study, avionics will be limited to navigation systems, fire control computers,
and head-up displays. The aerial weapons category includes guns, air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground
ordnance.
See USAF Fighter Weapons School, Basic Aerodynamics, pp.3-20 to 3-22; Gunston and Spick. Mod-
ern Air Combat, pp. 186- 193; and The Analvtic Sciences Corporation, The TASCFORM Methodology,
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Figure 3.1: An Analytical Typology: Air Weapon System Component
Aerial Weapons. Again, the disparate natures of the systems results in the designation of generic
attributes which are a bit vague but which capture the essential combat qualities of a weapon: its
lethality and its effectiveness in overcoming countermeasures.
Relational Factors. This subcomponent encompasses two attributes. First, subsystems need to be
related in time and space. Second, they must be related in terms of their proportional contribution
to mission output. These two attributes are referred to as configuration and relative utility respec-
tively.
3.1.3 Force Propagation Subcomponents and Attributes
The assembly of a family of attributes which credibly define the boundaries to realization of combat
potential for each nation over time is a daunting task. Authoritative military and academic literature
leaves no doubt that a nation's ability to support and operate combat weapons systems is a critical deter-
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minant of military effectiveness. Former Israeli Air Force Chief of Staff Ezer Weizman emphatically
stated that these largely human factors, '. . .will decide the fate of war, of all wars. Not the Mirage or any
other plane. . .' While this point might be somewhat overstated, there is no arguing with its essence.
Unfortunately, the individual and national variables which define such attributes as leadership, technical
acuity, planning insight, and operator proficiency are virtually impervious to operationalization in the
aggregate. Heroic attempts have been made to isolate the variables associated with national support
potential and operator proficiency. However, a thorough review of the suggested methodologies sub-
stantiated that they involved collection of information concerning variables which would greatly exceed
the resources of this research effort (e.g., aircrew training and continuation flying hours) or surrogate vari-
ables whose relationships to the attributes they were stipulated to represent were tenuous.
As an additional consideration, the measurement techniques suggested by most researchers who have
attacked this problem focus on those variables which might conceivably capture some portion of a
nation's 'microcompetance' to operate and employ weapons systems. No systematic measure of the
equally important attribute of the 'macrocompetance' required to organize and employ the weapons is
available. A review of three decades of Israeli air victories in the Middle East suggests that the latter is
just as important as the former. For these reasons, the effort to derive national measures of merit for
operator proficiency or employment effectiveness was deferred to other researchers. Indeed, it is probable
that regional experts can subjectively factor in these considerations with greater validity and efficiency than
can be generated by a fixed computational scheme.
As a result of this determination, the evaluation of employment factors in this study is limited to
those factors which inscribe an outer boundary on a nation's capability to generate its combat forces.
With this caveat, the analytical typology dealing with force propagation is displayed in Figure 3.2. Obvi-
ously, the inventory of air weapon systems possessed by a force is a necessary point of departure. This
gross total must be further elaborated by a term which reflects their likely allocation to given combat
roles. To complete the picture, some measure of a nation's cumulative potential to emplov the opera-
tttttttttttttTttttttt
Excellent discussions of realistic constraints imposed by operational and support capabilities can be
found in Pascal et al, Men and Arms in the Middle East; de Leon, The Peacetime Evalutalion of the
Pilot Skill Factor in Air- to-Air Combat; Kemp, Arms and Security; and DuPuy, 'Measuring Combat
Effectiveness'; among others.
Quoted in Lambeth, Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War, p.31. Ironically, Israel has
consistently pressed for the subsidized acquisition of the most advanced American systems and ener-
getically contested the Arab acquisition of the same or lesser capabilities.
8
9
See, for instance, Benjamin Lambeth's comments in 'Pitfalls in Fighter Force Planning', p. 16.
See in particular Pascal et al. op.cit., Timperlake and Lcvecn, A Methodologyfor Estimating Compara-
tive Aircrew Proficiency, and Leveen and Vogt, A Methodology for Assessing GrcU oundcrew Proficiency
This is an adaptation of the injunction credited to Alain Einthoven, 'The point is to render unto
computers the things that are computers and to judgment the things that are judgments.' Quoted in
USGAO, Models, Data, and War, p.73.
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tionally available inventory in the combat roles to which they have been allocated must be derived. The
ability to generate assets is the product of three attributes: the proportion of the force available for combat
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Figure 3.2: An Analytical Typology: Force Propagation Component
Regarding Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 together, the attributes identified at the third level of the hier-
archical structure represent the basic blocks with which a force level combat assessment can be built. As
such, they constitute a map to guide the search for potential capability measurement variables. The
numbers of variables describing a particular attribute might be as few as one or as many as ten or more.
Their selection is a function of the nature of the attribute, the relevant observations which pertain to it,
and the availability of descriptive data.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
The abbreviation 'Mx' is used as a shorthand term to describe maintenance.
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3.2 Variable Selection Guidelines
Even within these structured confines, the plethora of candidate variables far outstrips processing or intel-
lectual resources. Consequently, the explanatory power of possibly pertinent variables has to be screened
finely to extract the minimum number which explain the maximum significant variance in air weapon
12
system and national performance potential. The number of variables linked to an attribute should not
be so harshly pruned that comprehensive evaluation becomes illusory. On the other hand, redundant
variables which capture the same essential facet of an attribute need to be eliminated to avoid analytical
distortion. The more definitive the scale on which a variable is measured, the more precise are the results
which can be obtained from its analysis. Consequently, ratio or interval scaled variables are preferrable to
those valued on nominal or ordinal scales. However, ratio or interval level measures are not always
applicable to or available for key variables. While nominally described variables are not fully amenable to
some statistical processes, they should be included in the analysis if no legitimate alternative exists. Cap-
turing the effect of relevant attributes is more critical than adulterating the substance of the problem to
accommodate sophisticated statistical techniques.
A final temptation to be eschewed is the substitution of accessible 'surrogates' for qualities which are
not directly observable or or easily quantifiable. The use of surrogates is not in itself an unsound practice:
but each surrogate must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny before inclusion. The incorporation of surro-
gate variables which are only minimally or coincidentally related to the qualities they are designated to
represent cannot help but distort the resulting analysis from a substantive standpoint, often lethally.
In the same vein, the creation of composite or index variables stipulated to stand in for a more com-
plex and mathmatically indescribable characteristic must be treated cautiously. Indices frequently convey
meaningful performance related information unobtainable through any single component measure. In the
realm of aircraft, thrust-to-weight ratio, wing loading, and wing aspect ratio are all widely recognized as
legitimate indicators of energy maneuverability, turning capability, and relative lift respectively. However,
indices are legitimate only when their components have a functional impact on the characteristic being
represented and their combinational mode reflects an engineering or operational reality. A poorly chosen
surrogate or an invalidly constructed composite variable not only can miss the mark, it can lead the anal-
ysis astray.




This principle is often referred to as 'parsimony' and is commonly acclaimed as one of the key attri-
butes of any higher-order research effort. See, for instance, Manheim and Rich, op.cit., p. 353.
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• A list of candidate variable supporting the analytical structure described above should provide
broadest practicable explanation of the sources of variance implicit to each attribute.
• Variable lists should be culled to the rninirnum required to explain combat relevant variance, elimi-
nating redundant measures.
• Comprehensive attribute representation should overrule concerns for parsimony.
• Variables should be selected which represent the highest level measurement of the attribute being
portrayed but should not be eliminated if only measurable at a lower level.
• Surrogate variables should be used only as a last resort, and composite variables only when func-
tional or operational precedents had been established.
3.2.1 Variable Selection Process
3.2.1.1 Air Weapon Systems
A list of candidate system variables was compiled in 'shopping list' fashion, relying on attributes fea-
tured in publications such as Jane's All the World's Aircraft, USAF Fighter Weapons School's Basic Aer-
odynamics, and Modern Air Combat. Other variables were gleaned from periodicals such as Aviation
Week and Space Technology and Air Force Magazine. Finally, variables considered in other military
13
analyses were appended to the list if not previously included. As a final test of inclusiveness, the vari-
able list was submitted to a panel of three fighter pilots and one intelligence expert for review, and their
revisions incorporated.
The initial 300 variable list was exhaustive but unweildly and inappropriate for further action without
aggressive winnowing. It is immediately evident that collecting data on this number of variables is over-
whelming, even in the unlikely circumstance that the requisite data were available in unclassified sources.
Some categories of of variables had to be simplified to permit concentration on the most salient combat
related attributes. Avionics systems with important combat performance implications are treated generi-
cally as nominally scored single variables. For instance, the variable 'NAVCAT' cites navigation system
type, and the presence of head-up displays and integrated fire control systems is captured in nominal vari-
ables. The profusion of air to ground weapons systems and the multiplicity of associated characteristics
1 A
make them a particularly unweildly variable group. Nonetheless, categorical variables are retained to
indicate an aircraft's precision guided munitions capability and type, partially accounting for advanced
weapons capacity. Finally, the question of assessing air weapon ground support requirements tlirough
13 • •
For instance, LeGrow offers a thorough discussion of some performance variables and the dimen-
sions they capture, while TASCFORM's charts and equations irive a good overview of the attributes
and their inter-relationships. See also Cordesman, Jordanian Arms and The Gulf and the Search for
Security
It is reassuring to note that The Analytic Science Corporation arrived at the same conclusion con-
cerning air to ground weapons in their quite exhaustive study.
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14
analysis of a family of maintenance variables was deferred. Instead, the single variable, Man- Maintenance
Hours Per F;lying Hour (MMII/FH), recommended by Epstein as the best single indicator of support
complexity, was introduced 15
3.2.1.2 Airframes
Application of the above considerations reduces the number of variables to be considered to man-
ageable proportions. In addition, the structure was modified slightly to facilitate automated manipulation
and statistical processing. The initial complement of variables intended to portray the attributes of an
airframe itself is displayed in Table 3.1 The variables annotated with asterisks (*) are measured on a nom-
inal scale. Definitions of the variables follow the table. A complete file description is in Appendix A.

























FL360 Specific Energy At












The name and variant of the aircraft.
Defines the aircraft system type (e.g., fighter-interceptor, bomber-ground attack). Not to
be confused with nationally determined employment codes which are associated with the
inventory subcomponent.




Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 19.
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, release Ten (SPSSX) was used for the creation of
data files and all statistical and computational processing. A micro-computer based set of files and
procedures is currently under development.
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Wing Surface.
Total wing surface area, not considering tip mounted stores.
Wing Aspect Ratio.
Describes the planform shape of a wing, a factor which affects the wing's lift coefficient.
Combat Weight.
A weight calculation which defines the likely gross weight of an aircraft when engaged in
combat (as opposed to maximum takeoff weight).
Empty Weight.
The weight of an aircraft fully equipped less fuel and stores.
Maximum Weight.
The maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft fully fueled and loaded with stores.
Internal Fuel. The internal fuel capacity of an aircraft measured by weight.
Wing Loading.
The ratio of combat gross weight to wing surface area. Indicates the relative turning per-
formance of an aircraft, with an inverse relationship between the two.
Fuel Fraction.
Compares the internal fuel weight of an aircraft to its combat gross weight as an indicator
of combat persistence.
Combat G Limit.
The maximum centrifugal force, expressed in terms of acceleration of gravity, an aircraft is
designed to withstand in maneuvering combat.
Maximum Thrust.
The maximum 'wet' (with afterburner) thrust which an aircraft's powerplant can generate
at sea level.
Variable Wing.
Notes the presence of a variable geometry or 'swing' wing.
Variable Camber.
Notes the presence of devices such as leading edge slats or maneuvering flaps which
change the camber of wings in flight, thereby improving turning performance.
Thrust-to-Weight Ratio
Compares the combat gross weight of an aircraft to its installed thrust as an indicator of
its ability to accelerate and sustain turn rates.
Maximum Airspeed FL360.
Measures maximum airspeed in a high altitude profile. This altitude (36,000 feet) was
selected as it represents the high end of a likely combat envelope under most scenarios.
Maximum Airspeed SL.
Measures maximum airspeed at sea level. Sea level was selected as representative of the
low end of the combat envelope, at which aircraft might well have significantly different
speed capability than at higher altitudes, thus giving a better perspective of useful speed'.
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Specific Energy Alt.
A measurement of the total mechanical energy (kinetic plus potential) of an aircraft at its
maximum air speed and service ceiling.
Specific Energy SE.
As above, except measured at sea level.
Stall Speed. Speed at which the aircraft's drag exceeds its aerodynamic lift in level flight.
Rate of Turn. The maximum instantaneous level turn performance an aircraft can achieve at sea level in
clean configuration.
Specific Excess Power.
Measures an aircraft's ability to change its energy state by accelerating. Calculated at a
particular condition of flight (10,000 ft, Mach .9, level flight in this instance).
Service Ceiling.
Altitude above which aircraft is incapable of further acceleration.
Intercept Radius.
Maximum radius at which a normally air-to-air mission configured aircraft can conduct a
sub-sonic area intercept mission.
Attack Radius.
Maximum radius at which a normally air-to-ground mission configured aircraft flying a
hi-lo-lo-hi profile can attack a target.
Combat Range.
Maximum range at which an aircraft can conduct its primary combat mission.
Maximum Ordnance.
Maximum weight of air-to-ground ordnance which the aircraft can carry.
Weapons Stations.
Number of weapons stations available for air-to-ground ordnance.
Internal Guns.
Number of guns mounted internally to the aircraft.
Gun Rounds. Number of rounds of ammunition normally carried for the internal gun(s).
3.2.1.3 Target Acquisition Systems
The next data set is comprised of performance variables associated with target acquisition attributes.
While it consists of variables measured on both ratio and nominal scales, only the ratio level variables are
candidates for statistical manipulation. It is displayed in Table 3.2, with nominally measured variables
annotated (*).
Name. Most frequently, the alpha-numeric designator assigned to the system. In the case of U.S.
systems, the leading 'AN' portion of the designator has been dropped. For those systems
for which the designator is not published in open sources, such as the SU-27 Flanker, a
descriptive entry (i.e., 'FLANRAD') is used.
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Table 3.2: Target Acquisition System Variables
Name Code
Output Power Coverage







Doppler Beam Sharpening* ECCM Capability""
Code. A four letter descriptor of system type. The first two letters describe the system's generic
category (e.g., 'RA' for radar, 'LA' for laser) and the second two address its primary
employment role (e.g., 'AI' for air-intercept, 'GA' for ground-attack).
Output Power.
Actual or equivalent power emitted by system.
Coverage. Angular lateral coverage provided by the system, akin to the field of view.
Range- High Target.
Maximum range at which a fighter-sized target operating at the same or higher altitude
could be detected.
Range-Low Target.
Maximum range at which a fighter sized target operating at lower altitude could be
detected.
Data Points. The number of relevant information points (such as range, bearing, altitude, airspeed) the
system generates concerning the target.
Track While Scan.
Ability to continue to scan for potential threats while tracking the highest tlireat target(s).
CW Illumination.
Ability to provide the continuous wave target illumination required to guide semi-active
radar homing air to air missiles.
Ground Mapping.
Ability to provide radar display of ground environment with sufficient resolution to iden-
tify geographic or cultural features.
Doppler Beam Sharpening.
Ability to increase resolution of ground map display so that targets or wayppoints can be
easily identified.
ECCM Capabilitv.
Indicator of system's relative resistance to electronic counter measures through features
such as side-lobe suppression or frequency agility.
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3.2.1.4 Air-to-Air Missiles
The next variable set, outlined in Table 3.3, is comprised of variables associated with air-to-air mis-
siles. As with target acquisition systems, this table lists variables measured on both ratio and nominal
scales. Nominally scaled variables are not being considered for statistical processing, although they will
eventually be involved in combat potential computations.
Table 3.3: Air to Air Missile Variables
Missile Diameter Missile Length
Missile Weight Terminal Guidance Mode
Maximum Range-Head On Minimum Range-Head On
Effective Range-Head On Maximum Range-Tail
Minimum Range-Tail Effective Range-Tail












Gross weight of the missile.
Terminal Guidance Mode.
Method (semi active radar homing, infrared, active radar homing, command guided, etc.)
by which missile is guided during its terminal phase.
Maximum Range-Head On.
Maximum range against a target which is converging with the launch platform from the
forward hemisphere.
Minimum Range-Head On.
Range from the launch platform within which the missile is ineffective against a target
approaching from the forward hemisphere.
Effective Range-Head On.
Range envelope within which the missile is effective against a target approaching from the
forward hemisphere.
Maximum Range-Tail.
Maximum range against a receding target.
Minimum Range-Tail.




Range envelope within which the missile is effective against a receding target.
Warhead Weight.
Weight of missile warhead.
Fuzing Options.
The number of fuzing methods available.
Maximum Speed.
Maximum missile speed to burnout.
G Limit. The maximum centrifugal force, expressed in terms gravitational acceleration, the missile
can accept; an indicator of maneuverability.
ECM Susceptibility.
A relative measure of the missile guidance system's susceptibility to defeat by electronic
combat measures such as flares, chaff, or jamming.
Guidance Score.
An indicator of relative guidance system accurancy.
Acquisition Mode.
Indicates if guidance system is capable of locking-on to a target beyond visual range.
3.2.1.5 Aerial Guns
The final weapon system table, Table 3.4, lists key variables associated with aerial gun systems. All
of the variables are measured at the ratio level.
Table 3.4: Aerial Gun Variables
Calibre Maximum Effective Range
Dispersion Muzzle Velocity-
Rate of Fire
Calibre. Calibre of gun
Maximum Effective Range.
Maximum range at which projectile maintains sufficient velocity to remain effective.
Dispersion. A measure of relative accuracy which reflects dispersion of rounds around a mean point
of impact.
Muzzle Velocity.
Projectile velocity as it exits the gun.
Rate of Fire. Maximum number of rounds which the gun can fire in a minute.
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3.2.1.6 Relational Variables
Aircraft Configuration. This set of variables mates the airframe with its subsystems (target acquisition and
weapons). In addition, it contains those combat-related performance variables which are not suited to
statistical manipulation but which still need to be considered in calculating air combat potential. For ease
of manipulation, these are assembled in the configuration file shown in Table 3.5. As was the case previ-
ously, variables are defined following the table. Variables involved in mission potential computations are
annotated (*), and a formal file description is located in Appendix A.




Navigation Category* Radar Warning Receiver"




Head Up Display" Stability Augmentation-
Radar Guided AAM Number Radar AAM*
Infrared Guided AAM Number Infrared AAM-
Gun System , PGM Capable-
Release Point Computer*" Maintenance Hours Per Flying Hour-
Production Country
Crew Members.
Number of aircrew members normally assigned.
Air Refueling Capable.
Indicates if aircraft is capable of aerial refueling.
Navigation Category.
Identifies most sophisticated category of navigation system fitted to the aircraft.
Radar Warning Receiver.
Indicates presence of an electronic warfare threat receiver (detector).
Passive ECM.
Indicates capability to dispense non-intrusive electronic combat expendables such as flares
or chaff.
Active ECM. Indicates equippage with internal or external radar jamming or deception systems.
Radar System.
Identifies the target acquisition radar (air intercept, air-to-ground, or multi-mode) installed
in the aircraft.
Other Target Acquisition.
Identifies additional target acquisition systems (infra-red search track, laser, forward-
looking infrared) installed in or on the aircraft.
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Head Up Display.
Identifies the presence of a system which displays operational and combat related data on
a combining glass at eye level.
Stability Augmentation.
Measures to increase platform stability during air-to-ground weapon delivery.
Radar Guided A AM.
Identifies the radar guided air-to-air missile normally carried on the aircraft.
Number Radar AAM.
The number of radar guided AAMs normally carried.
Infrared Guided AAM.
Identifies the infrared guided AAM normally carried by the aircraft.
Number Infrared AAM.
The number of infrared AAMs normally carried by the aircraft.
Gun System. Identifies the aerial gun normally mounted internally.
PGM Capable.
Indicates aircraft potential to deliver precision guided air-to-ground munitions.
Release Point Computer.
Indicates presence of a computer which provides a CCIP/CCRP type solution for release
of bombs.
Production Country.
A code which describes the initial country of production for the air weapon system. The
singular exception are a few indicators which credit a host country such as Israel with
making such drastic modifications to the aircraft that it is drastically different from its
antecedant.
Maintenance Hours Per Flying Hour.
An estimate of the man-maintenance hours required to support one flying hour by a par-
ticular system.
Relative Utility. The problem of identifying variables which relate system and subsystem attributes to
mission output potential presents a thorny challenge. No definitive methodology entirely congruous with
the objectives of this project could be identified, although the TASCFORM model embodies many
applicable concepts. Applying TASC's concepts in conjunction with advice from air operations experts,
those junctures were isolated at which key combat related attributes were joined, building from the sub-
component to the full air weapon system level. For example, if an airframe possesses attributes categor-
ized as speed, maneuverability, and endurance, these would interact in varying proportions to contribute
to combat success in particular missions. At a higher level, the summed attributes of the airframe would
interact with the summed attributes of the the target acquisition system and payload in proportions the
values of which would be differentiated by mission. Employing this 'building block' approach, the list of
variables shown in Table 3.6 designates the juncture points. The values for each variable represent the
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relative utility of a given attribute at a given juncture. To eliminate redundancy, each entry actually rep-
resents four variables, one for each of the projected combat roles: air defense, air superiority, interdiction,17-
and close air support. The breaks in the table represent the progression of 'blocks' building to full air
18
weapon system potential.
Table 3.6: Relative Utility Value Variables
Airframe Component
Airspeed Utility Maneuverability Utility
Combat Endurance Utility
Payload Component
Infrared AAM Utility Radar AAM Utility
Gun Utility Unguided Ordnance Utility
Guided Ordnance Utility
Target Acquisition Component
Visual System Utility Radar System Utility
Secondary System Utility
Engagement Vulnerability Component
Airspeed Utility Maneuverability Utility
ECM Utility Signature Utility
Air Weapon System
Airframe Utility Acquisition System Utility
Payload Utility
3.2.2 Force Propagation Variables
Two alternative variable definition strategies were considered for assembling inventory data. Much of the
arms transfer literature concentrates on describing and evaluating the flow of weapons and associated
capabilities. While this approach has its merits, evaluating the combat potential which results from the
transfers involves the broader task of fixing those capabilities in the context of a national and regional
force structure. Additionally, the task of assembling a unfied body of reliable data on the flow of arms is
fraught with uncertainty. The potential for gleaning accurate data on major systems once they have been
introduced into an inventory is more promising than attempting to capture them in the pipeline'.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
17 -The formal description for this file is not presented in Appendix A, since the file is actually composed
of 76 discrete variables cryptically identified. The presentation in Table 3.6 should convey sulticent
18
information to grasp its content adequately.
The 'Vulnerability Component' constitutes a factor which depreciates the combat potential of the
entire air weapon system. As such, the relative values for its subcomponents need to be identified,
but it has by definition a relative utility of unity.
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3.2.2.1 Inventory
Consequently, an inventory approach was selected. To preserve the capability to track combat potential
back to the arms transfer source, the country of production variable in the system data sets could be
employed. An additional consideration is the identification of the likely employment of a weapons system
by a given country. Consequently, a variable stipulating employment code is necessary. Table 3.7 lists
the inventory related variables on which data would be collected. While the formal inventory file,
described in Appendix. A, includes information at the weapon system level only, a separate listing of sub-
systems available to a given country was prepared off-line for entry as variable values in the system con-
figuration file.







A two letter code, corresponding to DoD standard usage, which identifies the country
possessing the weapon system.
Weapon System Name.
The name of the air weapon system. Identical to aircraft name.
Employment Code.
An alpha-numeric code which identifies the likely combat role of the unit to which an air
weapon system is assigned (e.g., 'FGA' for fighter-ground attack, 'FMR' for fighter-multi-
role).
Weapon System Inventory.
The number of a particular aircraft possessed by a country in a given year.
Operationally Available Rate.
The estimated fraction of possessed aircraft which would be available for operational
employment.
3.2.2.2 Employment
As noted earlier, this study will limit its employment purview to those quantifiable attributes which imp-
inge directly on a national air force's capability to generate a multiple (sortie rate) of the combat potential
embodied in its individual weapon systems. Joshua Epstein convincingly demonstrated the viability ol'
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this concept in evaluating the Soviet air threat to Europe. Epstein contends that by weighing the amount
of maintenance required by an inventory of aircraft against the amount of maintenance available, the ana-
19
lyst can set a sortie generation boundary. While Epstein acknowledges the important roles personnel
quality, doctrine, and organization play in determining actual rates within an outer sortie generation
boundary, he asserts that calculating the boundary at least defines the 'worst case' even when all the other
variables are assumed to be equal. Operationalizing the problem requires that the researcher collect data
which describes the maintenance requirement imposed by each aircraft, the maintenance resources avail-
able to the national air force, and the employment scenarios in which the force will be employed.
To inject a greater differentiation and realism into the problem, additional qualitative variables will be
considered on an experimental basis. One study by The Analytic Sciences Corporation concluded that the
quality of ground support is the product of the motivation and technical acuity of the servicing ground-
crews. The technical acuity dimension is measured by assessing relative educational levels and the effects
of exposure to technical systems like automobiles and telephones. These measurements are modified by a
term which estimates the range of the population to which the average technical value would apply and
accounts for the influence of foreign advisors. Motivation is purportedly captured by scaling nations on a
psychologically oriented matrix which assesses relative adherence to the 'active mastery' theme inherent in
21
the 'Protestant Ethic'. While this approach might well be valid, the underlying psychological principles
and assignment criteria are too speculative to be applied here. Consequently, variables suggesting motiva-
22
tion were drawn from two other studies which addressed an analogous subject. These include the
number of armed forces per thousand, military expenditures per capita, and military expenditures per
GNP. The latter two variables also provide some indication of the relative investment in support
resources being made by the country concerned. The resulting employment variable set is depicted in
Table 3.8. Only the top two quantitative variables will be included in the baseline methodology. The
remainding qualitative variables will be employed for experimental purposes only and are by no means
definitive.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
19 Another study focused on Europe contends that, in the European environment at least, the availabil-
ity of pilots might be an even more potent predictor of sortie generation boundaries. See Alberts.
Deterrence in the 1980's: Part II, The Rule of Conventional Air Power, p. 32. Tliis limitation will
apply even more stringently in most Third World countries. Unfortunately,^ its consideration was
deferred because of the predictable lack of aircrew information at the unclassified level. However, it




Discussions with Northrop Corporation analysts revealed that thev include estimates of sortie dura-
tion by mission type, the length of the flying day, and the length of the maintenance day in their sor-
tie generation computation. While the methodology they employ is considerably more sophisticated
than the one contemplated here and is anchored at the weapon system rather than force level, their
approach is generally consistent with Epstein's.
See Leveen and Vogt, A Methodology for Assessing Groundcrew Proficiency, pp. 2-1 to 2-34.
See Timperlake and Leveen, A Methodology for Estimating Comparative Aircrew Proficiency, p.3- 11;
and Pascal et al, op.cit., p. 38.
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Percentage Eligible in Secondary School
Armed Forces Per Thousand
Military Expenditures Per Capita
Military Expenditures Per GNP
Military Expenditures Per Government Expenditures
3.3 Summary
This section has outlined a methodological structure which will be employed to channel the collection of
data relevant to the assessment of the combat potential of Middle Eastern air forces as a function of their
acquisition of air weapon systems. The overall problem was decomposed into two components: one
which addresses the combat potential inherent in the systems themselves and a second which considers the
force propagation potential of the operating nation. Each component is further segmented into a hier-
archy of subcomponents, attributes, and the variables which describe them. The structure created in this






Since the goal of this study is to evolve a workable methodology rather than to provide universally appli-
cable substantive solutions, it was necessary from the outset to draw some boundaries for data collection
and analytical focus. The regional boundary (Middle East) has already been drawn, but some additional
limitations need to be imposed. Though the definition of these boundaries restricts the playing field
somewhat, the essentials of the game are preserved.
4.1.1 Temporal.
Only those combat aircraft employed in the region during the last decade or which might reasonably be
introduced into it during the next will be considered. This temporal limit might appear to conflict with
the injunction laid down by other researchers to construct evaluation schemes valid over time, with data
bases looking back to World War II vintage aircraft. Historical merit aside, such a broad approach seems
unduly effusive in a scheme geared primarily to forward looking evaluation.
4.1.2 Functional.
A further limitation is to concentrate on those aircraft involved in primary combat roles. Consequently,
systems such as the E3A/AWACS, E2C/lIawkeye, reconnaissance platforms, and airborne tankers are not
included, although they support combat operations. Similarly, aircraft whose sole function is aircrew pri-
mary training are not included, but those advanced or conversion trainers which could be easily shifted to
a combat role are. Einally, rotary-wing combatants are not addressed in this initial study, although they
promise to play an increasingly significant role in Mideast combat. These restrictions on systems consid-
eration limit the field somewhat severely and regrettably exclude some important support aspects of com-
bat potential estimation. Nonetheless, the inclusion of over 120 combat aircraft makes it a representative
and viable data set.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
Some reconnaissance and training versions of combatant aircraft were included in the initial data h.-i^e
compilation and analysis phases and are displayed in the orders of battle. However, no combat poten-
tial scores were computed for them.
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4. 1 .3 Informational.
A final note on limitations is intended primarily for U.S. Government users. The data included in the
various study data bases are taken strictly from open source, unclassified materials. As a result, individual
data values might be at odds with those reflected in classified documents. Additionally, the author was, at
times, required to rely on an estimative process to arrive at data values he recognizes are specified more
precisely in authoritative classified data bases. This limitation was imposed for two reasons. Large-scale
automated statistical processing could not be conducted in a classified environment at the research institu-
tion. Also, a classified product would not be widely available for the critical review and comment of aca-
demic researchers. The unclassified data, although less precise, satisfactorily describe key variances, and
the penalty paid in accuracy by using them will be outweighed by the value of critical comments from the
academic community.
4.2 Some Collection Principles.
4.2.1 Leveling the Field.
The research and intelligence communities are often captivated by the illusion that there is somewhere a
number which reflects 'truth' with a capital 'T'. In reviewing the many publications and articles offering
information on weapon system characteristics and inventories, one is struck by a multiplicity of contend-
ing 'truths'. There is a profusion of data on many variables, but a substantial portion is contradictory and
of undefined derivation. The producer claims the ground attack radius of an F-20A is 550NM, while
other sources list it as 455NM and 595NM respectively. One very well informed author alternatively
notes the AN/APG-66A (now termed AN/APG-68) radar has a maximum target acquisition range against
a low altitude target of 47NM in one book and 38NM in another. Defense related literature is replete
with such examples. In the absence of a definitive classified source, what rule of thumb can be applied to
discriminating among competing 'truths'?
4.2.1.1 Conflicting Evidence
Along with simple error, deviations in data values appear to proceed primarily from two sources. Per-
formance characteristics are observed under a variety of conditions. Factors such as weapons load, mis-
sion profiles, estimates of combat duration and loiter time all contribute to the measurement of a variable
like ground attack radius. Even seemingly straightforward characteristics (e.g., combat weight, thrust-to-
2
weight ratio, wing loading) can be calculated from different but oiten unspecified bases. Except in classi-
fied technical publications, it is rare that these conditions are cited. Even when they are, the conditions
tttttttttttttttt+tttt
2 Analogous considerations apply to other types of data observations as well. I
counted upon initiation (SIPR I) or upon consummation (ACDA)?
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s an arms transfer
are invariably unique to a particular case or to a small family of cases. Consequently, it is virtually
impossible to identify values for a variable down an entire list of cases which were similarly observed.
The second source of deviation stems from the difference between design goals and realized operational
performance. With newer systems especially, the lack of an established performance history appears to
leave the field open to 'best case' analysis and some measure of speculation.
4.2.1.2 Resolving Contradictions
There is no neat method for unravelling the resultant web of uncertainty, but its grasp can be loosened if
the collector recognizes the sources of variation and attempts to level the playing field. In this study, no
one source was viewed as 'gospel'. Values for a system or inventory variable were collected from several
sources, along with information on measurement criteria when presented. When values conflicted, meas-
urement conditions were examined if available or estimated if not. The value was selected which most
closely approximated the weapons and fuel loads and operational settings deemed likely in regional com-
bat. Even when data did not conflict, observation conditions were reviewed or estimated to assess their
correspondance to the regional employment environment. If deviations appeared substantial, values were
adjusted accordingly. Once the basic data had been sifted, mathmatically derived values for variables such
as combat weight, wing aspect ratio, thrust-to-weight ratio, fuel fraction, and wing loading were recom-
puted using the formulae described below. This procedure generated a set of data bases in which the
sources of deviation had been minimized and in which the biases, if any, were at least consistent.
4.2.2 Filling Gaps
4.2.2.1 All the Numbers
Missing data are the bane of the quantitative researcher. Missing data adulterate statistical results and cast
suspicion on final values computed for each case. As Joshua Epstein notes, the researcher has two
options when confronted with missing data.
First, one can stop, throw in the towel, and regress to bean counting. Or, one can pro-
ceed like a rational animal: by fighting off the conditioned response that perfect measure-
ments are necessary to make a reasoned judgment on bounds; by drawing the most intel-
ligent inferences one can from the data that are available; and by varying one's
assumptions so that the consequences of irreducible uncertainty may be gauged.
These principles were, of necessity, applied liberally in the research at hand.
After initial data collection and review, missing data dominated some variable columns and affected
all. Across the spectrum of variables and cases, missing data represented over 20% of the observations,
with higher concentrations in certain key variables and sets of cases. Some of the variables for which
ttttttftttttttttttttt
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There is a horizontal dimension to this dilemma as well. Have the values for unique but related vari-
able for the same system been measured under the same circumstances?
Epstein, Measuring Military Power, pp. 145- 146.
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more than 50% of the data were missing were dropped in the belief that their explanatory power was neg-
ligible or was captured just as well or better by other variables (e.g., combat range, stall speed). However,
there were no suitable sustitutes for the explanatory power represented by others such as specific excess
power, instantaneous rate of turn, and combat radii. From a case perspective, data were most often
missing for Soviet and some European produced aircraft, a variety of target acquisition systems, and
countries with Soviet dominated inventories. Whether missing data represented a major portion of the
observations on a variable or were limited to just a few, the task was the same - to fill in the blanks
through 'intelligent inference'.
4.2.2.2 Analogous Comparison
The inferential process moved through three phases in ascending order of complexity and descending
order of certitude. First, cases with missing data were reviewed to suggest analogous cases for which data
on a given variable might be available. This procedure was particularly fruitful in filling in gaps in obser-
vations on individual models of a family' of aircraft. For instance, if the service ceiling for the MiG-23B
were cited in an authoritative source, but none were listed for the MIG-23E, the value for the MiG-23B
was assumed to apply to both models. In a slightly broader extension, a 'signature' characteristic of a
generation of equipment from the same producer was assigned to cases missing that value. For example,
aircraft fielded by Dassault- Breguet during the 1970's on which Combat 'G' Limit data were available all
showed the same value (7.33). That value was extended to aircraft from the same producer on which
definitive information was not available.
4.2.2.3 Regression Analysis.
The relatively innocuous analogical process was successful in reducing the body of missing data consider-
ably, but some troublesome although scattered gaps in key variable observations remained, notably those
pertaining to combat radii and maximum speeds. A statistical inferential tool, regression analysis, was
employed to fill these gaps, with the results modified by expert judgment. Pearson correlation coefficients
were inspected to identify variables pairs which displayed strong statistical affinity. Those pairs which did
not also intersect functionally (statistical artifacts) were discarded. The remainder were plotted to deter-
mine the statistical significance of their relationship and to ascertain if the relationship were distorted by
extreme values (outliers). In the penultimate step, the variable pairs were subjected to regression analysis
to define the predictive potential of one to the value of the other and to derive suitable prediction equa-
tions. Finally, the regression equations were employed to predict dependent values for all cases, and the
t+tttttttttttttttttrt
There is always a danger of overlooking a differentiating factor, however. F-15A/B's had a 'G' Limit
of 7.33, but sensor changes in the C/D model permitted an increase in the placard limit to 9.0.
Some tests were also conducted using two, three, and four predictor variables in multiple regression
equations. This technique is arguably more powerful than the variable pair approach and bears further
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results were compared to those cases with known values on the dependent variable to judge the equation's
efficacy.
To illustrate the process, the value for sub-sonic area intercept was missing for 21 fighters. One pos-
sible variable from which the unknowns could be predicted was ground attack radius. In those cases in
2
which values for both variables were known, they showed a positive correlation (r) of 0.88037 and an R""
of 0.77505, suggesting good explanatory potential. A scattergram reinforced the picture of a strong posi-
tive correlation not unduly influenced by extreme or outlying cases and indicated the variables would dis-
play a siginifcant positive relationship in all but one of 10,000 cases (F = .0000). A regression problem
with air intercept radius as the criterion (dependent) variable and ground attack radius as the predictor
(independent) variable was formulated. The results are depicted in Table 4.
1
Table 4.1: Predicting Air Intercept Radius
Ground Attack Radius as a Predictor
Multiple R .88037 F =75.80131
R Square . 77505 Signif F = . 0000
Adjusted R Square . 76483
Standard Error 54. 67714
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B BETA T SIG T
Ground Atk Rad .78994 .09073 .88037 8.706 .0000
(Constant) 232.49856 39.61341 5.869 .0000
A solution for the unknown value can be derived by substituting the known value and data from the
regression equation into the equation for a straight line: a = by + k, where (in this case):
a = Air intercept radius
b = Slope of the regression line
y = Value for ground attack radius
k = Value of the constant (intercept point)
The result of the computation is a predicted value for air intercept radius which, on the average, should
fall within plus or minus 55NM (the standard error) of the actual value. When the equation was applied
to all cases, and predicted compared to known values, predicted and actual values correlated closely in the
middle of the data set, with error as little two nautical miles. However, the observed error increased




in excess of 120NM off. The average error was 16%, and the direction of error was almost equally dis-
tributed between high (52%) and low (48%) predictions. In light of these observations, the predicted
values for the 21 unobserved cases were scrutinized individually and modified or estimated by another
method if distortion were suspected. This cautionary note notwithstanding, the regression technique,
when tempered with expert judgment, proved a most productive and reliable tool for filling data gaps. In
all, over 30 repression equations were developed and employed, closing all but the most persistent voids in
the data sets.
4.2.2.4 Estimative Analysis.
Analogy and regression work well as gap fillers when values are missing for a limited number of cases and
are not disproportionately concentrated on a particular variable or class of cases. Unfortunately, data on
several weapons performance variables, two employment related variables, and one class of inventory
variable were almost universally unavailable through open data sources. Careful estimation of values
appeared to be the only practicable solution. Estimation in this context does not suggest an arbitrary
assignment of values simply to provide grist for subsequent evaluations. To the contrary, care was taken
to involve ouside experts and other researchers' techniques in bringing the values as close into line with
assumed reality as possible. By definition, the estimation process incorporates a margin of error. Its
methods are not rigorously scientific, nor are its results exact. The fact that the element of uncertainty
may be transmuted into substantive results does not invalidate the overall assessment technique. In fact,
the ultimate combat potential computations are designed in such a manner as to permit the painless
replacement of estimated data with actual (or better estimated) values if and when they become available.
Those variables or classes of cases for which the bulk of the values were estimated are clearly identified in
the following section along with notes on the estimative techniques employed.
4.2.2.5 Expert Review.
In the final analysis, there is no substitute for informed judgment. So, the final data bases were submitted
for review to two senior fighter pilots (airframes, configuration, air-to-air missiles, and guns), an experi-
enced weapons system operator (target acquisition systems), and a regional intelligence officer (invento-
ries). While their reviews were necessarily cursory, they did identify a number of values winch they knew
to be in error or suspected to be out of tolerances. Additionally, all variables were analyzed using univar-
iate statistical techniques to flag values which appeared out of character for the data set. Suspect values
were double checked and replaced if warranted. This process brought the data bases to the level of com-
pleteness required by an investigation of this type while also purging them of random and systematic
error.
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4.3 Sources and Methods
4.3.1 General Comments.
The data collection process is, regretably, not nearly as cleanly systematic as the resulting well ordered
data bases might suggest, nor are the results necessarily definitive. It is incumbent on the researcher to
make the collection process as transparent as practicable so that the user can arrive at his or her own
conclusions concerning the information's validity. With this precept in mind, the following paragraphs
highlight the primary sources used in compiling the research data bases, identify equations used to calcu-
late derivative values, and provide explanatory notes on the techniques used to estimate values for vari-
ables which were largely unobserved. Compiling values for many of the variables was relatively fortliright
and non-controversial, and the associated explanations self-evident to the vast majority of readers. These
will not be addressed individually. Nor will each case in which analogous examples or regression pre-
dictions were employed to fill discrete data gaps be discussed. Rather, attention will be focused on those
variables and classes of cases considered noteworthy or potentially contentious.
The following subsections are ordered in consonance with the variable grouping scheme outlined in
Chapter 3. Primary data sources and mitigating factors are discussed in a lead-in paragraph, followed by
specific comments on the derivation of values for those variables which might provoke some question.
The full data sets are reproduced in Appendices B through D. All were compiled using SPSSX coding
conventions, so some of the descriptive information is relatively cryptic. Full variable names, measure-
ment units, and value descriptions are provided in the formal file description documents in Appendix A.
4.3.2 Airframe Performance Data.
4.3.2.1 Sources
Airframe performance data were culled from numerous publications. Various editions of Jane's All The
World's Aircraft constituted the primary source, closely followed by Gunston and Spick's Modern Air
Combat. Other specialized publications such as Cordesman's Jordanian Arms and the Mideast Military
Balance and The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, and the Department of Defense's Soviet Mil-
itary Power were also invaluable. A number of periodicals proved fertile sources, particularly on later
model systems. The most prominent of these were Aviation Week and Space Technology, Interavia,
Armed Forces Journal International, and Air Force Magazine. Last but not least, some information was
obtained directly from American, British, and French aircraft producers' literature and informally from
numerous of the author's acquaintances who had direct experience with particular systems.
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4.3.2.2 Comments
The general principles which were applied in sorting through the data and selecting specific values for
entry into the data base were described previously. Some explanatory information on variables of interest
is provided below. The aeronautical formulae cited were lifted from one of three documents: the U.S. Air
Force Fighter Weapons School Instructional Text, Basic Aerodynamics; Gunston and Spick's Modern Air
Combat; and Legrow's Measuring Military Capabilities for Military and Political Analysis.
Aircraft Designator. Because of coding protocols, aircraft names had to be condensed in most
instances. The aircraft name is followed by the variant designator. In those instances in which an aircraft
has undergone major modification for a particular recipient, an additional letter has been attached to the
variant code corresponding to the first letter in the name of the operating nation (e.g., MIRIIIEI for the
Israeli modified Mirage HIE). For Soviet aircraft, the name corresponds to the Soviet designator (e.g.,
MiG-23). The variant designator is derived from the NATO classification (e.g., B) which is more com-
monly recognizable than the multi-letter Soviet model designators.
Wing Span and Wing Surface Area. Values were for the most part taken directly from source docu-
ments. In the case of variable geometry wing fighters, the values were selected which reflected most likely
wing sweep during combat employment.
Wing Aspect Ratio. This measurement was recalculated for each aircraft from data entries for wing
span and surface area using the formula: AR = b /S, where,
AR = Wing Aspect Ratio
b = Wing Span
S = Wing Surface Area.
Combat Weight. Values for all aircraft were recalculated to reflect a likely combat weight. The
computation added half the internal fuel weight and the weight of a normal combat weapons load to the
aircraft's empty weight. All multi-role fighter weights were computed in the air-to-air role. Weapons
weight for air-to-air and multi-role aircraft was derived directly from the weight of the air-to-air missiles
identified in the aircraft configuration file. Weapons weight for all air-to-ground fighters was calculated at
half of maximum ordnance load and that of bombers at full ordnance load. This technique was used
because most fighters will rarely fly with a full complement of air-to-ground ordnance, particularly when
range is a compelling consideration, as it would be in most Middle Eastern scenarios.
Combat Wing Loading. Values were computed from file data using the formula: WL = W/S
,
where:
WL = Combat Wing Loading
W = Combat Gross Weight
S = Wing Surface Area.
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Fuel Fraction. The weight of internal fuel as a percentage of the clean (without weapons) take-off
weight of an aircraft.
Thrust- to- Weight Ratio. The ratio of installed (with afterburner at sea level) thrust to combat gross
weight.
Specific Energy at Altitude and at Sea Level. Depicts total aircraft energy (kinetic plus potential)
under specified conditions of flight according to the formula: E = h + V /2g, where:
E = Specific energy under the given condition
h = Altitude (service ceiling or sea level)
V = Maximum Airspeed at altitude or sea level
g = Force of gravity.
Specific Excess Power. Authoritative values for specific excess power were available in open sources
for less than 20% of the aircraft in the data set. The small number offered scant promise for application
of the analogical or regression techniques. A less rigorous and less reliable estimative approach was called
for. Specific excess power measures an aircraft's relative ability to change its energy state. Thus, it must
be measured from a common energy state described in reference to altitude, velocity, and attitude. In
deference to available data, these were stipulated as 10,000ft, .9Mach, and 1G respectively. Specific excess
power can be calculated by the following equation: P = V(T-D)/W, where:
P = Specific excess power
V = Velocity (.9 Mach)
T = Maximum thrust available
D = Drag
W = Combat gross weight.
Thrust and weight data were readily available, but information on drag is rarely published in unclas-
7
sified sources. With expert assistance, drag was 'back-calculated' for those aircraft for which P was
known and was compared to variables observed for all aircraft. Wing surface area and combat weight
appeared to oiTer the most explanatory promise. With too few observations to conduct a proper regres-
sion analysis, several calculations were tested until the equations which most accurately predicted to the
known values were isolated. These equations were applied to establish values for drag. P was then cal-
culated for all cases. The results were largely satisfactory, although not precise, with one exception. Val-
ues for Soviet and earlier generation aircraft were larger than deemed reasonable. This overestimation is
believed to result from the fact that the estimates were primarily derived from observations on late-model
U.S. aircraft which are generally aerodynamically cleaner than their Soviet counterparts and earlier cenera-
ttttttttttttttttttttf
7 Colonel Michael Nelson was invaluable in untangling the technical web associated with this and other
aeronautical questions and in suggesting alternative approaches to estimative hurdles. Without his
help, it is unlikely they would have ocen cleared.
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tion aircraft. That quality was not captured in the estimate. To compensate, estimated P values for
Soviet aircraft and early generation U.S. and European aircraft were adjusted downward on a case-by-case
basis, with a maximum adjustment of 10 percent.
Maximum Instantaneous Rate of Turn. Data were available on only a handful of cases through
unclassified sources, and the conditions under which they had been observed were infrequently cited.
Given these tenuous circumstances, it was obvious that instantaneous rate of turn would have to be cal-
culated independently not only to fill in the blanks but also to create a common plane of comparison. An
aircraft's best instantaneous turn rate is calculated through the equation: (0 = K (G /V ), where:
(0 = Instantaneous turn rate
K = A constant which converts radians per second to degrees per second and accounts for the
value of gravity
G = Maximum radial G
V = Comer Velocity.
A.
Two terms need further explanation. Radial G is the vector which defines the plane of a turn and is
equal to the square root of cockpit G (G ) minus one. Since the goal is to calculate the aircraft's best
turning performance, G was set at the aircraft's combat G limit (placard limit) which represents the
maximum gravitational force the aircraft's structure is built to withstand. Corner velocity (V ) is the
speed at which an aircraft can turn most efficiently, the velocity at which available G is exhausted.
Available G increases as the square of velocity up to the structural G limit of the aircraft (G,x Once that
limit is reached, available G is constant, and increasing velocity results in a decreasing rate of turn. To
grasp an aircraft's best turning performance, it is first necessary to determine its corner velocity.
The immediate problem was that data on V is rarely published. Consequently, the author had to
A
rely on an expert-assisted estimative procedure. Two known variables, wing loading and thrust-to-weight
ratio, were identified which generally correlated to the V values derived by decomposing published rate of
turn data according to the above equation. An admittedly unscientific procedure was evolved which pre-
dicted to known values fairly accurately. This method was used to predict V values for all aircraft.
These, in turn, were inserted into the rate of turn equation, and estimated instantaneous turn rates gener-
ated for all cases. While this technique was the best which could be improvised, the resulting estimates
range to the high side. However, the bias appears consistent, so the results should not distort further
applications unduly.
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4.3.3 Target Acquisition Systems.
4.3.3.1 Sources
Data for this set was considerably less profuse than was available for airframes. In addition to the All the
World's Aircraft, two other volumes from the Jane's series provided invaluable data: Avionics and Weap-
ons Systems. Information was also gleaned from many of the periodicals cited above and from a few
producers. Finally, The Analytic Sciences Corporation's excellent study, The TASCFORM ' Method-
ology: A Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization served as the template for assigning
nominal values to those variables for which interval measures were not appropriate. Many of the values
were subsequently altered to accommodate a different computational methodology, but the initial contri-
bution was vital.
4.3.3.2 Comments
Several general notes concern the cases themselves. The aircrew has an inherent target acquisition
capability irrespective of the systems installed. This was accounted for by creating a case called 'Visual',
the values for which reflect an aircrew's unassisted ability to detect a target. Values on this case were
developed through aircrew interviews and should be viewed as representative rather than absolute. Sec-
ond, sufficient data were not available to differentiate among various laser ranging and target designation
systems comfortably. Consequently, they were treated as generic cases, with values drawn from the limit-
ed data currently available. Third, authoritative data were not found on the radars installed on the latest
Soviet fighters (Flanker, Fulcrum, Foxhound) or on the infrared search track systems on two Flogger
variants. However, several articles speculate that their performance characteristics are essentially similar to
those of some Western systems. The radars are identified in terms of the aircraft (e.g., 'FLAN RAD'),
with the performance data adapted from the putatively analogous Western system. The infrared search
track systems are differentiated by the letter of the Flogger model in which they are installed (e.g.,
IRSTSB). Finally, in a few instances, the measurement variable is not entirely germane to a particular
system (e.g., output power for visual acquisition or infrared systems). In these, a dummy value was
derived from a regression equation which calculated the relationship between range and output power for
the radar systems. These cautionary comments aside, the target acquisition system data base captures the
bulk of the key attributes relevant to air combat.
Range-High Target and Range-Low Target. Data were collected which to the greatest extent possible
reflected the system's capability to detect a fighter-sized target (5m") while in the search mode. Adjust-
ments were made to the data when measurement under conditions other than these was indicated. The
two measurements were included to account for superior target detection potential accruing to a system
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which can distinguish a target while 'looking down' into ground clutter. Systems having this capability
had data entered for both variables. Air intercept radars capable only of acquiring targets at the same or
higher altitudes were measured only on the 'High Target' variable, while air-to-ground radars had data
entered solely on the 'Low Target' variable.
Data Points. The categories of significant data which the acquisition system could relate to the air-
crew or weapons computer relative to the target were enumerated for each case. These include range,
bearing, altitude, and airspeed. Data were entered as available from system description and imputed from
other system characteristics when not.
ECCM Capability. The scoring scheme was adapted from the one developed by The Analytic Sci-
ences Corporation. Values ranged from 0.7 for a system with a high susceptibility to electronic counter-
measures to 1.1 for a system with very low susceptibility.
4.3.4 Air-to-Air Missiles.
4.3.4.1 Sources
Performance data on air-to-air missiles was drawn largely from Jane's Weapons Systems along with many
of the aforementioned periodicals. Additionally, Gunston's Modern Airborne Missiles proved a most
valuable source document. As was the case with target acquisition systems, The Analytic Sciences Cor-
poration study provided a thoughtful matrix for extracting differentiating values for classes of nominally
described variables.
4.3.4.2 Comments
Terminal Guidance Mode. Descriptive values (e.g., 'SARH' for semi-active radar homing) were
entered in the data base. Associated values were assigned to a separate variable, guidance score. These
values range from 0.7 for a command guided missile to 1.2 for one with active radar homing. They are
further differentiated to reflect relative accuracy within class. For instance, an older infrared guided system
is scored as a 0.9, while a more modem version is rated at 1.0.
Maximum Range-Head On and Maximum Range-Tail. Two maximum range values were entered to
differentiate those missiles with all aspect capability from those which can only be launched from the rear
hemisphere (primarily infrared guided systems). A missile with an all aspect capability is measured on
both variables; one with a single aspect capability on only one.
Minimum Range-Head On and Minimum Range-Tail. This variable captures the distance required by
the system to actuate its guidance system after separation from the launch platform. Criteria for entering
values is as with the previously discussed variable pair.
Radars possessing a 'depressed angle' rather than pure look-down' capability were treated as having a
capability against lower altitude targets, but at attenuated ranges.
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Effective Range-Head On and Effective Range-Tail. Adjusts the maximum range of the missile to
account for the rninimum range which must be covered before it is effective. It is computed with a for-
mula borrowed from the TASC study: Ra = R_„ v (1 - RmoT/Rm in J, where:C I lid.A 1 1 Id.A 1 1 1111
R = Effective range
R~,„ v = Maximum rangemax 6
R~,;„ = Minimum Range,mm °
ECM Susceptibility . Assignment of values for this variable adheres to the same concepts described
above, but with the spectrum reversed. In this instance, a value of 0.7 reflects the system with the lowest
susceptibility, while one of 1.1 marks a system which is highly susceptible to countermeasures such as
flares, chaff, or electronic jamming.
Acquisition Mode. Two descriptive values are entered in the data base to indicate if a missile is
capable of engaging targets at beyond visual range (BVR) or is limited to visual range engagements (VR).
The descriptions are not associated with a numeric value, but are used to differentiate employment condi-
tions under the scoring logic which modifies the guidance score according to its pertinence to a particular
mission type.
4.3.5 Aerial Guns
Data for this category were extracted almost exclusively from Jane's Weapons Systems. Some additional
data were also taken from brochures distributed by producers. A few externally mounted guns were
included in this data set which is primarily concerned with internal weapons. Pod mounted guns were
entered to permit their evaluation as a configuration option during weapon system score compilation if
desired.
4.3.6 Relational Variables.
4.3.6.1 Aircraft Configuration Data.
The sources for the configuration data set were generally the same as cited above, with some notable
additions. The International Institute for Strategic Studies' The Military Balance was used to identify the
specific weapons available to a country for installation on its aircraft in a given year. Joshua Epstein's
book Measuring Military Power was irreplaceable as a source of data on aircraft man maintenance hours
per flying hour and, more importantly, as a guide on how to go about estimating values for systems on
which data were not published. In the latter regard, operations analysts at Northrop Corporation's Air-
craft Division provided insights into framing the estimation problem and practical documentation of esti-
mation techniques.
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For the most part, the entries in this data set are self-explanatory, indicating the presence or absence
of a class of capability or the installation of a particular target acquisition system, air-to-air missile, or gun.
Weapons system description documents such as Modern Air Combat catalogued possible or likely config-
urations. The Military Balance and various articles in periodicals and newspapers offered more definitive
information on subsystems available to a given country. Finally, some subsystems were deleted from ver-
sions of an aircraft in deference to political considerations associated with its transfer. For instance, two
versions of the Tigershark were configured, one with full up systems to included a radar missile and
sophisticated ordnance release point computer capability (F-20A) and one without (F-20). The latter
version is figured to be the one most likely to be approved for transfer to a Middle Eastern country like
Jordan, owing to political sensitivities. A version of the F-16C (F-16CSC) was similarly configured for
the same reasons.
The system configurations in this file represent a best estimate which is by no means definitive. The
values of all of the variables in this file are changeable during the combat potential scoring process. Tliis
feature permits the user not only to correct entries that might be in error but also to switch subsystems
and weapons to determine their impact on resultant combat potential.
Country of Production. In most cases, the entry on this variable reflects the original country of pro-
duction. No attempt has been made to identify aircraft for which the recipient country might have some
co-production responsibilities. Similarly, sources of secondary transfers are not singled out. There are a
handful of exceptions, mostly pertaining to aircraft in the Israeli inventory. When an aircraft has been
drastically modified by the recipient, the country of production annotation has been revised to reflect its
largely indigenous nature.
Navigation Category. The descriptive values entered for this variable categorize the most sophisticat-
ed navigation system installed on the aircraft. They range from dead reckoning to a global positioning
system. Not shown in this file are the differentiating values associated with these categories, which come
into play in the combat potential scoring process. These values are scaled from 0.6 to 1.4 reflecting the
9
navigation system's contribution to overall weapons system effectiveness.
Man Maintenance Hours per Flying Hour (MMHjFH). Collecting sufficient data on this variable
was an elusive task. While it suits the purposes of this study perfectly and is described by Epstein as 'the
standard index of aircraft maintainability in peacetime,' little data is published on it. In fact, authoritative
data could be obtained on only 21 aircraft, all but two of U.S. manufacture. The problem is compounded
by the fact that the maintenance hours required vary from year to year, presenting a moving target.
Because of these factors, it was necessary to adopt an estimative approach to fixing values for this vari-
ttttttttttttttttttttt
9 . . ....The categories and associated values were primarily developed by Major William R. O'Brien, an F-l 1
1
Weapon Systems Operator with 15 years experience with aircraft navigation systems.
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able. Epstein makes a solid case for taking this tack, noting that, while the estimated figure might not be
entirely accurate, it is a viable delimiter of mission generation.
The MMH/FH value associated with an aircraft is largely a product of two factors: the frequency
with which maintenace is required and the difficultly of effecting the maintenance. These are most fre-
quently measured as Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and xMean Time to Repair (MTTR) respec-
tively. There are other intervening variables which some into play, such as organizational maintenance
concepts, but these will be set aside here. An aircraft's MTBF is dictated in part by the number and reli-
ability of its subsystems, while MTTR is a product of their number, complexity, and the maintenance
procedure involved. Deficiencies in any of these areas can be offset by efficiencies in another. For
instance, newer fighters like the F-20A and the F-16C have multiple subsystems, but the maintenance
load is ameliorated through the reliability of advanced microelectronics and the pull-out, plug-in concept
of primary maintenance associated with them. It stands to reason that if MTBF and MTTR were known
for an aircraft, predicting to MMH/FH would be a fairly accurate process.
Unfortunately, those data are only marginally more available; so the estimation process has to fall
back one level and focus on analogous reasoning at the subcomponent level. A 1980 article presented a
body of data taken from Department of Defense reports which categorized 12 fighter aircraft according to
their complexity and indicated their respective failure rates, associated workload, and mail maintenance
hours per sortie. Various articles since then provided similar data on nine additional fighters. Using
this data as a baseline, the configuration data base and aircraft descriptions were studied to identify those
aircraft which were similarly appointed and were fitted with subsystems of the same vintage. Aircraft were
subjectively grouped, and analogous MMH/FH values assigned to those aircraft for which the variable
was undocumented. Multiple variants of a basic airframe were assigned the same value, unless their sub-
systems were substantially different. Some allowances were made for discrete reports concerning the reli-
ability of individual systems. For instance, Jordan and Iraq are reportedly displeased with the maintain-
ability and supportability of the Mirage Fl, causing values for that aircraft to be elevated slightly. " The
process worked satisfactorily for the majority of the aircraft in the file to generate data wliich portrayed at
least some measure of the relative differentiation among the systems.
No doubt, the resulting values contain many inaccuracies, perhaps some serious. However, these
need not be debilitating within the context and objectives of the study. The goal is to assess relative
combat potential, and the values derived via this process do that adequately, albeit imperfectly. It can be
tttttttfttttttttttttt
See Epstein, Measuring Military Power, pp. 153-165 for the estimative technique which he employed
in his study and its justification.
See Benjamin Schemmer, 'Pentagon, White House, and Congress Concerned over Tactical Aircraft
Complexity and Readiness'.




presumed at least that the errors will be no greater than those which might have resulted from picking
'authoritative' data from a single year. The figures can be challenged individually, but as a whole they
suit the purposes of this effort.
4.3.6.2 Relative Utilities
As noted in the previous chapter, a family of data had to be collected to glue weapon system attributes
together at their joints. The data had to reflect the relative contributions of these attributes to definable
mission outputs. The Analytic Sciences Corporation embodied this concept in its computational matri-
ces. But the specific values (termed 'Weighting Factors') were not suitable for direct adaptation for three
reasons. First, the TASC computational process differed from the one under consideration for this study
in several important areas. Attempts to decompose or rearrange TASC's values to suit this study's
scheme proved unfruitful. Second, the specific sources of the values and the considerations which went
into them were opaque. Third, the values were predicated on a Central European operating environment.
Since depicting the influence of the Middle Eastern operational environment on relative combat potential
is a study goal, greater control over the factors considered in formulating the values for the relational vari-
ables is imperative.
Expert Survey Concept. The concept underlying the survey procedures employed by LeGrow and
Jacoby in their explorations of Multi Attribute Utility Technique (MAUT) offered an attractive solution.
The collective judgment of experts with first-hand knowledge of the phenomena being investigated is a
valid measure of relative merit, subsuming the myriad of micro -considerations which defy individual
quantification in an aggregated model. Despite the flaws in the previous applications of MAUT to mili-
tary analysis outlined in Chapter 2, the survey technique on which it was predicated holds promise if
questions are focused on a reduced basket of relationships with which the respondants are all intimately
familiar and which could be considered at an intellectually more malleable level of abstraction.
Survey Formulation. Having been identified previously (Chapter 3), the junctures on which relative
utility values were needed were organized into a tabular structure which graphically outlined the relation-
ships to be evaluated. The basic questionnaire is included in Appendix C. A chart was prepared for each
air weapons system component which arrayed the component's key attributes against the four combat
missions being evaluated without reference to a particular system. The respondant was asked to make
zero-sum determinations on the relative contribution of each attribute to combat success in each category
of mission. The subcomponents having been scored, the respondant was asked in another chart to relate
them under the same conditions. A final chart requested a similar rating of the air weapon svstem, oper-
ttttttttttttttttttttt
Between the beginning of 1976 and the end of 1977, the mean time between failure rate for Ihc F- 15
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increased from 0.76 to 1.30, bringing its MM 11/FH value down to 41. Just two years later thai valu
had dropped further to 33.6. The error resulting from taking a 'snap-shot' of the data could pro\
just as fallacious as employing the estimative technique described here.
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ator proficiency, and command, control, communications and intelligence support (C I) contributions to
success in each mission category. Finally, five questions were included to establish the respondant's sys-
tem familiarity and fighter and combat experience. These data were used in discriminating among
responses if substantial disagreement on individual values cropped up. An accompanying letter defined
the Middle East the the employment region and gave a thumbnail description of a moderate intensity
(compared to Central Europe) air operating environment.
Survey Administration. Experienced fighter pilots familiar with flying conditions and combat scenar-
ios in the Middle East represented the best source of well informed survey judgments. Within the L'.S Air
Force at least, these are concentrated in Tactical Air Command's 9th Air Force, which serves as the air
component of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). Weapons and tactics officers from
the HQ 9th Air Force Directorate of Operations, whose primary job is developing combat plans and tac-
tics for the Middle East/Southwest Asia contingency operations, were requested to participate in the sur-
vey, along with weapons and tactics officers from two fighter wings with USCENTCOM contingency
commitments. Officers currently flying six different types of aircraft (A-7, A- 10, F-4, F-15, F-16, and
F- 111) were included in the survey. Twenty-four are pilots, with one an F- 111 weapons system operator.
They reported an average of almost 2000 hours total fighter time (high:4600, low:325). Thirteen had
accumulated an average of just over 500 combat hours, and eleven had some flying experience in the
Middle East. All had flown in exercises which simulated a Southwest Asia combat environment. So that
scenarios and objectives would be well understood, points of contact in each organization surveyed were
briefed and asked to select those officers who would generate the most thoughtful responses.
Survey Results. Data entered into the questionnaire tables were reformatted into an automated file as
values for the previously described relative utility variables. They were processed to determine the distri-
bution of data for each variable and to extract relevant statistical information such as their mean, maxi-
mum, rninimum, and median values and to establish a range of responses. Responses for 57 of 76 vari-
ables showed strong central tendencies, with median and mean values within 10 percent and with response
ranges of 40 points or less. Responses for only 10 variables showed a deviation of more than 10 percent
between the median and mean values. Of the 19 variables which displayed a range of values in excess of
40, the range for 15 could be reduced to 30 points by the removal of 3 or fewer of the extreme responses.
The categories of variables which showed the most pronounced divergencies of opinion were those related
to relative utility of radar guided air-to-air missiles, to that of precision guided air-to-ground munitions,
and to that of target acquistion modes. Additionally, a lesser breadth of opinion was registered concerning
the relative utilities of target acquisition systems and weapons payioads in the air defense and air superi-
ority roles. While these divergencies tarnish the aura of the 'collective wisdom' imputed to the mean or
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median values somewhat, they realistically mirror alternative positions often taken in arguments concern-
ing weapon system development, employment, and outfitting priorities in the tactical community. These
incidental disagreements aside, the survey results are sufficiently cohesive to produce relative utility values
which might not hit the mark but which will be very close to it.
One of two values (mean or median) can be selected as a measure of central tendency to extract a
typical score from data sets such as these. The mean is generally regarded as the best descriptor and is
preferrable to the median if the data set is not highly skewed. Only 19 of the 76 variables in this data
set had skewness values of 0.5 or greater, and all of those were reduced to less than 0.5 through the
removal of 4 or fewer outlying cases. This procedure was implemented. The resulting relative utility val-
ues are displayed in decimal form in the tables in Appendix C. While these values will be used for the
remainder of this study, the scoring procedure is designed so that they can be easily altered by another
user to reflect a different viewpoint or the different demands of another employment environment.
4.3.7 Air Inventories.
4.3.7.1 Sources
The combat aircraft inventories of the 22 nation study set were compiled from published air orders of
battle (AOB's) for 1984 and 1985 and supplemented with annual projections through 1990. Primary
source documents for the established inventories were the International Institute for Strategic Studies' The
Military Balance
,
Interavia's Air Forces of the World, and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' The
Middle East Military Balance. Fragmentary data provided in these publications were also used in devel-
oping force projections through 1990. Several periodicals were essential in the latter effort. These includ-
ed Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jane's Aerospace Weekly, and The Air Force Times. Addition-
ally, projected acqusition information was extracted from two automated files, the Arms Transfer Event
Data Base produced by Third Point Systems Corporation and the Aerospace!Defense Markets and Tech-
nology data base compiled by Predicasts Terminal Systems. Information on variables concerned with the
quality of the maintenance forces was drawn from an automated version of the World Military Expendi-
tures and Arms Transfer Data Base provided by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and from
the World Bank's World Development Report 1985, the Central Intelligence Agency's The World Fact-
book, and JCSS's The Middle East Military Balance. Complete air order of battle (inventory) listings are
included in Appendix D. All inventories reflect the end-of-year totals for the respective calendar year.
Thus, the 1987 inventory figures represent estimates oi the aircraft wluch would be possessed in Decem-
ber, 1987.
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Looking to future acquisitions, data were 'smoothed' to reflect logical entry into a
country's inventory when no specific delivery schedule had been reported. The procedure broke blocks of
ordered aircraft down into unit sized increments and spread these over the delivery period. Aircraft were
treated as operational when sufficient numbers to constitute a unit were on hand. To preclude the
erroneous impression of ever-expanding inventories, aircraft which would be made obsolete by newer
acquisitions were decremented as functional replacements became operational. This technique might
provoke controversy, but it is logical in light of the limited absorptive and support capabilities of the
nations in the set. Decrements were not enumerated on a strict one-for-one basis, but were forecast as
functional conversions at the unit level.
Acquisition Estimates. Estimative techniques were also employed to project possible acquisitions for
those countries on which scant planning data were available in open sources, particularly for those coun-
tries which are Soviet clients. Though virtually no information was available concerning their longer
range air modernization plans, it is highly unlikely that some modernization will not occur, particularly in
light of the recent introduction into Soviet forces of four new fighters. Here the procedure was to review a
country's acquisition track-record, identify the relative spacing between new equipment acquisitions, and
forecast the receipt of later model Soviet equipment. Without access to classified intelligence sources, the
resultant inventories in the post- 1986 period cannot be viewed as definitive, but they certainly represent
one potential course of force evolution for countries like Syria, Libya, Iraq, and the PDRY.
Operationally Available Rate Estimates. Without classified data, it was impossible to determine pre-
cise operationally available rates (OAR) for countries and systems. Even at the force level, data had to be
estimated based on an extrapolation from historical anecdotes. . Historical data were evaluated in the
context of a nation's military investments and assumed logistical capabilities to develop estimates of force
level operational availability. The values ranged from 0.9 for Israel to a low of 0.3 for Libya.
Maintenance Personnel Estimates. No authoritative data were documented to establish the actual
number of personnel available to perform primary maintenance on aircraft possessed by the nations under
study. Since values for this variable are integral to the formulation of sortie generation boundaries, an
estimative approach was dictated. Reviewing data on Lnited States' and Soviet forces in Europe, Epstein
calculated that approximately ten percent of total assigned air force strength accomplished the direct air-
1
7
craft maintenance function. This ratio might not be religiously applied in the Middle East, but it is
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This treatment is optimistic, since the actual assimilation period would probably stretch over a year
or more once the aircraft were in place. However, it is consistent with the concept of portraying an
outside limit to combat potential.
Sources included Epstein, op.cit.; Cordesman, Jordanian Arms, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic
Stability, and 'Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War'; and Staudcnmaicr, 'Iran-Iraq (1980 - ) among others
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likely that most of the nations in the region have borrowed similar personnel allocation concepts from
their respective patrons.
In lieu of more explicit data, the above mentioned source documents were reviewed to extract infor-
mation on known national air force manning in the base years (1984 and 1985). Ten percent of total
manning was assumed dedicated to direct maintenance. In the case of Israel, mobilized personnel aug-
mented the active contingent. The number of estimated direct maintenance personnel was divided by the
number of operational combat aircraft to identify the maintenance man to combat aircraft ratio which
obtained in the base years. Iran presented a special problem because estimates on air force manpower and
operational aircraft in the base year were admittedly speculative. Consequently, the maintenance man to
combat aircraft ratio observed in 1979 was used, reflecting a more reasonable organizational allocation of
manpower. Data on Lebanon were likewise tenuous, showing an exceptionally high ratio. Since the
Lebanese Air Force is, for all intents and purposes, non-functional, this anomaly is not significant.
Future year projections were made by applying this ratio to forecast inventories. Ratios ranged from
lows of below 1.5 (Libya, South Yemen) to highs in excess of 7 (Israel, Syria, Oman, Sudan, Iran). The
Iranian ratio was atypically high (22) because of the minimal numbers of operational aircraft available.
Since sortie generation calculations are also limited by the numbers of airframes available, this drastic
deviation from the norm would have little actual impact on combat potential estimates.
Quality of the Maintenance Force. Data on the motivational variables identified in Chapter 3 were
readily available. Rather than taking a 'snapshot' of a base year, data were assembled as a ten year aver-
age, predicated on the belief that motivational attributes and their impacts on personnel attitudes evolve
over time. The technological adaptability variables were drawn from 1982 (percentage of age group in
secondary school) and 1984 (literacy rate), indicating the relative literacy and educational background of
personnel who would be available for military service in the subsequent study period. It must again be
emphasized that these variables are 'soft' surrogates for the phenomena being studied and that this data set
was compiled for illustrative purposes only. The force quality modifiers developed from it will be applied




For a review of his supporting data, see Fpstein, op.cit., pp. 203-207.
This assertion was validated in small part by a conversation with an aircraft maintenance officer from
one Middle Eastern country who stated that personnel to aircraft ratio goals were derived from the
U.S. model. He also noted that few of the countries with which he was familiar in the region had
attained them.
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4.4 Protest and Progress.
Those readers reviewing the data bases provided in Appendix B and Appendix C will undoubtedly identify
variable values they believe fallacious. Just as surely, these occassional factual errors will provoke what
Epstein terms the, 'storm of affronted protest,' which prevails when explicit judgments on numbers are
made. But those judgments had to be made if the analytic process were to progress. The data are essen-
tial, and every care has been taken to ensure their accuracy. The exhaustive data lists are reproduced pre-
cisely so that technical experts can draw informed conclusions as to the relative reliability of the study's
substantive findings. It is important to note that, while differing individual values might influence the
outcome of specific combat potential computations, their impact will be discrete and predictably marginal
19
and the methodology undergirding them unaffected.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
19
Epstein cautions against analytical timidity when forced to employ data which might be open to
question: 'Nor should anyone be cowed out of analysis by pseudo scientific demands that an inher-





Despite the economies applied in the variable selection and data collection processes, the sheer volume
and differentiation of relevant data exceed manageable proportions. The derivation of aggregated values
or scores which efficiently measure each of the critical attributes is pivotal in transitioning from raw data
to a workable force level model. The data reduction process must adhere to many of the same considera-
tions enumerated in the discussion of variable selection criteria in Chapter 3. While parsimony is a prime
concern, it cannot be achieved at the expense of incomplete representation of the combat relevant facets.
Conversely, no one facet should be asymetrically represented, either directly or indirectly. In addition, the
creation of a relational scoring model presupposes a common mathmatical scale on which all variables are
measured. Otherwise, the higher level computations are distorted by the varying native scales. To com-
plicate the problem further, the level at which the values are measured must be appropriate to their appli-
cation. Composite or index variables identified in the data reduction process must, therefore, have ratio
2
properties if they are to be subjected to subsequent multiplicative computations. Consequently, a credi-
ble data reduction scheme must be judged against four criteria. Is it efficient? Is it comprehensive? Does
it eliminate the distorting effects of disparate measurement scales? Can its products legitimately be entered
into subsequent computations? The following sections will critically review alternative data reduction
procedures, propose a procedure which capitalizes on their stong points, and describe its application to the
data bases at hand.
5.2 Alternative Methods
Basically, the task is to create an indexed value for each relevant attribute which can be measured along a
homogeneous ratio scale. Among the several methods available, three appear to have most currency in
projects of this type, each with its drawbacks. These are discussed below, with an estimate of the degree
to which they meet the above criteria.
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For example, if values for speed (1300kts), rate of turn (19.5 degrees/second), and combat range
(390NM) are simply added, the value for speed accounts for over 75% of the resulting score.
2
See Blalock, Social Statistics, pp. 15-22; LcGrow, Measuring Aircraft Capability, pp. 10-20; and Rum-
mel, Applied Factor Analysis, pp. 222-223 for discussions of level of measurement concerns.
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5.2.1 Single /Marker/ Variable
One approach is to select a single variable which the researcher believes captures the bulk of the signifi-
cant variation in an attribute. In effect, this tack is an extension to the most basic level of the concept
employed in identifying families of variables described in Chapter 3. As with any summarizing technique,
the choice a single variable discards a measure of the information which describes the attribute. If the
attribute is monolithic, the loss is negligible. With a multi-faceted attribute, it can be injurious. Single
representative variables are identified in two manners. The researcher can simply assert that the variable
captures the essential quality of the attribute. For instance, a previously discussed study stipulated specific
excess power (P ) as the sole indicator of combat aircraft maneuverability. While P plays a vital role in
defining energy maneuverability, it fails to account for the equally important aspect of lateral maneuver-
ability.
A second technique is to use statistical procedures to isolate a variable the values for which vary
closely with others linked to the attribute under examination. For instance, the values for maximum
speed at 36,000ft and at sea level in this data set are highly correlated (r = 0.8278). Similar relationships
obtain for many variable pairs. Could one variable then be reliably selected to represent the attribute
defined by both? From one perspective, the procedure has merit, as long as the functional relationship
between the variables is valid and their correlation is not simply a statistical artifact. The process becomes
more complicated, however, when more than two variables are associated with an attribute.
In a variation on the same theme which accommodates several variables, factor analysis can be used
to define groupings of variables, with the variable having the highest loading selected as representing the
attribute. For example, Table 5.1 depicts the edited results of factor analysis of 18 of the variables in the
airframe data set.
Since Factor 2 includes all of the maneuverability related variables, rate of turn (TURATE) could be
selected to stand-in for the attribute in subsequent applications. While this technique is more powerful
than the ones described previously, it still provides a less than comprehensive portrayal of an attribute's
relative value.
Of course, selection of a single variable does not solve the measurement problem. The most direct
solution is to index all observations of the marker variable to a baseline value. In the TASC study, all
values were divided by the corresponding value for the F-4B, producing a homogeneously scaled data set
with ratio properties. Variables measured on differing scales could also be converted to standardized
scores. This method provides an excellent mode for data comparison, but standardized values bv dcfini-
ttttttttttttttttttttt
3 . . .Note that this application of factor analysis differs markedly from the efforts discussed in Chapter 2 in
which all variables loading on a factor were incorporated in creating an attribute score.
One can safely assume ratio properties since all these variables are measured on interval scales with an
implied although never observed natural zero point. See Blalock, op.cit., pp. IS- 19.
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Table 5.1: Airframe Variables Factor Analysis





































tion have no natural zero point and, thus, lack the essential ratio property required for multiplicative
manipulation.
To recapitulate, the isolation of a single or marker variable to represent an attribute is theoretically
sound, particularly when solid statistical techniques leavened with expert judgment are employed in the
selection. The technique engenders parsimony and negates redundancy. However, the marker's explana-
tory power varies in inverse proportion to the complexity of the attribute being represented. If complex
attributes suck as manueverability are on the table, a more inclusive technique is called for. The use of an
indexing scheme to reduce disparate values to a common measurement scale has no major drawbacks,
eliminating distorting effects and maintaining ratio properties.
5.2.2 Composite Indices
To overcome the loss of comprehensiveness inherent in the marker variable approach, some researchers
'build' composite variables which compress the multiple aspects of a complex attribute into a single value.
Composites frequently convey meaningful performance related information unobtainable through any
single component measure. Thrust-to-weight ratio, wing loading, and wing aspect ratio are all widely rec-
ognized as valid (although not sufficient) indicators of energy maneuverability, turning capability, and rel-
ative lift respectively. However, composites are legitimate only when their components have a functional
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impact on the attribute being represented and their combinational mode reflects an engineering or opera-
tional reality. There is no inherent fallacy in composite variable construction but its application can be
crippled through unrealistic variable combination. Rattinger proposed a multiplicative combination of
speed, payload, and combat radius as a composite measure of aircraft performance. Sherwin and Lau-
rance demonstrated the inadequacies of this procedure, noting the disproportionate impact of minor vari-
ations in variable values and its inability to deal with zero values.
An operationally more legitimate composite variable, 'Payload Utility', was created in the TASC
study multiplying target acquisition values by the weapons' values. This procedure has considerable
merit, since the two variables have a synergistic relationship. It is debatable, however, if the multiplicative
process is a true representation of it. To borrow an anology from another section of the same report, it is
questionable if a target acquisition system twice as capable as its predecessor were mated with a missile
system twice as capable as its predecessor that the product would be four times as potent.
Nonetheless, this type of functionally defensible composite does meet the basic criteria and offers a
data reduction option under rigorously controlled circumstances. The input variables must be critically
scrutinzed to ascertain their adaptability to the process, and the computational scheme must reflect
accepted operational relationships. The variables related to most of the attributes under evaluation here
do not lend themselves to the composite approach.
5.2.3 Factor Analysis - A Reprise
At first blush, factor analysis possesses many of the qualities which satisfy the data reduction criteria out-
lined above. It is certainly comprehensive in that there are structural limits on the number of variables
which can be analyzed. It is efficient, since groups of statistically related variables are arrayed into factors,
each of which accounts for a specified proportion of the overall variance within the data set. This char-
acteristic permits the researcher to peg the number of factors extracted for subsequent use to the number
pertinent to the phenomenon under investigation. The factor scoring utility calculates relative scores for
each case which add the absolute values for the variables in the data set in consonance with their loadings
on the factor. A single value measured on a common scale is thus generated for each case on as many
factors as are required to reach the desired level of explanation. Conceptually at least, the major draw-
back is that factor scores are interval level measures which are not natural candidates for subsequent
computations involving multiplication or division. This failing is not insubstantial in a model which
demands aggregation of the cumulative potential of a national inventory.
tttttttttTTtttttttttt
See Sherwin and Laurance, 'Arms Transfers and Military Capability', pp.372-374. Other questionable
composites include one commonly used in the military community which multiplies payload times
radius to indicate relative ground attack lethality.
The procedure is actually more complex and is described in detail in Vogt, The TASCFORM
Methodology, pp. 2-9 to 2-14.
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Chapter 2 sampled factor analysis based aircraft capabilities studies and highlighted the deficiencies
encountered in using factor analysis to spring from raw variable values directly to an employment level
combat potential assessment. In reviewing the factor analyses accomplished by Snider and LeGrow, it
was observed that the attempts to relate a minimum number of factors to such overarching concepts as
offensive and defensive capabilities or air-to-air and air-to-ground potential exceeded the reasonable
bounds imposed by the nature of the technique itself and by the explanatory breadth of the variables con-
sidered. Exploring the more sophisticated application conducted by the Analytic Assessments Corpora-
tion, some additional deficiencies were highlighted. Implemented at the systems level, factor analysis
defines variable groupings which are statistically valid but which often lack functional legitimacy. The
calculation of scores for performance attributes includes values for variables which are operationally
extraneous. Factor models incorporate no inherent logic for the aggregation of scores for multiple attri-
butes (factors). These substantial defects in application aside, the factor analysis technique did demon-
strate a facility for educing a common scale for the composite measurement of the contribution of multi-
ple variables to the value of a specific attribute.
5.2.4 Summary
Each of the data reduction techniques investigated has significant assets and liabilities. The use of marker
variables isolated by whatever technique is parsimonious but sacrifices too much explanatory power. The
creation of composites is a valid but spotty solution of too limited applicability to satisfy the majority of
analytical requirements in this investigation. Factor analysis offers the most comprehensive solution but is
ineffective when applied exclusively at the weapon system level. Additionally, its output is not fully ame-
nable to inclusion in subsequent computations.
5.3 A Minimalist Approach
A data reduction scheme which meets the stipulated criteria might seem unobtainable, but the kernel of a
solution resides in a factor analysis process construed less ambitiously. The programmatic structure
extruded in Chapter 3 provided a framework in which essential weapon system attributes and their func-
tional relationships were qualitatively delineated. Therefore, there is no requirement for the simultaneous
factorial analysis of all variables which pertain to an air weapon system. With attributes already defined
and linked, data reduction need only be accomplished within the realm of each attribute itself. If all vari-
ables in the problem were functionally associated with the attribute being analyzed, the derived factor
scores would be purged of the debilitating influence of irrelevant values. Setting aside the level of meas-




5.3.1.1 Analyze or Assign
The first task is to isolate and screen those variables contributing to the attributes identified in Chapter 3.
To preclude the previously discussed distortions which arise when dichotomous variables are factor ana-
lyzed, they were excluded from this phase of the data reduction effort and relegated to insertion during the
combat potential computation phase. The field thus narrowed, there are two alternatives for associatmg
variables with attributes for factor analysis. Variables could simply be assigned to an attribute group
based on their functional relationships, or they could be statistically grouped using factor analysis at the
subcomponent (e.g., airframe, missile, etc.) level. The latter technique offers the advantage of previewing
statistical anomalies and flagging possible redundancies. Reflecting on the observations made concerning
earlier studies, reliance on factor analysis alone to accomplish this function could cause more problems
than it solves. The happy medium is to begin with subcomponent level factor analysis and then modify
its results judgmentally.
5.3.1.2 The Airframe Example
Principal components factor analysis was accomplished for all weapon systems subcomponents. Just
the procedure to identify and allocate those variables associated with airframes will be described in detail,
but the same procedure was applied to each subcomponent. Table 5.2 displays the results of the factor
analysis of 26 variables, with values on 125 combat aircraft which are currently operated or might be
acquired by Middle Eastern states.
Five factors were extracted, accounting for 85.9% of the overall variation in the data set. Variables
loading on the first factor were primarily those associated with aircraft size and weight. The two excep-
tions were maximum thrust (MAXPWR) and specific energy at altitude (SPECENA). Speed and energy
related variables loaded heavily on the second factor, along with the variable for wing loading (WLOAD).
Fuel fraction (FUFRAC) loaded unexplainably on this factor, although weakly. Its expected association
with range related variables (Factor 4) did not materialize. Those variables measuring energy' and lateral
maneuverability loaded distinctly on Factor 3, while Factor 4 encompassed range and air-to-ground ord-
nance related variables. Factor 5, which accounted for just 4.5% of the total variance was limited to wing
aspect ratio (ARWNG) and wing span (SPAN). The association is unremarkable, since the square of
wing span is the nominator in the wing aspect ratio calculation.
Vulnerability Attribute. The next step is to evaluate these statistical results within the context of pre-
viously identified airframe attributes and examine them for functional relevance and statistical redundancy.
A key factor in an aircraft's susceptibility to engagement is its size. Bigger aircraft can be detected more
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surely at greater range visually or with radar. An aircraft's empty weight (EWGT) and fuel weight
(FWGT) are subsumed in the calculation of its combat weight (CWGT), and it has already been stipulat-
ed that aircraft rarely operate in combat at their maximum weight (MWGT). Maximum power
(MAXPWR) is irrelevant to the attribute and is assumed to load with these variables because larger air-
craft require greater power. Therefore, EWGT, FWGT, and MAXPWR were eliminated from further
processing, leaving the size attribute of the susceptibility to engagement calculation described by the vari-
ables combat weight (CWGT), wing span (SPAN), and wing surface area (SURF).
Airspeed!Energy Attribute. The variables which loaded on the second factor were for the most part
measurements of various aspects of airspeed and energy. Wing loading (WLOAD) and fuel fraction
(FUFRAC) are the major exceptions, and their inclusion in the factor is a statistical quirk rather than a
meaningful functional association. Of the remaining six variables, two, specific energy at altitude
(SPECENA) and specific energy at sea level (SPECENS) are products of calculations in which maximum
ttt+ttttttTt+tttt++t+
7 Other attributes contributing to susceptibility to engagement are its speed and maneuverability, which
contribute their own dynamics.
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airspeed at altitude (ASPD), service ceiling (SCEIL), and maximum airspeed at sea level (LSPD) are ele-
ments. Since the specific energy variables constitute a more sophisticated measure of the speed, energy
attribute, they were selected for insertion into the scoring process, along with rate of climb (CSI'Dj. This
screening eliminated the adverse influence of redundant measures of comparable phenomena and limited
the remaining field to variables the values of which showed a more normal distribution than their antece-
dents. 8
Maneuverability Attribute. Factor 3 variables are all statistically and functionally related to maneu-
verability (acceleration and turning). The design G value (LIMG) was subsumed in the calculation for
maximum instantaneous turn rate (TURATE), and the thrust-to-weight ratio value (TWPWR) was used
in estimating the denominator in the rate of turn equation and is closely correlated (0.98) to specific excess
power (PSFL100). For the sake of efficiency, TWPWR and LIMG were eliminated from further pro-
cessing.
RangeIEndurance and Payload Attributes. The fourth factor encompasses variables associated with
two airframe attributes: range or endurance capability and payload capacity. It is not illogical that these
variable should load on the same factor statistically, since aircraft designed to carry large volumes of ord-
nance are also usually designed to carry it greater distances. More subtly, an aircraft with multiple exter-
nal stations and and a heavier external load capacity can also carry more external fuel, thereby extending
its range in certain configurations. However, the simultaneous consideration of payload and range related
variables in the same same factor scoring module does not satisfy the goal of extracting separate values for
the range and air- to-ground payload attributes. A composite score for a notional range/payload attribute
9
would fail to capture the varying utility of these qualities in different mission roles.
Consequently, this factor was split into two 'sub-factors' which correspond to the attributes for
which measurements are desired: air-to-ground payload and range. A further subdivision of the range or
endurance attribute was also required to accommodate processing considerations. Aircraft with singular
mission roles (e.g.interceptors or ground attack fighters) had values entered only for the variable, area
intercept radius (AIRAD) or ground attack radius (GARAD), which corresponded to their mission cat-
egory. As a result, these two variables are replete with missing values, a fact which causes serious abnor-
malities in the factor analysis solution and permits factor scoring only if mean values are inserted in place
of the missing data. The solution was to process air-to-air and air-to-ground aircraft in separate runs.
tttttttttttfttttttttt
8 ASPD, LSPD, and SCEIL were skewed -0.256, -1.229, and -0.890 respectively. SPECENA has a
skewness value of 0.069 and SPECENS one of .447.
Q . .
Additionally, it should be remembered that the payload attribute for aircraft accomplishing air- to-air
missions is already described in terms of specific missiles in the configuration file, making the gross
measure of carrying capacity irrelevant.
An alternate was to create separate air to ground and air to air data bases with a variable akin to
AAC's 'mission radius'. This solution was rejected as being unnecessarily duplicative.
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Multi-role fighters were inserted in each. The final lineup was a factor group representing the air-to-
ground payload attribute comprised of maximum ordance capability (MAXORD) and air-to-ground ord-
nance weapons stations (STNS); one focusing on the air-to-air endurance attribute, area intercept radius
(AIRAD) and ferry range (FRANGE); and one capturing the air-to-ground endurance attribute made up
of ground attack radius (GARAD) and ferry range.
The Orphan Attribute. The fifth and final factor presents an interpretation dilemma. Wing aspect
ratio is an indicator of relative lift, but it loaded on neither of the attributes which might have been antic-
ipated, speed/energy or maneuverability. Since the explanatory power of this final factor was negligible
and did not correspond to an essential airframe attribute, it was dropped.
5.3.1.3 Target Acquisition Systems, Missiles, and Guns.
An analogous process was accomplished for each of the other air weapon system subcomponents. To
avoid repetition, just the high points and anomalies associated with them will be noted. As with air-
frames, variables described by nominal or dichotomous values were not entered into the factor problems.
All of the variables in the target acquisition set loaded on a single factor. Tlus was categorized as com-
prising the 'performance' attribute. The gun variable 'dispersion' is inversely related to accuracy. To
channel the scoring thrust in a positive direction, this variable was transformed into a reciprocal. Two
factors were extracted, with muzzle velocity and rate of fire loading heavily on one; and calibre, maximum
effective range, and the reciprocal of dispersion loading on the other. The two factors were separated and
scored as for airframes. In the air- to-air missile set, variables loaded on two factors. The first showed
heavy loading for those variables related to a missile's performance or lethality (the six range related vari-
ables, speed, warhead weight), while the second was composed of those defining a missile's vulnerability
to detection and target maneuvering (diameter, weight, and a negative loading for the maneuverability
variable, G limit). Since the maximum and minimum range variables against high and low altitude targets
had been the values in the maximum effective range computations, they were set aside. The G limit vari-
able was transformed into a reciprocal, so that highly maneuverable missiles would score lowest on the
vulnerability attribute. Two separate factor scoring problems were formulated to derive scores for each
attribute.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
Although the fuel fraction variable did not load on this factor, it was tested along with the range
variables in deriving factor scores. Its inclusion generated results which in some instances were at
drastic variance with known relative endurance qualities. The probable reason is that the variable
accounts only for relative fuel capacity and not fuel consumption efficiency. It is likely a valid rela-
tive indicator if a single class of similarly engined aircraft is under study. When applied across a
sample as broad as this, its effects are counterproductive.
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5.3.2 Attribute Indices Utilization
5.3.2.1 The Dilemma
As noted previously, the aggregation methodology contemplated for this study demands attribute values
be measured on ratio scales. The influence exerted by negative factor score coefficients was preempted by
the insertion into each attribute problem of only those variables which load heavily (statistically and func-
tionally) on the factor and the conversion to reciprocal values of those variables which load negatively.
Still, the fact that all raw data are transformed into standardized values prior to score calculation stands as
a barrier. Several mathmatical solutions were attempted, all basically anchored by tried techniques for
12
reversing the standardized scoring process. In fact, an arbitrary system was employed in the analysis
prototype. The data bases all contained systems the performance characteristics of which verged on the
minimum essential to a weapon which would have even a negligible combat impact. A nominal zero
surrogate factor score was created at a point one standard deviation below the lowest authentic factor
score in each attribute set. Its inverse was then added to each score on the attribute. The solution is
workable but unsatisfying, smacking of smoke and mirrors.
5.3.2.2 A Possible Resolution
The threads of a possible solution reside in the nature of the data processed in this particular string of
analyses. Since nominal and dichotomous variables were excluded from factor scoring, values for all
remaining variables could be assumed to have ratio properties, including a natural zero point. It was
observed that the few older aircraft which had no capacity to carry external ordnance (weapons stations
and maximum ordnance = 0) still received a factor score value. Since the values for these cases consti-
tuted valid natural zero points when entered into the problem, would not the scores generated for them
also constitute the zero point of the factor score scale?
To explore the potential, a 'control' case was created for each subsystem with a value of zero
assigned to all its variables. Factor analysis was accomplished at the subcomponent level to determine if
the insertion of the control case forced a redefinition of the factors (attributes). The basic groupings
remained the same. The same procedure was employed for each attribute, this time with factor scores
produced. The inverses of the values for the control cases were added to factor scores for the operative
cases, creating sets of attribute values which intuitively had ratio properties. However, logical assertion




The AAC study, for instance, speculated that a value five standard deviations from the mean might
constitute a reasonable surrogate for zero.
As ludicrous as the example might seem, a notional aircraft with an absolute capability of zero would
not fly. Thus, its airspeed, maneuverability, mission endurance, etc. would be zero. Despite the
awkwardness of the conception, it is no more unrealistic to postulate than the notion of zero temp-
erature or distance.
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5.3.2.3 The Ratio Test
The key element in establishing credibility is to demonstrate that the adjusted scores possess the same
ratio relationships as the input values. Reaching that goal with the study data files is patently infeasible.
A notional three variable data set (VAR1, VAR2, VAR3) was created with values for ten cases. It is
shown in Table 5.3. 'CaseO' was assigned values of zero for each variable, and 'Casel' was assigned the
value of a prime number. Subsequent cases were given a value which doubled that for the previous case.
The data were subjected to principal components factor analysis. All showed a loading of one on a single
factor, with factor score coefficients of 0.33333.
Table 5.3: An Observable Data Set
CASE VAR1 VAR2 VAR3
CaseO
Casel 1 3 5
Case2 2 6 10
Case3 4 12 20
Case4 8 24 40
Case5 16 48 80
Case6 32 96 160
Case7 64 192 320
Case8 128 384 640
Case9 256 768 1280
The scores are listed under the heading FACTOR SCORES (RAW)' in Table 5.4. The inverse of
the raw factor score for 'CaseO' (.61933) was added to the factor score for each case, and the results tabu-
lated under the column annotated FACTOR SCORES (ADJUSTED)'. As can be readily seen, their
values, with rounding, follow precisely the same progression as the input data.




CaseO -. 61933 . 00000
Casel -. 60721 . 01212
Case2 -. 59509 . 02424
Case3 -. 57085 . 04848
Case4 -. 52237 . 09696
Case5 -.42541 . 19392
Case6 -. 23149 . 38784
Case7 . 15635 . 77568
Case8 . 93202 1. 55135
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5.3.2.4 The Distortion Test
No solution is without its price, and the application of the zero based scoring technique appears to exact
two. The first is the most troublesome. The inclusion of a control case unarguably alters the spread of
the study data sets. As noted above, the factor patterns and score coefficients did not change, but a
cursory review of scores for airframes with and without the control case showed the changes in the values
of the derived factor scores for the active cases.
The magnitude and direction of the changes had to be determined along with their effect on relative
rankings. Factor scores were generated for five of the attribute groupings of the airframe data set under
two conditions, one with the control case and one without. Ordinal rankings were determined for each
attribute pair, and the results compared using a non-parametric correlation procedure. The results are
depicted in Table 5.5. Clearly, the effects of the insertion of the control case on relative case rankings was
negligible.






Air- to-Ground Range 0.9988
Air-to-Air Range 0. 9906
External Ordnance 0.9991
To put the effects of the insertion of the control case in perspective, the same test was conducted,
this time removing two active cases from the file (a fighter-interceptor and a ground attack fighter). The
effect on the speed, maneuverability, and air-to-air range scores was comparable. However, the correla-
tion of scores for the air-to-ground range and external ordnance attributes dropped to .9709 and .9566
respectively. Thus, it can be safely assumed that the insertion of the control case has at least no greater
ttftttttttttttttttttt
Ironically, the inclusion of zero values forced a more normal distribution for several variables which
were skewed to the right.
All factor scores represent relative values within the confines of the factor space. Hence, the addition
or deletion of any case, active or control, will change the relative scores and may change the relative
rankings. These changes are a result of the standardization transformation which is applied to all
absolute values prior to score generation.
16 Case by case results were also reviewed. The vast majority of rankings remained the same. Only a
handful changed bv more than two positions and just one "by more than two positions (four). With
the exception of the inexplicable four position change on one case, most ot the changes could be
traced to order reversals among variants of the same basic airframe (i.e., MiG-25R and MiG-25U,
Mirage-FIA and Mirage-FIB). While the reason for this phenomena is unclear, its effect is inconse-
quential.
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effect on relative case rankings than would the addition or deletion of active cases.
Although the effect of the control case on the scores' rank orders was inconsequential, it is prudent
to observe its impact on the score values themselves. The same paired lists of scores were compared
through the Wicoxon Signed- Pairs Test to determine the direction and locus of differences. Output sta-
tistics reflect the same tendencies for each pair of lists. The means of the values falling in the first two
quartiles were higher (less low) for the factor scores computed using the data sets including the control
case. The reverse was true for values which fell above the median. The means, standard deviations, and
and value ranges decreased slightly for the lists computed with the zero base. For each pair, the number
of cases in which the zero based score increased was larger than the number in which the reverse was true.
Within the more compact value ranges, scores toward the higher end of the scale increased slightly while
those toward the bottom decreased, providing greater differentiation. Predictably, the two-tailed signifi-
cance tests rejected the hypothesis that respective distributions were not similar (P = .0000). Coupled
with the results of the rank order correlation test, these statistics suggest that the insertion of the control
case does not adversely distort the sets of attribute factor scores. Conversely, an argument could be made
that the zero values provided a more well-defined representation of the actual ratio differences among the
active case input values, although this would be difficult to substantiate.
5.3.2.5 The Scale Test
The second price exacted by the adjusted scoring technique concerns the comparability of inter-attribute
measurement scales. The raw scores for the zero point varied considerably among the attribute sets,
ranging from a low of -1.90708 for the ordnance attribute to a high of -4.85510 for maneuverability.
Thus, their inverses constitute an uneven threshold. The threshold values themselves would in effect
determine a portion of the relative weight accorded each attribute during the additive phase of the scoring
process, mirroring the problem caused by adding disparately scaled values discussed at the beginning of
the chapter. After several false starts involving the computation of a grand mean across the attribute data
sets, a variation on the indexing technique was adopted. The concept of indexing each attribute to the
values for a given system satisfies the objective within the subsystem groupings, but fails to provide the
desired common frame of reference across subsystems. A more viable alternative is to index each attribute
score set to its own means. Considering the nature of the adjustment process, the mean of each score set
I 8
is equal to the inverse of the raw factor score of the set's control case. To cast the adjustment process
t+ttttttttttttttttttt
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Changes in case composition are made regularly. The initial airirame file, for instance, grew from 86
to 125 cases over the course of the study. Since any list of cases represents a sample oi a larger uni-
verse, the etfect of the inclusion or exclusion of cases does not constitute a invalidating factor. It
merely expands or contracts the space within which relative values are determined.
18
Since the raw factor scores are standardized, their mean is 0. Adding the inverse of the raw factor
score for absolute to the mean case creates a mean equal to the value of the inverse.
- 83-





+ (% *-D)/(% *-l). where: I
fi = Adjusted Factor Score for Casel
f i = Raw Factor Score for Case 1
fn = Raw Factor Score for CaseO.
5.3.3 A Reduction Method
The path might have been tortuous and its end, like that of any data reduction scheme, a less accurate
portrayal of reality than its contributing parts, but a modestly geared factor analysis technique has suffi-
cient merit on balance to warrant its employment. Of the alternatives, it best satisfies the four criteria for
effective data reduction postulated in the introduction. Applied at the subsystem level in conjunction with
subjective appraisal, it defines the groupings of variables which most efficiently captured an attribute's
value. At the attribute level, it generates raw factor scores which portray the relative value of each case on
a given attribute. Finally, the ratio properties of case scores can be restored in relation to a control case,
and the adjusted scores indexed to their means to create a common frame of reference across attributes
and subsystems. The outputs from this chain of analyses form the inputs along with the values for the
nominally scored variables and relational variables to formulae computing a weapon system's relative
technical potential in combat roles. These, in turn, can be mated with with force propagation attributes
to determine aggregate potential at the national level.
5.4 Data Reduction Results
The spadework done, it remains to generate adjusted factor scores for the various subsystem attributes and
judge the results subjectively. This section will touch on the salient points associated with each data
reduction iteration, capsulize results, and offer some subjective assessments of them. Complete listings of
the adjusted factor scores for each subsystem are presented in Appendix E.
5.4.1 The Airframe Subsystem
Scores for the five attributes comprising the airframe subsystem were derived using the minimalist factor
analysis technique described in the preceding section. The raw and adjusted factor scores for the top 15
scoring airframes are displayed in the tables for each attribute. Some cautionary notes are in order
regarding interpretation of the data in the tables. Most importantly, the scores have been adjusted math-
matically, but no modification has yet been made to account for the influence of nominally scored char-
acteristics such as variable camber wings (maneuverability) or navigational capability (range). The per-
ceptive reviewer will also note that, in some instances, airframes with slightly different raw factor scores
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are shown as having the same adjusted factor score in the display tables. This anomaly is caused by the
truncation for display purposes of the latter value to three decimal places. The automated files retain five
decimal place values, which are used in aggregate score computations. The question may also arise as to
why similar variants of an airframe have different scores on the same attribute, in particular maneuver-
ability and detectability. It should be remembered that each variant is specifically configured, and its
combat weight calculated on the basis of that configuration. Thus, the Tigershark variant whose radar has
the continuous wave target illumination option installed (F-20A) is configured with AIM-7 and AIM-9
air-to-air missiles, while the other variant (F-20) carries only the lighter AIM-9's. Since combat weight or
a composite variable of which it is a component is involved in the factor analysis of these two attributes,
19
the scores can be dissimilar and legitimately so.
5.4.1.1 Speed/Energy Attribute
The raw and adjusted factor scores for fifteen airframes which scored highest in the 125 airframe set are
depicted in Table 5.6. The location of the Mirage-FIE at the top of the list might seem surprising.
However, the most capable configuration of this aircraft has modifications to cockpit transparency and
wing leading edges which give it a Mach 2.5 capability at altitude, while retaining a Mach 1.2 top speed at
sea level. Like all of the later model Dassault fighters, it also has a high rate of climb. The placement of
the MiG-25R, which set high altitude speed records, in sixth position might also take some reviewers
aback. But the MiG-25's have a relatively poor speed capability at lower altitudes due to their airframe
design and structural composition. In fact, the positioning of the MiG-25's is an endorsement of the
principal that a single dimensioned 'marker' variable is insufficient to portray a meaningful picture of
combat speed. Finally, it is instructive to note that 1 1 of the 15 aircraft which rank highest on the speed/
energy attribute are not of U.S. or U.K. design. It has been observed that designers from these two
countries have recognized the limited applicability of speeds in excess of Mach 1.8 in most combat sce-




Where multiple variants of a basic airframe have the same score on an attribute, the score is credited
to a single designator describing all the variants to which the score applies (i.e., I' I5/A/B/C/D).
See Gunston, Modern Air Combat pp. 14- 17, and pp. 186- 193, for an informative discussion ot the








MIRF1E 1. 71643 1. 734
MIG29 1. 36185 1. 582
MIG31 1. 32272 1. 566
MIR2000C/T 1. 31800 1. 563




1. 19940 1. 513
F15A/B/C/D 1. 18451 1.506
SU27 1. 12331 1.480
MIG23G 1. 09501 1.468
F15E 1. 09396 1.468







The factor scores scaling relative maneuverability, Table 5.7, will perhaps provoke the most controversy,
since the results seem to challenge the assumed ascendancy of the lightweight fighter in this attribute.
However, it must be remembered that the attribute adresses maneuverability in two dimensions, energy
maneuverability or acceleration and instantaneous turning performance. The former dimension contrib-
utes to the positioning of the F-15E and SU-27 at the top of the list. It also bears mentioning that the
performance data on these fighters and on the MiG-29, Mirage-4000, and other new models are predicated
on design goals or prototype test results and not on operational performance. It can be safely assumed
that many of the values on yet-to-be-fielded systems will be altered when they reach operational status
and track records are scrutinized. The high maneuverability rating of the planned export version of the
Harrier (HARMK80) is consonant with its high thrust-to-weight ratio. In a continuation of a previous
comment, note that 12 of the top 15 scores are awarded to fighters of American or British design. The
maneuverability values shown will be further modified during the scoring procedure when the effect of
devices which vary their wing camber is considered.
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F15E 2. 32053 1.468
SU27 1. 87997 1. 389
F16A 1. 86495 1. 386
F16B 1. 85503 1. 384
F15C 1. 83723 1. 380
F15D 1. 78677 1. 370
MIG29 1. 74691 1. 361
F20 1. 72460 1. 357
F20A 1. 61733 1. 335
MIR4000 1. 61681 1. 335
F16CSC 1. 57651 1. 326
F15CFP 1. 55900 1. 323
F16C 1. 51086 1. 313
HARMK80 1. 50160 1. 311
F16D 1.43996 1.298
5.4.1.3 Air-to-Air Range Attribute
The highest relative air-to-air range or endurance scores for interceptors and multi-role fighters are listed in
Table 5.8. The F-15CFP is an F-15C configured with conformal fuel tanks (FAST packs), which increase
its sub-sonic area intercept and ferry ranges considerably. While ferry range has no intrinsic combat qual-
ity, it suggests an airframe's endurance enhancement potential if external fuel tanks and fuel efficiencies are
employed. Only two of the newest Soviet fighters appear near the top of this group which is dominated
by Western produced airframes.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
21 i •
This association is arguable. But a high fuel, light weapons load option would be called tor in some
Mideastern combat scenarios where endurance is a primary concern. Iranian F-14s were reportedly
employed in this configuration in the early stages of the war with Iraq. Thus, some measure of
endurance expandibility potential was believed important enough to include. The same logic was
used in deriving the air-to-ground factor scores.
- 87-




F15CFP 2. 35225 1. 717
F15E 1. 78011 1. 542
F14AC 1. 84757 1. 563
MIR4000 1. 70393 1. 519
F15C 1. 52780 1.466
F15D 1. 34757 1. 411
TORADV 1.27140 1. 387
MIR3NG 1. 17925 1. 359
F15A 1. 17463 1. 358
MIRF1E 1. 03482 1. 315
F15B . 99440 1. 303
FA18L . 99292 1. 303
SU27 . 95923 1. 292
MIRIIIE . 95836 1.292
MIG31 . 86412 1. 263
5.4.1.4 Air-to-Ground Range Attribute
The top two positions in the air-to-ground range attribute list, Table 5.10, went to the two Soviet built
bombers deployed in Middle Eastern countries. The inclusion of the earlier model F- 15 variants in this
attribute group could be challenged. However, they do have a secondary attack capability if appropriately
configured. In fact, some reports claimed Israeli Air Force F-15s participated in the bombing of the Osi-
raq nuclear reactor. The extraction of scores in a secondary role on this attribute acknowledges the
potential while offering no suggestion of its attainment. The air-to-ground potential scoring logic will
consider the mission of the unit of assignment and the configuration of the air weapon system before ren-
22
dering a score at the force level. The Tornado Interdiction Variant (TORIDS) recently ordered by
Saudi Arabia scored well on this attribute, as did several of the older single purpose ground attack fighters
(A-7E, A-7P, Mirage-5D2, and A-4H). The air-to-ground range scores will be given the added dimension
of 'effective' range, when modified by navigation capability values in the scoring process.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
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Saudi Arabian F-15s are not equipped for air-to-ground missions, nor are their aircrews trained in
them.
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TU22BD 4. 74706 2. 924
TU16AG 4.29450 2. 740
F15CFP 2. 04871 1. 830
F15E 1.49469 1. 606
F15C 1. 39035 1. 563





F15D 1. 25992 1. 511
MIR3NG 1. 19300 1.483
A4H 1. 19024 1.482
IL28 1. 10718 1.449
F15A 1. 03215 1.418
FA18L . 93925 1. 381
MIR4000 . 62108 1.252
5.4.1.5 Air-to-Ground Ordnance Attribute
The air-to-ground ordnance attribute scoring problem considered two aspects: the maximum ordnance
weight which could be carried and the number of positions on which it could be carried. The results for
the top 15 scoring airframes are included in Table 5.12. The number of stations was included in the factor
problem to capture the flexibility in ordnance mix engendered by multiple stations. The large number of
weapons positions available propelled the A-10A over seven other systems which have a greater total car-
rying capacity. While this result might raise eyebrows, the facet of multiple weapons type capability
which it portrays is important. The F-4MOD in the third position is a 'paper airplane' at present, a
design proposal developed by the Boeing Corporation and the Israeli Air Force to modify a portion of the
IAF's F-4s drastically to increase range and carrying capacity. Note the presence of just two Soviet fight-
ers in the top grouping, the SU-25 and SU-22 ground attack aircraft. Soviet fighters generally scored low
on this attribute and on the air-to-surface range attribute, indicative of the relatively weak air-to-ground
potential of aircraft supplied Middle Eastern clients by Moscow. During score computation, the adjusted
scores will be further differentiated to account for the precision and non-precision ordance delivery capa-
bilities of the host aircraft.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
yx ......
An alternative scoring process was also tried for this attribute, simply indexing maximum external
ordnance to the mean of the of the variable set. The results shifted some individual scores, but the
rank order correlation remained relatively high (r = .7917). The indexed scores were retained for
further sensitivity analysis in the combat potential computation phase.
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TU22BD 2. 96083 2. 342
F15E 2.43530 2. 095
F4M0D 2. 39578 2. 077
TORIDS 2. 09097 1. 935
MIR4000 1. 88353 1. 838
TU16AG 1.83921 1.814
A10A 1. 82164 1.813
FA18L 1. 57579 1. 692
SU25 1. 30224 1. 571
F4EF 1. 27546 1. 546
F15CFP 1. 23371 1.530
F16A/B/C/D 1. 15844 1.495
LAVI 1. 03694 1. 448
MIR2000C/T 1. 03520 1.437
SU22 1. 01349 1.431
5.4.1.6 Detectability Attribute
The final table, Table 5.13, lists the results of the vulnerability to detection segment of the factor scoring
process. Unlike the preceding tables, Table 5.13 depicts the 15 airframes with the lowest scores, the ones
least likely to be detected based on their size and combat configuration. The factor scores will be one of
four elements of the vulnerability to engagement compuation. The others are speed, maneuverability, and
electronic combat capability.
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F5B -. 81507 . 594
F5E -. 71492 . 644
F5F -. 69438
. 654
RF5E -. 69432 . 654
F104GCF -. 67349 . 664
F20 -. 66937 . 666
F20A -. 65667 . 673
HARMK80 -. 65291 . 675
MIG21F -. 64302
. 680
MIG21C -. 64136 . 680
PRCF7 -. 64136 . 680
MIG21JKL -. 63966 .681
5.4.2 Target Acquisition Systems
As noted previously, all of the ratio level variables which described a target tacquisition system's detection
potential loaded positively on the same factor. The results of the factor scoring process for the ten highest
scoring systems, all multi-mode or air intercept radars, are depicted in Table 5.14. The large and powerful
AN/AWG9, which is fitted to the F-14A/C topped the list, followed by the very capable Marconi/ Ferranti
FOXHUNTER air intercept radar carried by the Air Defense Variant of the Tornado. The AN/APG70
is a multi-mode system which will be installed in the F-15E, while the AN/APG63 and AN/APG64 are
associated with operational variants of the F- 15. The AN/APG67 is the multi-mode radar General Elec-
trics produced for the F-20A, and the AN/APG68 is the up-graded system installed in the latest F-16's.
The 'FLANRAD' and 'HOUNDRAD' are the radars installed in the two newest Soviet interceptors, the
SU-27/Flanker and MiG-31/Foxhound respectively. Their performance characteristics have been esti-
mated. The RDM is a multi-mode radar produced by Thompson-CSF for installation in export versions
of the Mirage 2000 series. The detection values for the target acquisition effectiveness attribute will
change somewhat when they are combined with nominally described characteristics (electronic counter-
counter measures, track while scan, and doppler beam sharpening) in the combat potential computations.
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AWG9 2.24577 2. 189
FOXHUNT 1. 96710 2. 042
APG70 1. 96316 2. 039
APG64 1. 92754 2. 021
FLANRAD 1. 85371 1. 982
HOUNDRAD 1.75172 1. 928
APG63 1. 66166 1. 880
APG67 . 90713 1.480
APG68 .84123 1.445
RDM . 71547 1. 379
5.4.3 Air-to-Air Missile Subsystems
In no aircraft subsystem are the tradeoffs between performance and vulnerability to detection and defeat as
evident as in the air-to-air missile category. The size required to house a more sophisticated radar based
guidance system, a larger warhead, and sufficient propellant to generate longer ranges increases the poten-
tial that the missile will be detected and outmaneuvered. Relative lethality scores are displayed in
Table 5.15. All the missiles placing in the top ten depend on radar guidance. All but two, AIM-54
(PHOENIX) and AIM-120A (AAMRAM), have semi-active radar homing (SARII) terminal guidance
systems, forcing the launching aircraft's radar to continue target illumination until impact. This factor,
which increases the launch aircraft's own vulnerability, will be considered in the combat potential compu-
tation.
Several of the missiles which gained the highest lethality scores are also the ones most susceptible to
detection and defeat, as demonstrated in Table 5.16. While the top of the list is occupied by an older
missile not among the top performers, the Soviet AA-6 (ACRID), the remaining entries correspond to six
25
of the missiles which ranked highest in performance. The western edge in micro-electronics can be
assumed to have contributed to absence of AAMRAM and the newest French radar guided missile (Super
530 D) from the top of the vulnerability list. The vulnerability scores will be further adjusted to account
for the guidance system's resistance to electronic counter-measures and will denominate the overall com-
bat potential score.
tttfttttttttttttttttt
Gunston points out, for instance, that a pilot who has detected a Mach 3 air-to-air missile with a
30G turning limit can outmaneuver it by making a 3G turn at 450 knots. See Modern Air Combat,
p. 15.
The 'B' model designator on Soviet missiles is assigned to those variants of the basic missile which















AA9A 1.20678 1. 685
ASPIDE . 84823 1.483
AIM7E . 84823 1. 362
SUP530F .62061 1. 352
AIM120A .61216 1. 347
AA7A .58902 1. 334
SKYFLASH .52188 1.296







1. 75773 1. 757
AA7A 1. 13195 1.488
AA7B 1.08042 1.466
AA9A 1.06897 1.461
ASPIDE . 78797 1. 340
SKYFLASH .73226 1. 316
AIM7D . 63438 1.273
AIM7C . 56567 1.244
SUP530F .53167 1.210
5.4.4 Aerial Gun Subsystems
The assignment of meaningful descriptive titles to the two factors associated with aerial guns was not
clearcut. Rate of fire and muzzle velocity loaded heavily on the first factor, while the other variables
loaded moderately, with the exception of calibre, which loaded negatively. The second factor showed
heavy loadings for calibre, maximum effective range, and accuracy. The identifications of the two group-
ings (rate of fire and effectiveness) are subjective approximations of the attributes they represent. The top
ten scores for each attribute are listed in Table 5.17 and Table 5.18 respectively. The patterns depicted
reflect reasonable relationships among the relative overall effectiveness of the weapons.
The two factor scores will be combined according to their relative contribution to overall performance
variance in developing a single measure of gun effectiveness. When mated to an airframe, their effcctive-
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GAU12U 1.58126 1. 646
GAU8A 1. 51434 1. 619
MKIIM0D5 1.43403 1. 586
M61A1 1.43403 1. 586
NR30GAT 1. 34511 1. 556
XM27E1 1. 00225 1.410
M39 . 98490 1.403
GAU2BA . 90187 1. 369
M28 . 90187 1. 369
GAU13A . 75365 1. 308
ness will be further differentiated by the host's ordnance carrying capacity (rounds) in developing a net
gun potential value. Several of the guns in the analysis are mounted in external pods. These are not
mated to aircraft in the present configuration file, but scores were generated for them so that they could be
considered as armament options in later analyses if desired.




GAU13A 1. 68924 1. 573
GPU5A 1.44211 1.489
DEFA554 1.44211 1.489
MAU27 1. 30054 1.441
KCA30 1. 19218 1.405
XM8 1. 10246 1. 374
DEFA553 . 97522 1. 331
M621 . 73419 1. 249
M5 . 63167 1. 214
GAU8A . 63055 1.214
5.4.5 Maintenance Force Quality
As remarked earlier, the use of national scores to quantify relative measures of the quality of maintenance
forces is an illustrative sidebar to this study. Nevertheless, the process through which the relative values
were derived deserves brief mention. The four variables standing in for motivation (armed forces per
thousand, military expenditures per capita, military expenditures as a percentage of GNP and as a per-
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centage of central government expeditures) and the two suggesting technical capacity (literacy rate and
percentage of eligibles in secondary school) were introduced into a factor problem. A notional country
with zero values was added to the 22 active cases, and scores extracted. Although two factors emerged
under rotation, all variables loaded significantly (at least 0.6) and positively on the first one. It was
selected as being sufficiently representative. The raw and adjusted factor scores for all 22 countries are
listed in Table 5.19. Adjustments to this data set were made in a slightly different fashion than for weap-
on systems. It was assumed that the the qualitatively most proficient maintenance personnel would gen-
erate one perfect maintenance manhour. Relying on historical observations, the quality of Israeli mainte-
nance manpower was assigned a value of one, and all other observations were scaled to it in proportion to
their raw factor scores.






Israel 2. 37109 1. 000
Jordan 1.45151 . 790
UAE 1.00045 . 688
Iraq .97870 . 683
Oman . 75180 . 631
Syria . 61468 . 600
Qatar . 61238 . 599
Libya .46904 . 567
Saudi Arabia .44771 . 562





Iran -. 15596 .424
PDRY -. 24876 .403
Bahrain -. 34915 . 380
Somalia -. 64010 . 314
YAR -. 82650 . 271
Tunisia -. 82826 . 271
Algeria -. 83542 . 269
Morocco -. 92810 . 248
Ethiopia -1.05612 . 219
Sudan -1.28085 . 168
While these data are patently superficial, the relative associations among the countries are generally
congruent with other studies and subjective appraisals. They should be approached gingerly, recognizing
the fact that the input data captured only a fragment of the societal and organizational complex wluch
determines force quality. The quality of maintenance force indices will be used to modify the man main-
tenance hours available data in the final step in the national air combat potential equations.
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5.5 Summary
Data were reduced to a manageable matrix through a system which capitalizes on the most attractive
aspects of several different data reduction techniques. The resultant body of data represents the relative
quantities of each attribute which a subsystem possesses with the loss of significant information minimized
to the extent permitted by any reduction scheme. Variables not lending themselves to higher orders of
measurement were not forced into statistical problems ill-suited to their evaluation. Most importantly, the
temptation to substitute neat statistical formulations for weighting relationships better determined by
expert operational judgment has been eschewed. Within the context of the study framework, the bulk of
the information required to calculate estimates of national air combat potential is now in place.
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Chapter 6
AIR COMBAT POTENTIAL SCORE COMPUTATION
Having plowed through the variable selection, data collection, and data reduction processes, the final step,
air combat potential score computation, is almost anti-climactic. The evolution of national force level
scores follows the hierarchical path outlined in Chapter 3. Air weapons scores are first computed at the
subsystem level. These scores are aggregated, in turn, at the air weapons system level in consonance with
specified system configurations and relational utility values. The force propagation branch computations
are less elaborate. Raw inventories must be transformed into operational mission specific force levels and
potential sortie rates estimated. In the ultimate step, the two branches are joined to calculate the maxi-
mum relative combat potential a national force could expect to achieve under optimum circumstances on
a given day. The nuts and bolts of the scoring sequence are outlined in the following sections, addressing
the air weapon system process first.
6.1 Air Weapon Systems
6.1.1 Principles
Before dissecting the individual system scoring iterations, a few general comments are in order. The com-
putational philosophy adopted in this phase is derived substantially from the TASCFORM ' method-
ology. While the following aggregation formulae and input variables deviate in some significant aspects,
the path cut by TASC offered the most thoughtful and comprehensive approach encountered. Some rel-
evant assumptions undergird the specific procedures.
First, air weapon subsystems and systems are treated as linear combinations of attributes and sub-
systems respectively. The single exceptions are measures of vulnerability, which are used to depreciate the
potential of the system as a whole. While the assumption of linearity sacrifices the dynamic of synergy
among system parts, the latter proved impossible to capture in a broadly based aggregated model.
Second, before subsystem scores are computed, the raw attribute values evolved in the data reduction
phase are modified by nominal values for those characteristics which enhance or diminish their potential
but which were not suitable candidates for factor scoring. Variables such as electronic combat suite and
navigation capability are examples of modifying variables. Since all of the modifying variables were nom-
inal, indicating the presence or absence of a combat related quality, the scoring strategy aimed at assigning
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them values which reflected their functional impact on the attribute being modified. For the most part,
analogous values were extracted from the TASC study, recast to accommodate procedural differences, and
submitted to a panel of fighter experts for review. Values were adjusted in accordance with the panel's
recommendations. As with any modifying factor or utility value in the computation process, their values
can be adjusted by users to accommodate differing perceptions or priorities.
Finally, combat potential scores are computed as a function of the mission(s) in which the air weap-
on system might conceivably be employed. Four mission areas are addressed: air defense, fighter or air
superiority, interdiction, and close air support. For the purposes of this investigation, the air defense mis-
sion includes point and barrier defensive counterair operations. The fighter mission represents over-the-
battlefield air superiority and escort employments. Interdiction includes deep interdiction and offensive
counterair operations, and the close air support mission area subsumes direct air support of ground forces,
battlefield area interdiction, and counterinsurgency applications. Mission differentiation among the com-
bat potential scores for a given system is a function of its configuration and the mission specific relative
utilities extracted from the aircrew survey discussed in Chapter 4. As with the modifying variables, these
utility values are user-adjustable during score computation.
6.1.2 Airframes
The relative potential of an airframe in a combat role (AF ) is a product of the attribute values for
airspeed/energy (NFSS), maneuverability (NFSM), and range/endurance (NFSR ) and their respective
relative utility values (e.g., US for the relative utility of the airspeed/ energy attribute). The maneuver-
ability attribute is modified by a factor (MA) which accounts for the influence of devices which vary wing
camber, such as leading edge slats or maneuvering flaps, thus enhancing turning performance. The precise
effect of such devices varies from airframe to airframe. In the absence of specific data, a general value of
1.2 was selected as representing the best estimate across the field. Specific values can be substituted when
known. The range/endurance value is modified by two factors, one of which is linked to aerial refueling
capability (RA) and the other to navigation capability (NA ). Since aerial refueling is dependent on the
availabilty of tankers, it will not be included in the baseline calculations. Its effects will be demonstrated
in a country-specific example later. The navigation modifier aims to transform theoretical range into
effective range by tapping the capability of an airframe to exploit its full range potential. An experienced
navigator assigned relative values to navigation categories ranging from dead reackoning (.6) to global
positioning system (1.4). These values were further differentiated according to the relative importance of















To demonstrate the implementation of this equation, the following example is the computation of
the combat potential score for the F-16C in the fighter mission role. The F-16 has leading edge flaps and
trailing edge flaperons for increased maneuverability and is equipped with an inertial navigation system.
AF
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6.1.3 Target Acquisition Systems
The target acquisition computation assesses an aircraft's target acquisition systems' potential to detect,
identify, and provide engagement related information concerning a target in various combat roles. Mis-
sion and aircraft non-specific scores (NFSTA) were derived for individual subsytems in the data reduction
phase. The air weapon system configuration hie mated subsystems to aircraft variants. As was the case
with the airframe calculation, several of the initial subsystem attribute values are modified by nominally
measured characteristics in the initial phase of the computation. Visual acquisition capability is enhanced
by multiple aircrew members. Differing expert opinions were offered on the percentage improvement in
visual acquisition afforded by a second set of eyes, noting that experience, workload, and personal quali-
ties were key determinants. In the absence of a consensus, a factor (VA) of 1.3 was identified as an aver-
age position. Radar scores did not consider nominally described variables such as the presence of track
while scan, doppler beam sharpening, and target illumination capabilities or address a system's relative
resistance to electronic counter measures. Presence of a track while scan capability was estimated to
enhance target acquisition by 30 percent in the air-to-air roles, and doppler beam sharpening by 20 per-
cent in the air-to-ground roles. The target illumination modifying value was set at 1.2 for laser systems
which provided a self-designating capability. These values were combined for each system into a modify-
ing variable (TAA ). Resistence to electonic countermeasures values (ECCM) ranged from 0.7 to 1.1.
Values were awarded to systems based on descriptions of their frequency agility, side lobe suppression,
and other features which diminish the effects of countermeasures. Utility values weight the subsystems'
relative contributions to successful target acquisition in four combat roles. The target acquisition score
(TA v calculation for an aircraft with visual (TAV), radar (TAR) and secondary subsystems (TAS) would


















Again, the F-16C in a fighter role is presented as an example. It is a single-seat fighter equipped in
this configuration with an AN/APG68 multi-mode radar and a laser range finder. Since the laser range
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finder has no application in a fighter role, the value for a secondary acquisition system is set to zero. The
AN/APG68 has track-while-scan and doppler beam sharpening capabilities and has a relatively high
degree of resistance to electronic countermeasures. Just the values in the final equation are depicted
below.
TAf= (.22*215) + (.51*2.290) + (.17*0)
TAf= 1.256
6.1.4 Weapons Payload
The calculation of weapons payload potential values (PL ) involves a number of steps and, unlike those
for the previous subsystems, is applied in two different forms depending on mission category. The
expression for aerial guns will be presented first, followed by discussions of air-to-air missiles and air-to-
ground ordnance.
6.1.4.1 Aerial Guns
Aerial guns were scored on two attributes, the rapidity and velocity with which they could deliver ord-
nance (NFSRAT) and its effectiveness (NFSEFF). A third factor associated with the host aircraft, the
volume of ordnance available, must be entered into the equation. The total number of rounds carried by
each aircraft was computed and indexed to the mean of the data set. The resulting variable (NRND) is
used in the scoring process to modify the NFSRAT value. Since values for the relative utility of rate and
volume of fire (URAT) and ordnance effectiveness (ULEF) had not been established via the aircrew sur-
vey, they were assigned subjectively. The equation for the mission non-specific combat potential score for
an aerial gun (PLG) is:
PLG = (URAT+NFSRAT+NRND) + (ULEF+NFSEFF)
When applied to the M61A1 carried by the F-16C, the associated values are:
PLG = (.6+1.546+1.573) + (.4+1.073)
PLG = 1.889
6.1.4.2 Air-to-Air Missiles
The data reduction process scored air-to-air missiles on two attributes, performance (NFSPERF) and
vulnerability to detection and defeat (NFSVUL). Two descriptive variables, guidance system type
(GLTDTYP) and susceptibility to electronic countermeasures (ECS) modify the respective attribute
scores. The values associated with guidance type (GUDIDSC ) were assigned subjectively, considering
such features as relative accuracy and the ability to track a target without continuing input from the
launching aircraft. The values ranged from .7 for a command guided missile to 1.2 for one with its own
active radar homing system. The modifying factors were further differentiated by their launch parameters
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within or beyond visual range and the weight of that capability in air defense and fighter type engagements
respectively. A weight of one was awarded an infra-red guided system in a fighter role at the low end of
the spectrum, while a weight of 1.6 for an infra-red system with beyond visual range capability in the air
defense role topped the list. The susceptibility to electronic warfare modifier was also constructed sub-
jectively, relying largely on descriptive information. Missiles least vulnerable to electronic warfare (to
include chaff and flares) were assigned a value of .8. Those with high susceptibility were assigned a value
of 1.1. Combat potential scores (PLM ) were computed for missiles in each of the air-to-air roles






Note the use of the modified vulnerability value as a denominator. This combinational technique
acknowledges that a system's vulnerability to defeat depreciates the value of its performance in full pro-
portion. A sample computation is shown for the AIM-9L missile carried by many U.S and Western








A single air-to-ground ordnance attribute score (NFSO) was extracted during data reduction, but greater
differentiation is needed to account for precision guided munitions capability (PGMC) and avionics sys-
tems which enhance the accuracy of unguided ordnance delivery. Precision guided munitions are unar-
guably more accurate than their unguided cousins, producing more effective 'bang' for the same ordnance
load 'buck'. However, the extent to which accuracy is enhanced over that provided by a combination of
freefall ordnance, modern release point computers, and head-up displays is the subject of considerable
debate. Individual comparisons of specific weapons, delivery parameters, and target arrays can be com-
puted using weaponeering algorithms. However, these are not suited to application in a study such as
this. Consequently, modifying values were assigned in accordance with the following assumptions. A
stability augmented (SA) aircraft with a modern release point computer (CRP) and a head-up display
(HUD) can deliver freefall munitions at accuracies approaching those of all but the most advanced preci-
sion guided systems. While precision guided munitions display greater accuracies, their effective employ-
ment can be degraded by dust, haze and darkness and by their somewhat rigid delivery parameters. While
their theoretical accuracies might eclipse those of freefall ordnance by a factor of four or higher, their
practical combat accuracies are more modest. The accuracy value of freefall ordnance delivered by a sta-
bilized platform equipped with a release point computer and a HUD was assigned a baseline accuracy
TTT++JTT+TJ++j++ -[-"fff•f
No such svstem is currently operational, but the iogic was included in the scoring sequence to permit
expandability.
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value of one. The generic precision guided munition (OAPG) was assumed to be 40 percent more effec-
tive on the average. A descending scale was used to score non-guided mumtions delivery accuracy
(OANG) ranging from 1 for a full suite of delivery assistance equiptment to 0.2 for an aircraft with just an
iron sight. The two following equations apply:
PLO = (NFSO*OANG)
PLO = (NFSO+OAPG)
Substituting the values for the F-16C, which can deliver precision guided munitions and which is














Computing an aircraft's payload potential score (PL ) is a matter of combining invidual weapons type
scores in accordance with information specified in the configuration file and weighting them according to
relative utility values by mission (UIM , URM , UGU ). PL is computed separately for the air-to-air












The number of missiles carried (NAAMI or NAAMR, infra-red and radar guided respectively) is divided
by two to establish an indexed basic load. Earlier tests showed that, without this convention, the cumu-
lative weight of multiple missile scores dominated subsequent air weapon system calculations. The F-16C
is again used to demonstrate the computation. The latest version of the F-16C equipped with the
AN/APG68 radar is reportedly capable of carrying radar guided (SARH) missiles. The following calcula-
tion is based on a weapons suite of two AIM-7F's, two AIM-9L's, and an M61A1 aerial gun and
addresses the fighter mission.
PL
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A similar set of equations determine payload potential scores in the air-to-ground missions. The rel-










Substituting values and relative weights for the F-16C in an interdiction role, the equation would read:






As noted earlier, vulnerability to engagement has two contrary dimensions, detectability and the ability to
avoid engagement once detected. The first dimension is captured by the size attribute scored in the data
reduction process (NFSV). The second is a product of an aircraft's speed (NFSS), maneuverability
(NFSM), and electronic warfare capability (EC ). The first two avoidance attributes were determined
previously. Electronic warfare capability is influenced by the ability to know that one has been detected
(RWR) and to degrade the effectiveness of opposing target acquisition systems through passive (PECM)
or active (AECM) means. These variables are nominally described, so the first task is to develop values
which represent their influence in avoiding detection and engagement. The basic assumption governing
the assignment of values was that possession of the full suite of electronic warfare capabilities applicable to
a given mission would diminish an aircraft's vulnerability to the full value consistent with the relative util-
ity of ECM in a combat role. Since the vulnerability equation is additive, an aircraft with a full comple-
ment of ECM assets would have an EC score of zero. Weights for the relative utility of each system in
varying roles were determined subjectively after discussion with fighter experts. EC values were comput-









An aircraft with a full ECM suite would score 0; one with no ECM capability would score 1.
With the establishment of the EC values, all the information required to formulate the vulnerability
equation was at hand. The offsetting nature of the two families of attributes posed a combinational chal-
lenge. Various strategies were tested before an approach which best portrayed the influence of the relevant
attributes and was conducive to further applications was identified. Initial vulnerability to detection is
largely a product of an aircraft's size. Speed, maneuverability, and electronic combat capability diminish
that vulnerability somewhat, but their most significant contribution is in avoiding engagement once
detected. The lower an aircraft's potential speed, maneuverability, or electronic combat capability, the
higher the probability it will be engaged when detected. To preserve the additive combinational form,
values for those attributes which diminish vulnerability first had to be transformed into reciprocals. The




UVE ) established by the survey and added to the value for detectability multiplied by its utility
factor (UW) Thus, the vulnerability to engagement potential of a fast, maneuverable aircraft with a full
electronic counter-measures suite would be largely limited to its detectability. In mathmatical form,
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Applying formula across the spectrum of aircraft and missions produced reasonable differentiation.
The least vulnerable aircraft in the air defense and fighter roles scored as being approximately half as likely
to be engaged as the most vulnerable aircraft accomplishing those missions. The range of values for the
interdiction and close air support missions was considerably greater due to the inclusion of bombers and
low performance aircraft in those mission areas. The ratios between most and least vulnerable aircraft in
the air-to-ground categories were 3.5 and 5.3 respectively, not unrealistic considering the the low survival
expectancy of an aircraft like an SF-260 in a moderately dense defensive environment.
6.1.6 Combining Subsystems
The final step in solving the air weapon system combat potential puzzle is to assemble the pieces accord-
ing to their relative utlities in individual combat roles. No modifying factors are involved, so the procedure
is considerably cleaner than those discussed above. Airframe, target acquisition, and payload values are




UPL ) and added. The sum is depreciated by the

















Substituting the values for the previously described F-16C equipped with two AIM-7F and two AIM-9L
air-to-air missiles, air combat potential in the fighter role would be calculated:
ACP
f




Alternatively in the interdiction role, the F-16C's combat potential would be computed:
ACPj = ((.27*1.329) + (.37+1.023) + (.36+ 1.837))/.589
ACPj = 2.374
Lacking a better term, the product of these equations will be referred to as 'Air Combat Potential
Units' (ACPU's). It should be remembered that they represent the full theoretical combat potential of a
specifically configured aircraft in a particular mission role relative to the potential of other aircraft in the
data set in the same role. Thus, adding the ACPU's of a given aircraft does not produce a measure of
total combat potential across a spectrum of missions. Altering aircraft configurations or changing the
composition of the data set will yeild different ACPU values. The methodology was designed this way to
permit evaluation of alternative configurations. Similarly, input relative utility values applicable to the
entire mission set can be modified to accentuate a given attribute or subsystem corresponding to a specific
employment environment or combat requirement. Again, the ACPU's generated will change. They are
dynamic relative indicators not absolute measures of air weapon system worth.
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6. 1 .7 Air Weapon System Results
Illustrations of the output from the air weapons system assessment process are displayed in the next four
tables, one for each mission area. Each table lists the 15 aircraft which scored highest in the category,
along with their Air Combat Potential Unit (ACPU) values and the values for their subcomponents. As
previously, multiple similarly configured variants have been compressed into a single entry for editorial
purposes, even through their exact scores differed slightly. Individual values for all aircraft arranged by
mission area are included in Appendix F. All of the mission groups are dominated by newly operational
or programmed aircraft, not suprisingly. As noted previously, the values on which their scores are predi-
cated include measures of speculation and wishful thinking. Though their position atop the lists will no
doubt be sustained, the margins of new and future systems' superiority can be expected to contract as
operational observations become available.
6.1.7.1 Air Defense Mission
Table 6. 1 contains the results from the air defense mission area computations. The margin by which the
F-15E leads the pack is a product of the fact that it is configured with six AIM-120A (AAMRAM) air-to-
air missiles. Neither they nor the F-15E are currently in service. Likewise, the ranking of the modified
F-4 being considered by the Israeli Air Force is based on design information only, as is that of the
Mirage-4000. Among the operational aircraft, current versions of the F- 15 score well across the board,
with particluarly high marks for payload potential. The F-15s carry six of the the newest models of the
AIM-7/SPARROW. U.S. lightweight fighters (F-16, FA18L, F-20A) also fare well, their less formidable
payload capability offset by lower vulnerability scores. The relatively low (within this group) position of
the F-14AC despite its undisputed excellence in the interceptor role is a product of the fact that its con-
figuration in this data set reflected the paucity of AIM-54/PHOENIX missiles available to its only opera-
tor in the area, Iran. Just two AIM-54's were loaded on the aircraft, and even that loading is overly gen-
erous. The three newest Soviet fighters (SU-27, MiG-29, MiG-31) place in the top grouping. The next
highest scoring Soviet fighter (MiG-23G) is in thirty-second position, suggesting a wide generational gap.
Final positions in the top grouping are occupied by the latest French and British entrants into the export




Aircraft With Highest Air Defense Potential
AIRCRAFT ACPa AFa TAa PLa va
F15E 5.242 1. 582 2.042 7. 762 . 703
F15C/D
F15CFP
4. 058 1. 543 2. 007 5. 264 . 711
3. 985 1.510 2.007 5. 953 . 776
F15A/B 3. 746 1.464 1. 706 5. 264 . 732
SU27 3. 148 1.474 1. 796 3. 692 . 729
F20A 2. 843 1. 342 1.485 2. 287 . 596
F16C/D
MXG29
2. 715 1.458 1.452 2. 213 . 622
2. 554 1.416 . 854 2. 808 . 633
FA18L 2. 523 1. 505 1. 262 2.440 . 672
MIR2000C/T 2.522 1.421 1. 387 2. 058 . 636
F14AC 2.459 1.439 1. 674 2. 991 . 820
MIG31 2. 370 1. 386 1. 624 2. 867 . 820
TORADV 2. 360 1.418 1. 566 2. 902 . 822
F4M0D 2. 187 1. 358 1. 279 2. 535 . 773
MIR4000 2. 104 1. 609 1. 146 2.046 . 739
6.1.7.2 Fighter Mission
Looking at Table 6.2, generally the same aircraft are represented. However, it is interesting to note
the positional changes, with the smaller lightweight fighters creeping closer to the top of the list and the
gaps between them and the F-15s shrinking. The MiG-31 and the Mirage-4000 drop out of the top group
and are replaced by the F-16A and the austerely appointed version of the F-20. Neither the F-20 nor the
F-16A carries radar guided air-to-air missiles. Despite the consequent lower payload scores, high manev-
erability and low vulnerability qualify these lightweight fighters for inclusion in the top group. Comparing
just these two tables demonstrates conclusively the benefit of employing mission sensitive relational values
in a quantitative assessment of this type. Without them, operationally or environmentally pertinent con-
siderations are overlooked to preserve statistical simplicity. The measuring instrument is leaner but inca-
pable of detecting the legitimate and force posture relevant capabilities variations depicted in these two
tables.
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Table 6.2: Aircraft With Highest Fi ghter Potential
AIRCRAFT ACP f AF f TAf PLf V f
F15E 3. 934 1.576 1. 762 5. 612 . 726
F15C/D
F15CFP
3. 065 1. 520 1. 720 3. 754 . 739
3.005 1. 503 1. 720 4. 186 . 795
F15A/B 2. 800 1.423 1.469 3. 754 . 764
F20A 2. 576 1. 382 1. 284 2.001 .594
F16C/D 2. 392 1.476 1. 256 1. 877 . 633
SU27 2.260 1.460 1.543 2. 194 . 757
FA18L 2. 185 1.508 1.097 2.026 . 692
F16A/B
TORADV
2. 158 1.513 .834 1. 726 . 614
2. 130 1.403 1. 364 2.501 . 806
MIR2000C/T 2. 130 1.414 1. 202 1. 631 . 657
F20 2. 125 1. 393 1.284 1.478 . 649
MIG29 2.057 1.436 . 756 1. 968 . 653
F14AC 2. 045 1.427 1.454 2.426 .849
F4M0D 1.880 1. 350 1. 124 2. 156 . 802
6.1.7.3 Interdiction Mission
Moving to the first air-to-ground category, Table 6.3 lists the aircraft with the best potential in the inter-
diction role. Again, the programmed F-15E, the first of that series designed specifically as a true multi-
role aircraft, is at the top. F- 15 variants which have only a secondary air-to-ground role move toward the
bottom of the group, their positions taken by multi-role fighters characterized by relatively small size, high
performance qualities, and substantial although not superior ordnance carrying capacities. The exceptions
are the modified F-4 and the Interdiction Variant of the Tornado. The former is planned to have signifi-
cantly greater range and ordnance capabilities than existing F-4's, and the latter was designed specifically
for the air-to-ground mission. Note the presence of only one Soviet fighter, the SU-27, in this group,
suggesting an apparent lack of emphasis in Soviet design on those qualities most important in conducting
interdiction operations.
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Table 6.3: Aircraft With Highest Interdiction Potential
AIRCRAFT ACPi AF i TAi PLi V i
F15E 2. 760 1.438 1. 379 2. 637 . 669
F16C/D
FA18L
2. 374 1. 329 1.023 1. 837 . 589
2.272 1. 374 .882 2. 066 . 634
F16A/B
MIR2000C/T
2.261 1. 352 . 716 1. 837 . 571
2. 190 1. 300 . 981 1. 660 . 599
F4M0D 2. 150 1. 195 . 941 2.498 . 730
F20A 2. 068 1. 238 . 928 1. 327 . 559
MIR4000 2.026 1. 360 . 842 2. 069 . 703
F15C/D
F15CFP
2.024 1.414 1.227 1. 480 . 676
1. 951 1. 388 1.227 1. 694 . 737
KFIRC7 1.898 1.262 . 705 1. 593 . 619
TORIDS 1. 897 1.291 .874 2. 160 . 764
F15A/B 1. 848 1. 331 1.055 1.480 . 694
SU27 1.831 1.205 1. 106 1.487 . 693
F20 1. 790 1.245 . 928 1. 327 . 646
6.1.7.4 Close Air Support Mission
A review of the close air support mission group in Table 6.4 reveals some suprising results when viewed
out of context. It is highly unlikely, for instance, that F-15's would be employed in a close air support
role, although they possess attributes awarded high utility values by the aircrew survey. Their inclusion in
the list does not imply employment in that role in force level aggreggations, it merely reflects theoretical
potential. The absence of traditional CAS aircraft such as the A-7, A- 10, and SU-25 is also noteworthy.
Their positions below the top grouping are strictly a product of their higher vulnerability to detection and
engagement. The A-10A, for example, was second only to the F-15E in total payload potential, but its
vulnerability to enagement was almost twice as high due to its relatively lower speed and maneuverability.
With the exception of these structural anomalies, the CAS listing again shows the high mission potential
of small, lightweight fighters with good payload capacities, maneuverability, and speed.
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Table 6.4: Aircraft With Highest CAS Potential
AIRCRAFT ACP C AFC TAC PL c V c
F15E 3. 115 1.529
. 749 2. 764 . 560
F16A/B 2. 743 1.423 .482 1.842 .462
F16C/D 2. 702 1. 388
. 596 1.842 .480
F20A 2. 651 1. 300 .462 1. 691 .440




. 573 1. 998 . 570
2.401 1.235 . 587 2.401 . 612
F15CFP 2. 362 1. 518 . 573 2. 146 . 610
F20 2. 329 1. 310 .462 1. 691 . 502
MIR2000C/T 2. 251 1. 316 .566 1.461 .497
F15A/B
F16CSC
2. 247 1. 367 .509 1. 998 . 588
2. 103 1.414
. 340 1. 632 . 539
MIR4000 2. 068 1.430 .515 1. 709 . 594
KFIRC7 2.035 1.292 . 379 1.432 . 509
F4EF 1. 944 1. 120 .410 1. 936 . 616
6.2 Force Propagation
6.2.1 General Comments
The technical combat potential of air weapons systems is only realized in their employment. The force
propagation side of the air combat potential equation addresses those factors which govern the quantity of
available technical potential which a national air force might generate under optimum conditions in spe-
cific missions areas. As noted earlier, no attempt will be made to assess the relative operational, com-
mand and control, or support proficiency of individual nations in this study. Those factors constitute fer-
tile ground for research, and values derived from such research could modify the suboptimal results
produced here. In this effort, operational, command and control, and support capabilities will be assumed
to be equal.
Accepting this assumption, four elements need to be considered in assessing an air force's propaga-
tion potential: the numbers of specific air weapon systems on hand, the fraction that will be available for
employment, the role(s) in which they will likely be employed, and the number of times per day which
they can be flown. The final product of these four elements describes the daily sortie potential (SP ) for
each system in its probable combat role(s). To keep the problem manageable, sortie potential will be
calculated for a single day, representing the first day of combat. Surge operations are postulated over a 15
hour flying day, with no combat or maintenance losses considered and all non-essential maintenance
deferred. While these conditions are unrealistic, they serve the purpose of defining the outer boundary of
-T+++tttttttttttttt+t
2 A detailed combat assessment model would have to include the effect of multi-day operations, losses,
and maintenance deferrals. Operations analysts regularly employ methodologies which consider these
and other variables in analyzing specific cases. However, the construction of a detailed combat model
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a nation's force propagation potential.
6.2.2 Available Inventory in Role
The number and type of aircraft on hand were tabulated in the the air inventory file along with an indica-
tor of the primary mission to which they are assigned. Also in the file was an operational availability rate
estimated at the force level. Determining the number of aircraft available for employment is simply a
matter of multiplying the system inventory in a given year (INV
t
) by the operational availability rate
(OAR). For instance, of the 32 F-16C's Israel will possess in 1988, 29 would be available for combat at
an operational availability rate of 0.9.
Allocation of aircraft to employment roles (AL ) is a bit more cumbersome. Unit employment codes
are geared to a generic mission category (e.g., fighter ground attack) which, for the most part, subsumes
two mission areas (interdiction and close air support in the case of ground attack fighters). One unit type,
multi-role fighter (FMR), encompasses all four. Without a specific combat scenario, aircraft are allocated
equally across mission areas, with two notable exceptions. Bomber aircraft are cast only in an interdiction
role, their effectiveness in close air support being suspect. Israeli F-15's assigned to multi-role units arc
assumed to perform primarily in the air-to-air roles for which they are best suited and not at all in the
close air support role. To acknowledge their deep interdiction potential, 20 percent of the available
Israeli F-15's are allocated to that role. The remainder are equally distributed between the air defense and
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6.2.3 Sortie Rates
The number of mission area sorties an aircraft can fly in a given day (SR ) is determined by the length of
the flying day (LOD), the duration of the mission (MD ), the time the aircraft spends on the ground taxi-
ing and arming (GT.), and the time required to accomplish necessary maintenance (MT). Other factors
ttttttttttttTttttfTtt
is beyond the purview of this research project and would outstrip its resources.
3
In actuality, each svstem would have differing operational availibility rates. If credible operational
availability data could be gathered across the spectrum of systems and countries being considered, they




The F- 15 is too expensive and uniquely capable an air-to-air system to be thrust into the heavy ground
defense environment which confronts CAS missions.
Operations analysts at Northrop's Aircraft Division generously provided the outline of a simplified
technique for estimating sortie rates. Their suggestions" were essential in identifying the relevant factors
and presenting a potential computation formula. Appendix B to Epstein' Measuring Military Power
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associated with availability of parts and supplies are also important, but will be assumed to be be equal
across forces in this study. The length of the flying day has been stipulated to be 15 hours. Mission
duration varies considerably as a function of environment and mission role. The environment was
assumed to be equal for all forces and missions. Nominal mission durations were assigned subjectively by
category. They ranged from a low of .75 hours for a close air support mission to a high of 2 hours for a
deep interdiction mission. It is recognized that these values would be significantly different in a confron-
tation between Israel and Syria as opposed to one between Egypt and Libya, where greater distances
would come into play. The mission durations used in these calculations represent regional averages and
can be easily modified for country specific analyses. Ground time was estimated to be 45 minutes for air-
to-air missions and 75 minutes for air-to-ground missions, which require more elaborate arming.
Three factors needed to be considered in estimating maintenance time for an aircraft flying a particu-
lar mission (MT ): the hours flown on the mission (MD), the man-maintenance hours required to sup-
port one flying hour for the aircraft (MMHFH), and the maintenance personnel available for each aircraft






To demonstrate its use, values for a MiG-21JKL operated in a fighter role by the Syrian Air Force are







Thus, just over two and one half hours of maintenance time would be required between each mission.
If the effectiveness of maintenance personnel were to be considered, the MXP term would have to be
modified by the support quality factor extracted earlier. This indexed value (Israel = 1) would be applied
to the denominator in the formula. In the case of Syria, the support quality index value is .600. Conseq-
uently, the maintenance ground time for the same MiG-21JKL in a fighter role would increase to 4.306
hours if the force quality indicator were included. Unfortunately, the force quality values are low-
confidence estimates and will be employed just to demonstrate their effect.
The determination of a potential sortie rate for an aircraft and mission combination in the context of










To again use the example of the Syrian MiG-21JKL in the fighter role,
SR
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provided an an alternative methodology. The technique employed here borrows from both.
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If the force quality modifier were considered, the potential sortie rate would decrease to to less than 2.5
per day.
6.2.4 Sortie Production
The number of sorties which an air force could potentially generate in each mission area on a given day
can be determined by multiplying the number of aircraft available for a mission area by the system's sortie
rate in that role. In mathmatic notation, the computation is,
SP^ = OL/SR
rt rt r
Substituting values for an Israeli F-15C in the fighter role in 1988,
SP^g = (11.5*1.7)
SPfS8 = 1955
Again, the fractional values represent an average and could be truncated if desired.
Table 6.5 lists total one-day sortie production by mission for 21 Middle Eastern and North African
countries in 1988. The numbers in the far right column sum the total sorties across mission roles. The
figures are uncontrolled for maintenance force quality, so some of the sortie production totals are consid-
erably higher than would probably be the case in actual circumstances.
It could be observed that the overall Israeli sortie rate across missions (2.2) is lower than advertised
performance in the Yom Kippur War. This possible anomaly can be explained by three factors. The
average sortie durations used in the region wide computation are longer than were flown in 1973, and the
flying day is shorter. Additionally, a substantial portion of the Israeli force is allocated to the more time
consuming interdiction and close air support missions. While the Syrians could potentially (quality of
manpower being equal) produce nearly as many total sorties, the mix is quite different. Israel could gen-
erate nearly twice as many air-to-ground sorties, with Syrian sortie production concentrated in the air-to-
air missions. Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Jordan, in descending order, are the only other
countries in the region with a substantial sortie production capability. With the exception of Jordan, the
estimates for the other countries in this group would be depreciated significantly if maintenance quality
were included in the calculation. Table 6.5 also illustrates a point often made concerning the relatively!
low threat posed by Libya's disproportionately large and difficult to maintain inventory. With a low
operational availability rate and a small native maintenance pool, Tripoli cannot propagate a credible
number of sorties without enormous quantities of outside assistance. Several of the Gulf States also show
discouragingly low sortie production, largely as a factor of small maintenance pools which have not kept
pace with the influx of aircraft.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
Lebanon was omitted from this and other tables, since none of its aircraft are currently operational and
there are no indications as to when that situation might change.
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Table 6.5: Daily Sorties By Mission - 1988
COUNTRY INVEN-
TORY
ADX FTR INT CAS TOTAL
Algeria 266 79 55 31 106 271
Bahrain 12 2 2 1 3 8
Egypt
Ethiopia
419 174 121 60 136 491
150 22 52 74
Iran 47 13 9 32 60 114
Iraq 556 279 196 78 177 730
Israel 544 337 237 204 422 1200
Jordan 130 29 20 48 139 236
Kuwait 89 11 8 5 24 48
Libya 530 23 15 9 34 81
Morocco 93 30 136 166
Oman 50 6 4 9 50 69
Qatar 22 2 6 8
Saudi Arabia 214 60 41 65 144 310
Somalia 64 7 5 7 22 41
Sudan 49 10 7 11 38 66
Syria 528 445 317 114 241 1117
Tunisia 22 6 29 35
UAE 67 10 7 7 30 54
North Yemen 73 5 4 4 9 22
South Yemen 104 22 15 6 15 58
6.3 Combat Force Potential
The ultimate step in the assessment process is to meld the two branches into a value which which cat-
egorizes a nation's relative potential to conduct combat air operations under the employment considera-
tions stipulated. This step transforms input data into a mission relevant potential combat output. Math-
metically, the process is straightforward.
CFPnrt = ACP/SPnrtnrt r nrt
where,
CFP^ = Combat Force Potential for Country n in Role r in Year t
ACP = Air Combat Potential for an Aircraft in Role r
SP^ = Sortie Production for Country n in Role r in Year t.





Calculations are accomplished for each air weapon system in the inventory. The results can be eval-
uated individually or aggregated for the entire national force. Table 6.6 lists the 1988 combat force poten-
tial assessments for the Israeli and Syrian Air Forces in 1988. In this table, the quality of the respective
maintentance forces is assumed equal. Force totals are summed at the bottom of each column.
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Table 6.6: Comparative Force Potential - 1988
AIRCRAFT INVEN TYPE ADX FTR INT CAS
-TORY
ISRAEL
A4H 18 FGA C1 8. 33 25. 71
A4N 50 FGA C ) 26. 26 77. 19
F15A 18 FMR 51. 72 26. 72 6. 49
F15B 2 OCU 5. 72 2. 96 _ 72
F15C 32 FMR 114. 27 59. 97 14. 54
F16A 62 FMR 73. 41 55. 93 42. 79 116. 13
F16B 8 OCU 9. 47 7. 23 5. 55 15. 10
F16C 54 FMR 99. 45 61. 49 44. 60 111. 29
F16D 8 OCU 14. 66 9. 06 6. 61 16. 51
F4EF 100 FMR 80. 12 49. 90 39. 71 115. 53
KFIRC2 120 FMR 111. 00 84. 61 77. 93 188. 33
KFIRC7 72 FMR 98. 19 70. 22 58. 41 132. 12
TOTAL: 544 658. 01 428. 09 331. 94 797. 91
SYRIA
MIG17F 36 FGA C) 7. 59 23. 18
MIG21F 72 FIN 76. 87 65. 21 C )
MIG21JKL 84 FIN 112. 61 94. 66 C1
MIG21UM 20 OCA 22. 49 19. 03 c)
MIG23B 24 FIN 25. 80 17. 23 c)
MIG23E 48 FIN 43. 13 33. 24 c )
MIG23F 70 FGA C ) 19. 09 53. 95
MIG23G 36 FIN 44. 13 29. 24 c )
MIG23UM 10 OCG C1 c1 9. 45
MIG25 38 FIN 36. 44 23. 20 c)
MIG29 24 FIN 77. 67 44. 39 c)
SU22 42 FGA C ) 32. 60 75. 23
SU25 24 FGA C1 9. 28 28. 47
TOTAL: 528 439. 14 326. 20 68. 56 190. 28
Note: Undepreci ated for Maintenance Quality
Reflecting back to Table 6.5 which showed the two countries with nearly equal undepreciated sortie
production, the impact of air weapon system quality is vividly demonstrated. While Syria could poten-
tially generate 30 percent more air defense sorties than Israel in a single day of surge flying, the quality of
its aggregate output in that mission category is one-third less. Roughly 60 percent of Syria's air defense
force is comprised of older MiG-21 aircraft, while the least capable Israeli aircraft flying the mission is the
F-4EF, an aircraft which has significantly greater target acquisition and payload capabilities. Even the
projected addition of two squadrons of MiG-29's to the Syrian inventory is not enough to olfset the
advantage accruing to Israel through superior air weapons system technology. Table 6.6 also illustrates
Syria's relative impotence in providing air support to its ground forces. Even with the SU-25 added to its
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inventory, Syrian capabilities in the interdiction and close air support roles are dwarfed by the Israeli
potential. The Israeli MATMON B air development plan, drafted in the wake of the 1973 War, estab-
lished creation of an air force capable of striking with overwhelming power anywhere in the region as a
prime goal. This analysis reflects the attainment of that goal. As will later be seen, the IAF has built an
air-to-ground capability unmatched by Syria or any other country in the region.
If the estimated quality of maintenance support is considered, the margin of Israeli superiority in all
mission areas becomes even more pronounced. Table 6.7 depicts 1988 combat potential depreciated for
maintenance quality. The IAF would have almost a 2:1 superiority measured in Air Combat Potential
Units in the combined air-to-air missions and nearly a 6:1 margin over Syria in the air-to-ground roles.
Looking to the region as a whole, Table 6.8 depicts the aggregated 1988 combat potential scores for
8
21 Middle Eastern/ North African countries. Any number of observations could be drawn from this
chart. Overall, projected air combat potential development for all countries except Israel appears to have
focused primarily on the creation of credible air defense and air superiority capabilities. Syria, Saudi Ara-
bia, Iraq, and Egypt all will have amassed significant air-to-air combat potential by 1988 under projected
acquisition plans. Development of commensurate air-to-ground capabilities has lagged. Two factors
contribute. First, the aircraft, current and projected, acquired by Soviet clients in the region simply trail
their western produced counterparts in air-to-ground potential. Second, the primary western supplier, the
United States, has demonstrated a political reluctance to export significant quantities of capable air-to-
ground aircraft to states which might pose a potential threat to Israel.
As a result, the combined air forces of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq still fail to attain the
levels of interdiction and close air support potential credited to Israel in 1988. It should be noted that
mission capabilities are not operationally matched in combat, with the possible exception of air superiori-
ty, and do not exist in a vacuum. Thus, the combined Arab lead in air defense potential should be oper-
ationally considered in the context of Israeli interdiction potential. Similarly, the preponderance of Israeli
close air support capability is partially offset by the numerically superior ground forces Arab states could
theoretically commit.
In the critical Persian Gulf, the Saudi acquisition of the Tornado package will boost its capabilities,
in asscociation with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to a position of parity with the
other dominant air power in the region, Iraq, by 1988. In North Africa, Egyptian potential overwhelms
-r-+-f-+++-j"f"|-+++-j-+++-!"r-f"f"f
7 .
Since the measure of maintenance quality is indexed to the Israeli raw value, the Israeli figures are
unchanged from the previous table.
8 A full listing of nationally agcregated combat potential scores differentiated by mission for the 1984 -
1990 time frame can be found" in Appendix G.
9
This example does not imply that the combined combat potential of those Arab states could be
cumulatively brought to bear against Israel. Although such an asssertion is occassionaly made in tiring
the political kettle, it consitutes a logistic, command and control, and intra-Arab political impossibility.
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Table 6.7: Comparative Force Potential - 1988
AIRCRAFT INVEN TYPE ADX FTR INI i CAS
-TORY
ISRAEL
A4H 18 FGA C) C) 8. 33 25. 71
A4N 50 FGA C ) C ) 26. 26 77. 19
F15A 18 FMR 51. 72 26. 72 6. 49
F15B 2 ocu 5. 72 2. 96 . 72
F15C 32 FMR 114. 27 59. 97 14. 54
F16A 62 FMR 73. 41 55. 93 42. 79 116. 13
F16B 8 OCU 9. 47 7. 23 5. 55 15. 10
F16C 54 FMR 99. 45 61. 49 44. 60 111. 29
F16D 8 OCU 14. 66 9. 06 6. 61 16. 51
F4EF 100 FMR 80. 12 49. 90 39. 71 115. 53
KFIRC2 120 FMR 111. 00 84. 61 77. 93 188. 33
KFIRC7 72 FMR 98. 19 70. 22 58. 41 132. 12
TOTAL: 544 658. 01 428. 09 331. 94 797. 91
SYRIA
MIG17F 36 FGA C) C) 5. 69 18. 50
MIG21F 72 FIN 57. 76 48. 07 C
MIG21JKL 84 FIN 84. 61 69. 77 C
MIG21UM 20 OCA 16. 90 14. 03 C
MIG23B 24 FIN 17. 78 11. 70 C
MIG23E 48 FIN 29. 90 22. 69 C
MIG23F 70 FGA C ) C) 13. 00 38. 72
MIG23G 36 FIN 30. 42 19. 86 C
MIG23UM 10 OCG C ) C) C 6. 87
MIG25 38 FIN 25. 58 16. 03 C
MIG29 24 FIN 56. 07 31. 48 C
SU22 42 FGA C ) C) 23. 22 56. 90
SU25 24 FGA CI C) 6. 91 22. 56
TOTAL: 528 319. 02 233. 63 48. 82 143. 55
Note: Depreciated for Maintenance Qual:-ty
that which could be generated by Libya without tremendous assistance from the Soviet Bloc. To the
south, Sudan's potential in all missions is modest and does not match the air-to-ground potential available
to Ethiopia, while Somalia lacks a significant capability in all but the close air support roles. Across the
Bab-el- Mandeb, North Yemen would clearly require assistance from Saudi Arabia to contest South Yem-
en's superiority in all mission areas. Finally, there is no doubt that Algeria will maintain a dominant air
position in the Maghreb. The Tunisian and Moroccan air forces are simply too small and too undere-
quipped to pose a credible match.
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Table 6.8: Combat Mission Potential - 1988
COUNTRY INVEN- ADX FTR INT CAS
TORY
Algeria 266 69. 17 50. 88 15. 85 59. 68
Bahrain 12 1. 93 1. 53 1. 16 3. 72
Egypt
Ethiopia
419 202. 51 145. 21 36. 58 107. 27
150 C) 12. 59 38. 62
Iran 47 25. 55 15. 63 25. 80 66. 35
Iraq 556 247. 39 190. 79 64. 85 177. 67
Israel 544 658. 01 428. 10 331. 95 797. 91
Jordan 130 46. 34 32. 53 43. 73 152. 29
Kuwait 89 16. 37 11. 55 2. 98 17. 76
Libya 530 25. 86 17. 22 8. 99 30. 49
Morocco 93 C) 34. 25 114. 47
Oman 50 14. 26 8. 90 8. 48 37. 89
Qatar 22 C) 1. 99 6. 14
Saudi Arabia 214 226. 56 120. 31 71. 53 199. 05
Somalia 64 3. 45 2. 79 2. 20 8. 35
Sudan 49 7. 11 5. 91 5. 29 20. 81
Syria 528 439. 14 326. 21 68. 55 190. 29
Tunisia 22 C) 6. 07 23. 56
UAE 67 26. 30 15. 14 3. 21 16. 03
North Yemen 73 3. 39 2. 71 2. 66 8. 05
South Yemen 104 19. 38 13. 01 5. 67 16. 27
Note: Undepreciated for Maintenance Qua.Lity
6.4 Summary
These thumbnail analyses are representative only and by no means exhaust either the relevant questions
pertaining to air development in the region or the analytical potential of the assessment methodology.
Further examples will be offered in Chapter 7 which exercise these application attributes. What this
chapter has demonstrated is that an analytical regimen which countenances the combined contributions of
technical capability and force propagation to potential output in specified air combat roles is a viable
assessment tool. The elimination of any one of these considerations (technical potential, mission rele-
vance, propagation potential) leads to conclusions which lack military and, to some extent, political rele-
vance. One may quarrel legitimately with individual input values in this data set and with the assump-
tions under which they were combined; but there can be no argument as to the essentiallity of their
consideration in an analysis which attempts to measure the effect of weapons transfers on national air




The goal of this research was to develop a military analysis tool which could assist policy makers in
developing, evaluating, and supporting security assistance packages. The mechanism has been described
and implemented and some individual results highlighted, but its efficacy in producing decision relevant
data still needs to be established. The model as it stands produces results dictated by the input data and
underlying assumptions. As such, its output is static and conceivably unresponsive to the problems, pri-
orities, and perceptions of a user evaluating a specific security assistance question. In Chapter 1, it was
noted that a model which could not be molded to meet user denned criteria would inevitably fail to gen-
erate policy relevant results. To avoid this pitfall, features have been included in this methodology which
permit user directed modifications of assumptions and, in many instances, of input data. This chapter will
demonstrate the sensitivity of these features in evaluating a security assistance question and suggest some
additional categories of questions to which it could be directed.
7.1 Criteria
E. S. Quade, in his discussion of the role of analysis in supporting policy decisions, posits a cycle which
an analytical regimen must transit. He describes a ten step process which begins with the determination
of analytical objectives and criteria, flows through data collection and model design, applies the model to
assessing alternatives for evaluation and interpretation, and ends with the reassessment o( assumptions and
alternatives for reintroduction into a subsequent analytical phase. Without delving into the paradigm s
elements too deeply, two key concepts bear mention in the context of this effort. Most significantly, the
analytical process is iterative. It must accommodate the introduction of evolving alternatives and chang-
ing assumptions if it is to present the decision maker with options pertinent to his problem. The model
which it employs must, therefor, be adjustable at each phase of its operation. The interpretation of ana-
lytical output demands decision maker participation, the effectiveness of which is largely a product of liis
appreciation of the methodology's assumptions, input data, and combinational scheme. To question and
change any of these essential elements, the decision maker must have access to them and be able to make
alterations to suit his requirements. The methodology proposed for assessing the impact oi air weapon
systems' transfers on recipient force structure and regional military balances possesses those attributes
ttttttttttttttttttttt
i
See Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions, pp. 50-66 for a thorough discussion of the steps in policy
analysis and their interrelationships.
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which permit the decision maker not only to test alternatives but also to alter the conditions under which
they are tested.
The analytical example offerred in the next section is geared to illustrate the methodology's flexibility
in responding to hypothetical decision maker directed changes at various junctures in the analytical pro-
cess. In particular, the capability to modify input data and underlying assumptions is emphasized, along
with the potential to derive new alternatives and evaluate their effectiveness. Methodological results will
be interpreted strictly on their own merits, recognizing full well that the actual interpretation process
would by necessity involve a host of considerations exogenous to the model.
7.2 Enhancing Jordanian Air Combat Potential
Rather than trekking through a series of discrete problems, this example will consider a single secunty
assistance question and its permutations. The security assistance dilemma presented by Jordan's require-
ment for an advanced air defense fighter embodies many of the elements which confound arms transfer
policy makers. Jordan is a long- time American arms client whose strength and stability are critical to
regional security. It is threatened sporadically by a much more powerful neighbor, Syria, whose Soviet
patronage and radical tendencies are antithetical to Washington's regional objectives. Jordan is also puta-
tively threatened by Israel, whose policy of aggressive deterrence includes regular overflights of Jordanian
territory. Conversely, Jordan itself is viewed as a threat by Israel, America's closest ally in the region.
Consequently, any security assistance to Jordan must be evaluated not only in the context of its own
2
defense but also in terms of the potential threat it poses to Israeli security.
From a military perspective, Jordan is highly vulnerable to incapacitating air attacks from either of its
more powerful neighbors. Much of its industry is concentrated in along the Dead Sea; 60 percent of its
agriculture is confined to the eastern Jordan Valley; and its economy is highly dependent on free access to
the port of Aqaba. Its power and water supplies are likewise inviting air targets. Both the Syrian and
Israeli air forces currently have the capability to overwhelm Jordan's air defense system, and those capa-
bilities will increase over the next five years as new systems are introduced. The air component of Jor-
dan's air defense system is currently limited to 38 Mirage F-1/B/C/E's, with which Amman is not entirely
satisfied.
Against this admittedly sketchy backdrop, the elements of a question to which the air capabilities
methodology could be applied can be drawn. In 1985, Amman requested United States' assistance in
enhancing its air defense capabilities to counter the projected threat into the 1990's. One component of
++++T+ttT++tttttttttt
2 See Cordesman, Jordanian Arms and the Middle East Balance, pp. 39-42, for a discussion of threats to
Jordan and incidents of Israeli overflights. This example will not treat the political dynamics of the
problem or become embroiled in the debate of who threatens whom. The intent of tliis section is to
demonstrate methodological flexibility, not to evaluate Middle Eastern political questions. The influ-
ence of political perceptions and objectives would be applied outside of the methodology.
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the package was a request for 40 air defense fighters. The American response is currently adrift in a
political maelstrom, and it is not the intent of this illustration to reenergize it or advocate particular alter-
natives. Nonetheless, the Jordanian air defense enhancement request provides a demanding vehicle with
which to flex the proposed analytical methodology. What pertinent questions are tractable to quantitative
military analysis? First, it can evaluate the relative combat potential of alternative air weapon systems in
the projected employment environment. Second, it can test the impact each alternative makes on national
air capabilities. Third, it can assess the effect of the proposed arms transfer on the regional military bal-
ance under varying scenarios. In the Jordanian case, the first problem is to identify and evaluate the air-
craft and configurations feasible for transfer under the constrictions imposed by the terms of the request
and American transfer policy.
7.2.1 Aircraft Alternatives
Two aircraft are likely candidates to meet Jordanian requirements: the F-16C and the F-20A. In defer-
ence to probable political restrictions, it is hypothesized that the aircraft would have to be configured in
such a way as to preclude their effective employment in an air-to-ground role. Further, the transfer of a
capability to launch radar guided air-to-air missiles is stipulated as being destabilizing vis-a-vis Israel. It
might be remembered from a previous chapter that modified versions of the F-16C and the F-20A have
already been configured in the study data set, identified as the F-16CSC and F-20 respectively. The
F-16CSC is equipped with the AN/APG66 radar which does not have the capability to illuminate targets
for radar air-to-air missile guidance. Additionally, the CCRP/CCIP feature of the fire control system has
been omitted to complicate effective air-to-ground ordnance delivery. The AN/APG67 radar associated
with the F-20 has been similarly limited, with options to support BVR radar guided missiles and enhance
ground tracking capabilities eliminated. Both systems will be configured for the air-to-air role with four of
the latest export version of the Sidewinder (AIM-9P), which lacks a foreward hemisphere engagement
capability. To extend the frame of reference, a French aircraft, the Mirage-2000C, is also evaluated on the
surmise that it might be an alternative from the Jordanian perspective if Washington denied Amman's
request. Of course, the French alternative would not be subject to U.S. imposed constraints; so its con-
figuration was not altered from that already exported to other Middle Eastern states. Air-to-air combat
potential scores were computed for each aircraft using the techniques, assumptions, and data discussed in
earlier chapters. The results of the initial inquiry are displayed in Table 7.1.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
3 • •
See Gordon, 'Administration Urges Congress to Accept Arms Sale to Jordan', for a description of the
requested arms package and its supporting rationale.
It needs to be clearlv understood that these particular assumptions and other like them cited in this
example are included for the purposes of illustration only ancf do not correspond to U.S. government
policies, perceptions, or practices.
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Table 7.1: Combat Potential in Air-to-Air Roles







Note: Scores computed with system defaults
As a reminder, the numbers shown represent units of air combat potential (ACPU's) credited to the
air weapon system alone. ACPU's are relative measurements within the confines of the study data set.
They do not connote absolute values of independent merit. The higher scores awarded the F-20 in rela-
tion to the F-16CSC are primarily the products of a more effective radar and a lower vulnerability to
engagement. The fact that the F-20 has a greater gun ordnance capacity also plays a marginal role in
producing higher ACPU ratings. These factors offset the relative superiority of the F-16CSC airframe in
both roles. The Mirage-2000C garnered the highest ratings largely because of its equippage with radar
guided air-to-air missiles, which are afforded a high relative utility in the air defense mission. In reviewing
the initial findings, note that the assumptions under which the default relative utility values had been
established were predicated on a nominal regional employment environment which did not correspond
entirely to the situation facing Jordan. Given the compact defensive environment, it is probable that the
range attribute is overemphasized, as is the relative utility of radar guided air-to-air missiles. To correct
this deficiency, utility values were adjusted to lessen the impact of range and radar missile capabilities on
the overall computation. The results of the second iteration are displayed in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Combat Potential in Air-to-Air Roles - Revised










Note: Scores computed with revised utility values
While the Mirage-2000C still receives superior scores due to its multiple missile type carriage, its
margin of superiority lessens as a function of the lower relative utility awarded the radar guided missiles.
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The impact of the changed utility values on the comparison between the F-16CSC and F-20 is negligible,
although both score higher as a result of the modifications. If the inquiry were terminated here, it would
appear that the F-20 represents a more favorable American alternative when only air-to-air applications
are considered. It is also evident that either American alternative is inferior to the Mirage- 2000C when
combat potential is considered under asymetrical political constraints in an employment vacuum. Of
course, only the first step in the inquiry has been completed.
7.2.2 Force Structure Impacts
The next challenge is to measure the effect of the proposed transfers on the Jordanian air defense force
structure. To accomplish this task, additional information needs to be extracted from the data set and
modified in accordance with inquiry objectives. First, alternative air inventories must be formulated.
According to a least one report, the first F-20s could be delivered within 2.5 years of a decision, with the
full package in place within 5.5 years. Initial F-16CSC deliveries would be delayed an additional year.
Information concerning Mirage-2000C production schedules was not available, so it was assumed first
deliveries could take place within three years of an order. For the sake of the illustration, it was postulat-
ed that all deliveries would be completed by 1990, a risky assumption in the case of the F-16CSC, but one
which is suitable to the demonstration. In deference to data base limitations, it will be assumed that the
notional analysis is being conducted in response to the initial request, with a decision anticipated before
the end of 1985.
Based on the above, F-20's were introduced into the Jordanian inventory begining in 1988, with all
40 delivered by 1990. All 40 F-16CSC's were also forecast to be in place by the end of that year, as were
all the Mirage-2000C's, the delivery of which would have begun in 1989. The results of the force level
computations are displayed in Table 7.3 Again, a couple of reminders might be useful. The capabilities
embodied in the transfers under study are integrated into a pre-existing force structure, so the Air Combat
Potential Unit ratings constitute aggregated totals. Additionally, the force level computations include a
sortie generation algorithm which considers an aircraft's maintenance requirement (man maintenance
hours/flying hour) and mission specific sortie lengths. Consideration of these factors creates even greater
differentiation among the options than was exhibited when the sterile air weapon system ratings were
examined.
Regarding this table, additional dimensions of the assessment process come into focus. First, the
earlier availability of the F-20, if accurate, provides a more immediate payoff. Second, the low mainte-
nance overhead associated with the F-20 permits a higher sortie generation rate which more than com-
pensates for the higher weapon system scores received by the Mirage-2000C. On the basis of this force
level analysis, it appears that the F-20 represents the most effective air-to-air combat choice for the Royal
Jordanian Air Force, even when the French option is considered.
- 122-









































Note: Computation used unmcidified data and system defaults
7.2.3 Modifying Assumptions and Packages
7.2.3.1 Alternate Assumptions
Upon reviewing these results, the user might again decide that some of the input data need further revi-
sion. For instance, it could be observed that the maintenance requirement for the F-20 (15 MMH/FH) is
not derived from an evaluation of fielded systems and might be overly optimistic and that the F-16CSC
estimate (23 MMH/FH) is a bit pessimistic. Consequently, the maintenance figure for the F-20 could be
raised to match user perceptions and the F-16CSC estimate lowered. Table 7.4 displays the results of a
computation when the maintenance requirement for the F-20 is raised by four hours and that for the
F-16CSC is lowered by two. The recomputation places the F-16CSC in a more competitve position in
the 1990 time frame with the Mirage-2000C, although the F-20 still enjoys a definite advantage.
ttttttttttttttttttttt
This statement in no way is meant to impugn the estimates made by any aircraft producer. These
variations are included solely to demonstrate methodological flexibility.'
- 123 -





































































7.2.3.2 Alternate Package Composition
On the basis of these preliminary findings, it could be hypothesized that the F-20 package merits addi-
tional evaluation. Table 7.5 portrays the impact of the 40 aircraft F-20 package on overall Jordanian force
potential, this time including the air-to-ground assets. Jordanian interdiction and close air support capa-
bilities are provided primarily by 56 F-5E's. CASA C-101's (14) join the inventory beginning in 1988 to
accomplish the counterinsurgency mission, which is subsumed into close air support in these calculations.
The calculations used in compiling this and subsequent tables incorporate the assumption and data revi-
sions postulated earlier.
Table 7.5: Jordanian Air Combat Potential
1988 1989 1990
Air Defense 75. 91
Fighter 53.56
Interdiction 43. 73









Total 325.50 383.50 452. 11
For the sake of this demonstration, an assumption could be made that proposal of a 40 aircraft
package would be politically inopportune but that a smaller complement might be palatable. Recognizing
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Jordan's precarious security situation, it might be advisable to couple the reduced package with assurances
of American support in case of Syrian aggression. While this hypothesis is a bit far-fetched politically, it
would reduce Israeli sensitivities to the proposal while bolstering Jordanian confidence. A tentative secur-
ity package was envisioned which would limit the number of aircraft to 24 but which would pledge
American air refueling support for air defense missions and supplementary maintenance support for all
F-20's in the case of war with Syria. Under this proposal, 12 F-20's would be delivered in 1988, with an
additional 12 the following year, mirroring the original delivery proposal. No further deliveries would be
accomplished. The results of this notional formulation on Jordanian air combat potential are depicted in
Table 7.6.






Total 339.36 405.91 405.91
87. 02 123. 05 123. 05
56. 32 80. 29 80. 29
43. 73 44. 45 44. 45
152. 29 158. 12 158. 12
The impact of aerial refueling and supplementary maintenance (20%) support can be seen most
clearly in the air defense scores for 1988 and 1989. Potential air defense combat output in each of these
years is significantly enhanced by the combined effects of increased endurance and greater maintenance
resources. Fighter mission capabilities are less noticeably affected, since tankers would not be committed
to support air superiority missions. However, the figures in the 1990 column indicate that these support
enhancements will not fully compensate for an inventory reduced by 40 percent, even though they do
make a dent in the potential deficit.
In realistic terms, this particular security assistance arrangement might be a pipe-dream, but the
potential to evaluate such complex hardware and support combinations is inherent in the analytical
methodology. One more flexibility exercise will be conducted before moving to the regional stability
issue. Acknowledging that Jordan is confronted with a relative deficit not only in air defense assets but
also in ground attack resources, a final question is to evaluate the impact of the contemplated F-20 trans-
fer insofar as it would permit the Jordanian Air Force to shift other assets to ground attack missions.
Specifically, the F-20's might conceivably replace the current contingent of Mirage F-l's in the air-to-air
ttttttttttttttttttttt
According to the manufacturer, the F-20 can be equipped with an optional refueling probe.
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missions, with the latter re-roled as ground attack assets. Table 7.7 depicts the results of that investiga-
tion.
Table 7.7: Jordanian Air Combat Potential - F-l's Re-roled
1988 1989 1990
Air Defense 75,91 60.48 100.80
Fighter 53.56 42.43 70.72
Interdiction 43.73 64.37 64.37
Close Air Support 152.29 207.12 207.12
Total 325.50 374.40 443.01
In this instance, the 37 F-lC/E's were reassigned to air-to-ground missions in 1989 after the first 24
F-20's had become available for air-to-air operations. Note the substantial drop in air defense and fighter
capabilities in 1989 which is only partially rectified with the arrival of 16 additional F-20's in 1990. At the
same time, Jordan's interdiction potential would increase by approximately 50 percent, with close air sup-
port capabilities climbing a more modest 25 percent. Given the Jordan's vulnerability to air attack and
the relative superiority of its neighbors, such a conversion would be unlikely, but its effects can be fore-
cast.
7.2.4 Assessing Regional Stability
Of course, force potential computations are only of passing interest when viewed outside their employ-
ment context. The next series of assessments places a proposed 40 aircraft F-20 sale to Jordan in two
threat environments. The first assesses the relative combat balance between Jordan and its allies against
its most threatening neighbor, Syria.
7.2.4.1 Jordan and Allies Versus Syria
At the outset, it is important to recollect that the ratings represent the balances of relative potential for a
single day of combat. They are unmodified by considerations of operational proficiency or C I support
and should in no way be construed as predictors of combat outcome. They are static rather than dynamic
indicators of potential combat effectiveness. To further explore system capabilities, it will be assumed that
Saudi Arabia and Iraq will provide Jordan limited air support in a confrontation with Syria. .Amman s
notional allies will retain all air-to-air assets for their own protection and will contribute a portion (Iraq,
50%; Saudi Arabia, 30%) of their interdiction resources for attacks against Syria. No allied close air sup-
port assets will be considered, since the command and control difficulties involved are be prohibitive. The
balance of air combat potential under this scenario is shown in Table 7.8.
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Table 7.8: Jordanian/Syrian Air Combat Balance - Allied Support
1988 1989 1990
Jordan and Allies
Air Defense 75. 91 106. 15 146.47
Fighter 53. 56 74. 78 103. 07
Interdiction 60. 66 60. 66 60. 66
Close Air Support 152.29 158. 12 158. 12
Syria
Air Defense 439. 14 434.23 544. 74
Fighter 326.21 310. 59 347. 32
Interdiction 68. 55 69.40 65. 60
Close Air Support 190.29 192. 93 181. 34
Syria's preponderant superiority in air-to-air combat potential is clearly demonstrated. Its air-to-
ground potential is considerably more modest, virtually on a par with that of Jordan and its allies. How-
ever, the comparisons which really count in this evaluation are those between the mission roles. Syrian
air defense forces have such a significant combat potential that the relatively weak interdiction effort which
Jordan and its allies could launch would not likely be any more than marginally effective from a military
standpoint. Similarly, the probability of Jordan maintaining air superiority over the battlefield would be
remote, given the overwhelming Syrian superiority in the fighter mission category. The inability to credi-
bly contest Syrian air superiority would severely curtail the potential effectiveness of Jordan's close air
support assets, even though they are on a relative par with Syria's. On the plus side, the combination of
Jordan's bolstered air defense potential and Syria's low interdiction potential distinctly diminishes the air
threat against key targets within Jordan. All other factors being held constant, the addition of advanced
aircraft to Jordan's air defense arsenal might well deter a Syrian air attack but would still not be sufficient
to carry the air war to Syria or to offset Syrian ground force superiority.
7.2.4.2 Jordan and Allies Versus Israel
A second threat environment which must be adressed, albeit reluctantly, involves war between the Arab
Confrontation States and Israel. The first problem is to define which states fit in the Confrontation cat-
egory, and the composition is by no means clear. Since the study is concerned with military potential and
not rhetoric, the Arab posture will be construed less effusively than is sometimes the practice. Syria is the
Arab hub; and Jordan will be included only insofar as the assessment concerns the impact of arms sales to
it. Additionally, Iraq and Saudi Arabia will be assumed to contribute the same level of support as was
postulated in the previous scenario against Syria. With Egypt militarily and politically neutralized by the
Camp David Accord, this line-up seems to constitute the least unreasonable of the potential threats to
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Air Defense 526. 16 494. 71 645. 56
Fighter 382. 53 353.02 418. 04
Interdiction 165. 86 187. 28 183. 48
Close Air Support 342.58 400. 13 388.46
Israel
Air Defense 658.01 669. 14 646. 84
Fighter 428. 10 434. 92 419. 70
Interdiction 331. 95 328. 01 363. 10
Close Air Support 797. 91 780. 51 746. 92
Looking at Table 7.9, combined Syrian and Jordanian air-to-air combat potential will approach that
8 .... .
possessed by Israel at the end of the decade. Relative parity in the air-to-air roles would be predicated
on Syria's acquisition of four squadrons of MiG-29's and two squadrons of SU-27's by 1990 and Jordan's
receipt of the F-20 arms package. Israel will continue to hold a clear edge in air-to-ground mission
potential, compensating for numerical inferiority on the ground. Evaluating the situation across mission
areas, the picture is less clear. The Arab potential to conduct successful interdiction operations against
Q
Israel proper in the face of the IAF's substantial air defense capability is negligible. In the same regard,
evolving Arab air defense potential might attenuate the hitherto unchallenged Israeli potential to conduct
deep interdiction operations at will. Over the battlefield, air superiority potential would suggest a virtual
standoff if other factors such as pilot skill, maintenance proficiency, and CI are held constant. Even
when this matchup is deemed a wash, Israeli capabilities to provide air support to ground forces measura-
bly* outstrip Arab potential to do the same. In a final comment, the organization and training of the
Israeli Air Force give it considerably greater flexibility in asset allocation. With F-16's, F-4's, and, to a
lesser degree, F-15's assigned to units with multi-role responsibilities, assets can be employed in combina-
tions tailored to a particular threat scenario rather than according to the static allocations used in this par-
ttttttttttttttttttttt
From a political vantage point, the inclusion of Iraq and Saudi Arabia in a colleaal effort with Syria is
improbable. From a militarv perspective, Jordan's participation would be suicidal with Egypt on the
side-lines. This example is illustrative only, not predictive or even plausible.
In this an other force level examples, the reader will note that total combat potential actuallv decreases
in some years. The seemingly counterintuitive observation is a function of the replacement logic which
decrements obsolete aircraft in unit sized increments after new acquisitions become available. When
tabluated annually, this procedure creates some inventory overlaps which would disappear if invento-
ries were tabulated on a monthly or quarterly basis
Recognizing the Arab deficit in interdiction assets, Jordanian Mirage F-l's are committed to air-to-
ground roles in this assessment of the threat to Israel.
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ticular computation. For instance, multi-role fighter could be withdrawn from the air defense mission
to gain air superiorty or to launch massive interdiction campaigns if the combat situation warranted.
To insert the impact of another dimension, quality of maintenance support, Table 7.10 depicts the
same force balance when sortie generation potential is depreciated for relative support personnel profi-
ciency. While the specific support index values might be challenged, there is no serious argument that
Arab maintenance capabilities are on a par with Israel's. As can be seen from Table 7.10, the relative
balance between the IAF and the combined Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces disintegrates when support
personnel quality is considered. A further diminution of Arab potential would surely result from any
appraisal which considered operator and CI proficiency as well, either quantitatively or subjectively.
Table 7. JO: Arab/Israeli Air Combat Balance - DepreciatecI
1988 1989 1990
Jordan and Allies
Air Defense 344. 77 365. 08 473. 70
Fighter 251.56 256. 92 303. 39
Interdiction 140.47 127. 84 138. 53
Close Air Support 317. 62 324. 75 315. 70
Israel
Air Defense 658. 01 669. 14 646. 84
Fighter 428. 10 434. 92 419. 70
Interdiction 331. 95 328. 01 363. 10
Close Air Support 797. 91 780. 51 746. 92
7.2.5 Conclusions
This string of analyses demonstrates the responsiveness of the proposed methodology in analyzing the
military aspects of a security assistance case under a variety of assumptions. The model proved useful in
assessing the relative merits of system alternatives, defining their impact on force structure, and evaluating
their effect on stability in a regional context. Most importantly, the potential for user interaction at each
phase of the process was exercised, altering computational inputs to accommodate differing perceptions or
priorities. In this light, analytical output constitutes a flexible and comprehensive input to the interpreta-
tion and deliberation process.
Using the findings from this hypothetical example, for instance, one might observe that the transfer
of a package of 40 F-20's configured for air-to-air operations is the most effective practicable response to
Jordan's requirement for a modern air defense fighter. The F-20's would create the potential by 1990 to
defend against Svrian air attacks on the vulnerable Jordanian heartland while not providing sufficient
10 Those allocations can be changed within the model to reflect differing threat perceptions, although
this was not done in the current example.
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capabilities to support offensive Jordanian air operations against either Syria or Israel. The sole threat
such a transfer appears to pose to Israel is to diminish the potential effectiveness of Israeli interdiction
operations. When depreciating factors such as the quality of maintenance support are considered, even
this impact on Israeli security is negligible.
It goes without saying that these quantitatively based observations are insufficient evidence on which
to predicate a transfer decision. Rather, they must be melded with assessments of other military factors
such as ground based air defense capabilities, ground force combat potential, and a basket of international
and domestic political considerations before a comprehensive policy can be elicited. Nevertheless, the
type of quantitative military analysis capability demonstrated here is an essential element in the process.
This fact demands that it be firmly grounded technically and methodologically, be visible to and accessible
by the user, be adaptable to alternate configuration and computational assumptions, and capture the
impact of security assistance programs on recipient combat potential output and regional balances. As
illustrated, this methodology meets the demand.
7.3 Other Applications.
Throughout most of this investigation, the spotlight has been on the development and application of an
assessment tool to assist arms transfer policy makers. It would be remiss, however, not to mention some
additional applications to which it could be adapted.
7.3.1 Air Intelligence Analysis
The same features which make the methodology viable from a policy assistance standpoint are germane to
some aspects of air intelligence analysis. There is no doubt that its focus on combat potential permits a
more relevant portrayal of air capabilities evolution than does an analysis tethered exclusively to invento-
ries. The ability to consolidate the combined influences of aircraft attributes and subsystems is even more
valuable. The cumulative effects of the strengths and weaknesses of an air weapon system's parts are
assessed all too infrequently in intelligence analyses which are boresighted on a handful of system charac-
teristics. In the same vein, the impact on combat potential of upgrades to aircraft subsystems can be
evaluated discretely or at the force level, as can alterations to force specific attributes such as mission allo-
cation or maintenance support. The iterative capability is likewise pertinent to the process of estimating
future threats under a variety of scenarios and force structures. As in the case of arms transfer policy
assistance, the methodology is not sufficient in and of itself to capture the full range oi factors which
determine threat. However, it provides exponentially more comprehensive input data to the threat
assessment process than does a mere listing of orders of battle and isolated performance characteristics.
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7.3.2 Operations Research/Analysis
Standing alone, the methodology lacks the element of dynamic interaction inherent in most operations
analysis models. While the latter are capable of stepping through multiple series of force on force combat
simulations, many rely on categorical or nominal input data. Since force quality is an integral element in
most operations analyses, system and force specific combat potential values generated by a methodology
such as the one proposed in this study could supplant nominal measures at the front end. While no fea-
sibility tests of this application have been conducted, it appears to be a productive avenue for additional
inquiry.
7.3.3 Microcomputer Processing
Throughout the discussion, several substantive and procedural defects in the air combat potential meth-
odology have been flagged as requiring further development. One additional deficiency is the fact that the
model as currently constituted is cumbersome to operate. It was constructed on an IBM 3033 mainframe
computer, using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) processing system. While this
combination provides a powerful and flexible processing environment, input data and combinational
algorithms are not readily accessible to or modifiable by the casual user. For instance, each of the analyt-
ical iterations described in the previous section required reprogramming of the logic and utility values in
several different computational modules. The procedure is effective but demands intimate familiarity with
the data sets, access procedures, and programs. To that extent, system transparency is beclouded. Initial
tests on data sub-sets suggest that the system could be installed profitably on a microcomputer outfitted
with data base management and spreadsheet software.
Conceptually, a hierarchy of menu-like screens could channel processing in the direction(s) desired by
the user and make the information which he required for a specific inquiry immediately available. Using
dBase-II as a test vehicle, a series of menu screens were constructed, the options listed in which linked the
user to specific data files. FUes were arranged to correspond to the progression of analytical nodes
described in Chapter 3 (e.g., airframe, target acquisition system, inventory). Employing the file edit capa-
bility, input data could be altered and sub-sets reserved for eventual introduction into the computational
(spreadsheet) phase. Computational variables (e.g., relative utility variables, modifying variables) were
established as 'look-up' tables in the spreadsheet (LOTUS 1-2-3) and could be inspected and altered by
the user prior to score calculation.
In execution, these procedures proved conceptually sound but tedious and at times frustrating. User
visibility and interaction were enhanced, and the requirement to delve into specific programs was elimi-
nated. However, processing was limited to segmented data sets and required the linking' of several
spreadsheets. Values for computational variables could be changed with relative ease, but evaluating dif-
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fering configurations or force alternatives required reinitiation of the entire problem definition process. In
effect, the breadboard micro-based model proved only marginally more 'user-friendly' than the original
system and was more time consuming. One additional deficiency stemmed from the fact that factor scor-
ing could not be accomplished using the system configuration available. To add a new system or subsys-
tem to a microcomputer file required regeneration of the expanded file on the mainframe system with
results downloaded to the micro.
Several of the problems experienced in attempting to adapt the analytical methodology proceeded
from the technical limitations inherent in the micro itself (Z-100 with 192K, no hard disk). Others
undoubtedly reflect the researcher's relative unfamiliarity with applicable micro software. Given these
factors, it would be imprudent to abandon the effort to adapt a version of this methodology for micro-
computer operation. With a more powerful processor and more flexible data base management software,




The objective of this research effort has been to develop a methodology which permits the assessment of
the aggregated impact of air weapon systems transfers on recipient air combat potential and regional mili-
tary balances. At the outset, it was established that a viable methodology would have to meet six criteria:
• The methodology must be oriented toward combat relevant output not system input.
• The contribution of weapon subsystems to combat potential must be addressed.
• Comparison between aircraft in definable mission roles and among aggregated national forces is
essential.
• Input data must be valid, accessible, and free from bias.
• Analytical procedures must be transparent and purged of sources of systemic error.
• Analytical assumptions must be clearly delineated and amenable to user designated variation.
8.1 Analytical Structure
To insure compliance with the first three criteria, a matrix was developed the key elements of which con-
stitute the components implicated in assessing force air combat capability. Two essential elements, air
weapon system performance and force propagation potential, were positioned at the apex of the frame-
work. They were divided into the subcomponents which define their basic dimensions. Along with the
various categories of subsystem, the air weapon system performance group included a family of factors
which related the subsystems in terms of configuration and combat utility. On the force propagation side
of the ledger, inventory, mission allocation, and sortie generation subcomponents were identified. The
importance of intangible factors such as operator proficiency and CI support was acknowledged but their
consideration deferred to other research efforts. Each subcomponent thus identified was further divided
into the performance attributes which contribute to its operation. These were in turn subdivided into the
variables which describe those attributes.
8.2 Data Collection
The articulated analytical structure constituted the data collection matrix. While absolute validity was
compromised by the requirements to consider only unclassified data and to estimate values for some
unknowns, multiple sources were cross checked to develop the most accurate values possible. When data
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were unavailable, they were estimated using the most accurate technique which could be supported. In
some instances, specific data values are consequently open to challenge. While the inaccuracies are
lamentable, they are not fatal to the evaluation technique itself and can easily be revised in subsequent
applications. Measurement biases were minimized by closely scrutinizing observation conditions and
adjusting reported values to a common measurement plane. Certain artiiical constraints were established
to expedite the process. Only fixed wing aircraft with direct combat application in recent or future Middle
Eastern combat scenarios were considered. Since the methodology aimed to support the development of
future arms transfer policies, national air combat inventories were anchored with known data from the
past two years and projected out to 1990.
The final air weapon system data set consisted of performance and configuration data on 125 aircraft
and aircraft variants, 52 target acquisition systems, 41 air-to-air missiles, and 36 aerial guns. The configu-
ration data set mated subsystems to aircraft and addressed those performance relevant characteristics (e.g.,
navigation system) for which quantitative values were not available. A unique data set was collected to
determine the relative utilities of attributes and subsystems in definable combat roles. A panel of 25
fighter experts familiar with Middle Eastern air operations was polled to ascertain their views on the rela-
tionships which obtain among attributes and subsystems in four different mission areas. The results were
synthesized statistically and recast as relational variable values to be employed during the weapon system
combinational phase.
8.3 Data Aggregation
To identify a data reduction and aggregational methodology which produced the most comprehensive
results uninfluenced by systemic bias, off-the-shelf aggregational methodologies were evaluated to identify
their assets and liabilities. Factor analysis stood out because of its ability to consolidate multiple variables
into common attribute performance measures. However, its combinational logic is haphazard when
applied at the weapon system level, and its output measures are not legitimate candidates for aggregation
at the force level. Multi-attribute utility technique produces a judgment based combinational matrix but
is administratively unweildly and naturally applicable only to ratio level data. The weighted linear aggre-
gation technique developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation incorporates expert judgment and pro-
cesses data of any measurement level but cannot accommodate multi-variable attributes and is insensitive
to performance variations within broadly defined subsystem categories. Whatever its strengths or weak-
nesses, each methodology demonstrated the criticality of solid and comprehensive data input to the pro-
duction of meaningful results.
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Capitalizing on the strengths of existing approaches, a hybrid methodology for data reduction and
aggregation was implemented. Factor analysis was employed to create relative index values for attributes
described by multiple variables. Targeted at the attribute level, this minimalist version of the factor anal-
ysis methodology purged the indices of extraneous variable influences. Ratio properties were restored to
the indices through the utilization of a zero-valued control case the factor score for which constituted a
threshold from which other scores in the data set could be scaled. Variables described by nominal values
were not included in the factor problems to preclude their distorting influences but were reserved for
introduction in the aggregation process.
The computational phase itself was adapted with a few major variations from the linear equations
developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation. The process was initiated at the bottom of the analyt-
ical ladder, combining subsystem attributes. Expert assigned values for nominally described variables were
used to modify the raw attribute scores extracted from the data reduction phase. Attribute scores were
combined in accordance with their relative air combat utilities in each mission area. An analogous proce-
dure was followed at the subcomponent and component levels, with the computations not only consider-
ing relative utility values but also conforming to specific air weapon system configurations. The product
is a set of relative combat potential scores (Air Combat Potential Units) for each of the 125 air weapons
systems in whatever mission roles were appropriate.
Force propagation values were computed in a somewhat different fashion. National aircraft invento-
ries, mission allocations, operational availability rates, maintenance requirements, and maintenance
resources were considered in a series of equations which computed the sortie generation potential for each
possessed air weapon system in those roles to which it would likely be committed. To illustrate the
impact of personnel force quality on sortie generation, an additional force level factor, the relative support
index, was also injected into selected force propagation equations. Since the variables on which the sup-
port index was predicated are considered 'soft' surrogates for personnel quality, its general application is
not recommended. However, its profound influence testifies to the requirement for such intangibles to be
considered objectively or subjectively in force propagation and air combat analysis.
In the ultimate computational step, air weapon system mission potential and national force propaga-
tion potential were mated to produce an estimate of a country's air combat potential in four mission roles
on a single day of flying. All of the modifying and relative utility values involved in weapon system and
force level calculations are explicit and can be modified by the model's user to reflect differing combat
scenarios or priorities. This feature was installed to permit user visibility and control over methodological
functions. This model is not a black-box'.
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8.4 Results
The results of the aggregation phase were reviewed to determine their efficacy both at the air weapon sys-
tem and national force levels. The results conformed to intuitive assessments and poignantly demonstrat-
ed the desirability of employing a analytical scheme which aggregates the cumulative effects of system and
force subcomponents on specific mission outputs. To further exercise the model, a phased analysis of a
specific arms transfer proposal (advanced air defense fighters for Jordan) was conducted. The model
showed itself to be responsive to the type of modifications a decision maker might stipulate in evaluating
specific weapon system alternatives, weighing their contribution to force capabilities under varying condi-
tions, and analyzing their impact on regional military balances under differing conflict scenarios.
8.5 Evaluation
The air combat potential aggregation methodology proposed in this study is a powerful and flexible
mechanism with which to analyze the composition, benefits, and liabilities of air weapon systems transfers
individually and at the force and regional levels. However, the methodology is far from perfect possessing
some drawbacks which are easily surmountable and others which might prove impervious to systematic
solution. The most prominent strengths and weakness of the of the proposed model, arranged according
to study criteria, are outlined below.
• Throughout, the focus on mission relevant combat output was maintained. However, the linear
combinational form and the absence of key combat related intangibles produce results which are
static indicators of undepreciated potential. According to the aircrew survey, technical potential
determines approximately 35 percent of combat effectiveness. Consequently, model output cannot
legitimately stand alone but must be incorporated with other analysis which addresses the the
remaining 65 percent of the question.
• The model effectively captures the performance attributes of the most prominent aircraft subsys-
tems and their relative combat utility under varying scenarios. In doing so, it permits the evalua-
tion of specific configurations and subsystem alternatives. The picture could be further sharpened if
equipment-specific quantitative values for electronic warfare equipment, air-to-ground ordnance,
and fire control computers could be integrated.
• Methodological output is composed of ratio level measurements which can be aggregated into a
virtually infinite variety of combinations to permit comparisons across any spectrum. However, the
measurements are not absolute and are relevant only in relation to other values derived from the
same data set and analytical model.
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• The data reduction and aggregation methodology is transparent and free of crippling systemic bias.
Two drawbacks are the requirement to reprocess data sets statistically to determine new relative
attribute values as systems are added to the data set and the linear computational form noted in an
earlier comment.
• Methological assumptions and limitations were underscored throughout the discussion. The more
important assumptions are represented mathmatically in the computational equations and can be
modified to accommodate revised assumptions or priorities. Given the prototype's processing
environment, making these adjustments is at present a decidely complicated and user-unfriendly'
task.
8.6 Suggestion for Further Development
The methodology's underlying philosphy, analytical framework, and combinational scheme are valid and
extendable to other regions, categories of weapons, and analytical problems. But first some enhancements
are required to shore up its validity and applicability.
• A classified data base should be created and expanded to include additional aircraft, subsytems, and
regions. This process would obviate inaccuracies and permit application to other Thrid World
regions.
• Analytical subsets addressing elements of the ground air defense environment could also be intro-
duced into the model relatively painlessly to permit analysis of a complete air combat picture.
• A microcomputer based version of the analytical methodology should be developed permitting
direct user interaction. The feasibility of a menu driven micro-based system has been demonstrat-
ed; so this objective can be readily realized given the appropriate equipment and software expertise.
• Of greater complexity is the development of algorithms which capture the synergy among system
and force components. One possibility is to attempt adaptation of existing air combat simulations
to define an alternative non-linear aggregational scheme.
• Integration of combat relevant intangibles is a similarly complex challenge. Reliable mathmatical
representations might not prove possible, but the influences of operator proficiency and the like can
be reasonably assessed by weapon system and regional experts and applied subjectively in inter-
preting model output.
8.7 Conclusion
The air weapon system potential model is not a predictor of combat outcomes, but it does provide the
decision maker with finely textured and responsive static indicators of individual weapon system and force
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potential. These indicators are essential points of departure in evaluating the military dimension of secur-
ity assistance options. With the enhancements described above, the methodology developed in this
research effort represents a productive vehicle for intelligence community participation in the secunty




A.l Middle East Combat Aircraft File
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SSPD STALL SPEED (KTS)
LIMG COMBAT G LIMIT
TURATE EST TURN RATE AT SL ( DEG PER SEC)
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FRANGE FERRY RANGE (NM)
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AIRAD AIR INTERCEPT RADIUS (NM)
GARAD GROUND ATTACK RADIUS (NM)
NGUN NUMBER OF INTERNAL GUNS
CAL CALIBRE OF GUN(S)
ROUNDS ROUNDS GUN ORDNANCE
STNS NUMBER OF WEAPON STATIONS
MAXORD MAXIMUM ORDNANCE (LBS)









A.2 Middle East Target Acquisition System File
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1. 1 VERY LOW
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A.3 Middle East Air-to-Air Missile File







AAMI AIR TO AIR- INFRARED GUIDED
AAMR AIR TO AIR- RADAR GUIDED
PRODCC PRODUCER COUNTRY CODE
DIAM MISSILE DIAMETER (IN)
LENGTH MISSILE LENGTH (IN)
MSLWGHT MISSILE WEIGHT (LBS)









WHWGHT WARHEAD WEIGHT (LBS)
FUZE NUMBER FUZE OPTIONS
MAXHRNG MAXIMUM HEAD-ON RANGE (NM)
MINHRNG MINIMUM HEAD-ON RANGE (NM)
MAXTRNG MAXIMUM TAIL- CHASE RANGE (NM)
MINTRNG MINIMUM TAIL- CHASE RANGE (NM)












1. 1 VERY HIGH
EFFHRNG EFFECTIVE HEAD-ON RANGE
EFFTRNG EFFECTIVE TAIL- CHASE RANGE
MODE MISSILE LOCK-ON MODE
VALUE LABEL
VR VISUAL RANGE ONLY
BVR BEYOND VISUAL RANGE
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GIUDADX GUIDANCE SCORE AIR DEFENSE
GUIDAS GUIDANCE SCORE AIR SUPERIORITY
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A.4 Middle East Aerial Gun File








ACCE ACFT CANNON EXTERNAL
ACCI ACFT CANNON INTERNAL
PRODCC PRODUCER COUNTRY CODE
CAL CALIBRE (MM)
MRNG MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE RANGE (NM)
DISP DISPERSION (MILS)
MVEL MUZZLE VELOCITY (FPS)
RATE MAXIMUM RATE OF FIRE ( SPM)
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A.5 Middle East Air Weapon System Configuration File

















DOP DOPPLER NAV SYSTEM
DR DEAD RECKONING
GPS GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
INS INERTIAL NAV SYSTEM
TAC TACAN TYPE SYSTEM












AAMR PRIMARY RADAR AAM
NAAMR NUMBER RADAR AAM
AAMI PRIMARY IR AAM
NAAMI NUMBER IR AAM
GUN INTERNAL GUN

















TARAD RADAR TGT ACQ SYSTEM
TAOTH SECONDARY TGT ACQ SYSTEM
MMHFH MAN MAINTENANCE HOURS PER FLYING HOUR
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A.6 Middle East Air Order of Battle 1984-1990





















































































































SPAN SURF ARWNG EWGT FWGT CWGT
30 188 4. 75 7374 3351 11805
30 188 4. 75 7749 3648 12328
29 266 3. 18 13228 4409 19621
58 506 6. 53 21541 10700 34062
36 184 7. 01 6211 3448 10775
28 260 2. 91 10100 5440 17120
28 260 2. 91 10100 5440 17120
28 260 2. 91 10800 5440 18255
39 375 4. 01 19127 10200 31727
39 375 4. 01 19781 10200 32006
35 214 5. 83 6195 2203 8797
40 186 8. 51 5093 1754 6135
40 186 8. 51 5093 1754 6135
35 215 5, 62 7606 4260 12216
35 215 5. 62 7606 4260 12216
35 215 5. 62 7606 4260 12216
38 400 3. 52 20860 10380 27432
22 196 2. 47 14082 5819 20742
38 565 2. 58 39921 16200 50335
43 608 3. 01 28000 11635 37212
43 608 3. 01 28800 11635 38012
43 608 3. 01 28000 13455 38122
43 608 3. 01 28000 23205 43001
43 608 3. 01 28800 13455 38922
43 608 3. 01 28000 13455 37064
31 300 3. 20 15586 6972 19824
31 300 3. 20 16258 5787 19904
31 300 3. 20 18259 6972 23127
31 300 3. 20 18259 6972 22433
31 300 3. 20 19059 6972 23927
31 300 3. 20 17780 6972 21954
27 186 3. 86 11220 5050 14433
27 186 3. 86 11220 5050 15127
38 530 2. 78 28000 15614 37101
39 530 2. 80 30328 15630 39525
39 530 2. 80 30328 20094 41761
25 170 3. 77 8085 3166 10012
25 170 3. 77 8361 3116 10263
27 186 3. 83 9723 4063 12099
27 186 3. 83 10576 4603 13222
37 288 4. 78 10950 3910 12905
30 195 4. 46 8598 3736 12466
25 201 3. 18 13000 5060 16282
31 180 5. 28 8750 3000 10626
31 180 5. 28 8015 3060 10315
31 180 5. 28 8015 3060 12945
31 180 5. 28 8015 3060 10315
34 349 3. 25 13270 3199 14870
34 349 3. 25 14070 3199 15670
70 655 7. 57 28417 14450 42256
29 260 3. 12 15432 7540 24452
37!
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JAGI11 FTAT 29 260 3. 12 15432 7540 24452 34612
JASTREB FTAT 34 209 5. 66 6217 2600 8727 11243
KFIRC2 FTMR 27 375 1. 95 16060 5670 19715 35715
KFIRC7 FTMR 27 375 1. 95 16060 5670 19695 35715
KFIRTC2 FTTM 27 375 1. 95 16860 5670 20105 35715
LAVI FTMR 29 350 2. 34 15500 6000 19300 37500
LIGHTNG FTIN 35 380 3. 19 28000 12000 34660 50000
L29 FTTA 40 283 5. 58 5027 1905 6200 7804
L39ZA FTTC 31 202 4. 75 8060 2122 10334 12346
MB326K FTAT 33 208 5. 24 5907 1568 8691 11475
MB326L FTTA 33 208 5. 24 5907 1568 8691 11475
MB339A FTTC 36 208 6. 10 6889 2425 10102 13000
MB339C FTAT 36 208 6. 31 7066 3523 10963 13558
MB339K FTAT 36 208 6. 31 7066 3523 10963 13558
MIG15BIS FTMR 33 255 4. 27 8115 2586 9408 11085
MIG15UTI FTTC 33 222 4. 91 7716 2586 9009 10766
MIG17F FTMR 36 265 4. 89 9220 2962 10701 13393
MIG19C FTMR 30 269 3. 41 12700 3721 14941 20062
MIG21C FTIN 24 248 2. 25 12440 4202 15301 19026
MIG21F FTMR 24 248 2. 25 12300 4300 15210 20723
MIG21JKL FTMR 24 248 2. 25 12300 4668 15394 20723
MIG21R FTRE 24 248 2. 25 12440 4300 15590 20863
MIG21UM FTTM 24 248 2. 25 13100 4300 16010 21853
MIG23B FTMR 47 400 5. 47 21250 12168 30064 41670
MIG23E FTMR 47 400 5. 47 21200 12168 28044 44312
MIG23F FTAT 47 401 5. 46 24250 12168 32534 44312
MIG23G FTMR 47 400 5. 48 21450 12168 29186 41670
MIG23UM FTTC 47 400 5. 47 22000 10300 29350 41000
MIG25 FTIN 46 612 3. 43 44100 27000 63860 79800
MIG25R FTRE 44 603 3. 21 43200 27000 60700 73635
MIG25U FTTI 46 612 3. 43 44090 27000 63850 79800
MIG27DJ FTAT 47 401 5. 46 23787 12168 33179 39685
MIG29 FTMR 34 380 3. 11 25000 8800 32242 37500
MIG31 FTIN 44 580 3. 40 48115 27000 64457 90725
MIRF1A FTMR 28 269 2. 81 16314 7379 21710 32850
MIRF1B FTTI 28 269 2. 81 16314 7379 21710 32850
MIRF1C FTMR 28 269 2. 81 16314 7379 21502 32850
MIRF1E FTMR 28 269 2. 81 17857 7379 23045 33510
MIRIIIC FTIN 27 375 1. 94 13570 5039 17789 17637
MIRIIIE FTMR 27 375 1. 94 14570 5039 18332 17637
MIRIIIEI FTMR 27 375 1. 94 14570 5039 18346 17637
MIR2000C FTMR 30 441 1. 97 16535 6513 21188 36375
MIR2000R FTRE 30 441 1. 97 16535 5860 20090 36375
MIR2000T FTTM 30 441 1. 97 17235 6513 21888 36375
MIR3NG FTMR 27 375 1. 94 17000 5959 21478 32400
MIR4000 FTMR 39 786 1. 98 24220 19539 35386 unk
MIR5DD FTTA 27 375 1. 94 15350 5842 22271 30200
MIR5DR FTRE 27 375 1. 94 14550 5842 21880 30200
MIR5D1 FTIN 27 375 1. 94 14550 5842 18714 30200
MIR5D1E FTIN 27 375 1. 94 14550 5842 18867 30200
MIR5D2 FTAT 27 375 1. 94 14550 5842 22101 30200
OV10D MIAT 40 291 5. 50 6893 1714 9550 14444
PRCA5 FTAT 32 301 3. 36 14317 6356 19700 26455
PRCFT6 FTTM 30 269 3. 39 12700 3432 14416 22045
PRCF6 FTMR 30 269 3. 39 12700 3725 14943 22045
PRCF7 FTIN 24 248 2. 25 12440 4202 15301 19026
PRCF7E FTIN 24 248 2. 25 12440 4202 15265 19026
RF4C FTRE 38 530 2. 78 29000 15164 36782 58000
RF5E FTRE 27 186 3. 83 10723 4603 13225 24722
SF260MW MITA 27 109 6. 91 1830 373 2347 2866
SF260TP MITA 27 109 6. 91 1654 403 2186 2366
SUPETEN FTAT 32 306 3. 27 14220 5428 19249 19259
SU20 FTAT 46 432 4. 90 22050 8157 30539 39020
SU22 FTAT 46 432 4. 90 22500 8580 32302 42330
SU25 FTAT 51 450 5. 73 17250 10000 26660 36050
SU2 7 FTMR 48 500 4. 51 39000 15500 48948 63500
SU7BMKL FTAT 29 297 2. 89 19040 5181 24381 29750
SU7U FTTA 29 297 2. 89 19000 5181 24341 29750
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TA4EH FTTA 28 260 2. 91 10084 5440
TA4KU FTTA 28 260 2. 91 10900 5440
TORADV FTIN 46 400 5. 20 31500 15632
TORIDS FTAT 46 400 5. 20 31065 14000
TU16AG BMAT 108 1772 6. 58 82000 56870






ACFT MAXPWR TWPWR ASPD SPECENA LSPD SPECENS CSPD SCE1
ALPHAMS1 5952 .50 487 975. 30 540 215. 54 11220 480C
ALPHAMS2 5952 .48 487 975. 30 540 215. 54 11218 480C
AMX 11030 .56 700 1195. 52 628 291. 51 15000 500C
A10A 18130 . 53 450 716. 35 380 106. 73 6000 340C
A37B 5700 .53 455 849. 11 403 120. 05 6990 4176
A4H 9300 .54 587 1071. 36 548 221. 97 8000 490C
A4KU 9300 .54 561 1032. 63 548 221. 97 8000 480C
A4N 11200 . 61 583 1067. 90 560 231. 80 10300 490C
A7E 15000 .47 720 974. 85 600 266. 10 20000 355C
A7P 12200 . 38 563 825. 96 600 266. 10 12000 355C
BAC167 3410 . 39 410 791. 19 391 113. 00 5250 4001
CM170 2116 . 34 392 613. 58 378 105. 61 3740 300C
CM170I 2116 .34 392 613. 58 378 105. 61 3740 300C
C101BB 3700 . 30 430 803. 34 373 102. 84 3780 400C
C101CC 4700 .38 450 849. 68 373 102. 84 5300 420C
C101DD 4700 . 38 450 849. 68 373 102. 84 5300 420C
FA18L 32000 1. 17 1146 1887. 41 730 393. 90 60000 5501
F104GCF 15800 . 76 1232 2088. 58 690 351. 91 50000 580C
F14AC 41800 . 83 1342 2264. 53 702 364. 26 30000 560C
F15A 47860 1. 29 1433 2601. 18 700 362. 19 50000 650C
F15B 47860 1.26 1433 2601. 18 700 362. 19 50000 650C
F15C 47860 1.26 1433 2601. 18 700 362. 19 50000 650C
F15CFP 47860 1. 11 1433 2601. 18 650 312. 29 29000 650C
F15D 47860 1.23 1433 2601. 18 700 362. 19 50000 650C
F15E 54820 1.48 1433 2601. 18 670 331. 81 50000 650C
F16A 25000 1.26 1175 1853. 83 793 464. 82 50000 500C
F16B 25000 1.26 1175 1853. 83 793 464. 82 50000 500C
F16C 25000 1.08 1175 1853. 83 793 464. 82 50000 500C
F16CSC 25000 1. 11 1175 1853. 83 793 464. 82 50000 500C
F16D 25000 1.04 1175 1853. 83 793 464. 82 50000 500C
F16J79 18000 .82 1146 1804. 08 687 348. 86 50000 500C
F20 17000 1. 18 1146 1887. 41 694 356. 00 52800 550C
F20A 17000 1. 12 1146 1887. 41 694 356. 00 52800 550C
F4CD 34000 . 92 1275 2201. 59 773 441. 67 28000 600C
F4EF 35800 . 91 1301 2230. 26 787 457. 81 28000 5875
F4M0D 41200 . 99 1301 2230. 26 787 457. 81 28000 58 7 5
F5A 8160 .82 802 1325. 43 635 298. 05 28700 5 IOC
F5B 8160 . 80 768 1285. 97 635 298. 05 28700 5 IOC
F5E 10000 . 83 934 1508. 14 661 322. 95 34500 518C
F5F 10000 . 76 894 1440. 76 661 322. 95 32890 510C
F86F 5970 .46 670 1215. 14 650 312. 29 17700 530C
G91Y 8160 . 65 544 902. 08 600 266. 10 17000 4 IOC
HARMK80 21500 1. 32 739 1257. 00 641 303. 71 20000 5120
HAWK200 5700 .54 688 1183. 21 560 231. 80 1200 5000
HAWK50T 5340 .52 575 1077. 72 535 211. 57 11800 5000
HAWK60A 5700 .44 575 1077. 72 560 231. 80 11800 5000
HAWK60T 5700 .55 575 1077. 72 560 231. 80 11800 5000
HUNTER 10000 .67 622 1202. 63 621 285. 05 17500 5500
HUNTERT 10000 . 64 622 1202. 63 621 285. 05 17500 5500
IL28 11904 .28 434 811. 72 432 137. 94 2952 4035
JAGI04 16800 . 69 917 1621. 55 729 392. 82 26100 600C
JAGI11 18540 . 76 917 1621. 55 729 392. 82 28000 6000
JASTREB 3000 . 34 422 787. 88 408 123. 04 4135 3937
KFIRC2 17900 . 91 1317 2248. 73 750 415. 78 45930 5800
KFIRC7 18900 . 96 1317 2248. 73 750 415. 78 45930 5800
KFIRTC2 17900 .89 1317 2248. 73 750 415. 78 45930 5800
LAVI 20620 1. 07 1060 1797. 18 597 263. 44 30900 5800
LIGHTNG 32600
. 94 1318 2284. 01 700 362. 19 50000 6000
L29 1960
. 32 353 592. 11 332 81. 47 2755 3000
L39ZA 3792
. 37 373 704. 50 340 85. 45 4130 3610
MB326K 3360 . 39 470 813. 81 460 156. 41 6494 3903
MB326L 3360 . 39 470 813. 81 460 156. 41 6494 3903
MB339A 4000 .40 441 943. 75 485 173. 87 6595 4800
MB339C 4450 .41 441 902. 09 490 177. 47 6550 4550
MB339K 4450 .41 441 902. 09 490 177. 47 6550 45 5
MIG15BIS 5952 . 63 582 1097. 92 567 237. 63 10400 5085
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MIG15UTI 5450 . 60 565
MIG17F 7400 . 69 570
MIG19C 14200 . 95 779
MIG21C 12677 . 83 1031
MIG21F 13688 . 90 1159
MIG21JKL 14550 . 95 1177
MIG21R 13688 . 88 1159
MIG21UM 14550 . 91 1177
MIG23B 27350 . 91 1290
MIG23E 27350 . 98 1290
MIG23F 23350 . 72 974
MIG23G 27500 . 94 1318
MIG23UM 22485 . 77 1280
MIG25 50020 . 78 1616
MIG25R 50020 .82 1616
MIG25U 50020 . 78 1616
MIG27DJ 25350 . 76 974
MIG29 38000 1. 18 1318
MIG31 61730 . 96 1500
MIRF1A 15873 . 73 1261
MIRF1B 15873 . 73 1261
MIRF1C 15873 . 74 1261
MIRF1E 15873 . 69 1433
MIRIIIC 13225 . 74 1261
MIRIIIE 13670 . 75 1261
MIRIIIEI 13670 . 75 1261
MIR2000C 19840 . 94 1347
MIR2000R 19840 . 99 1318
MIR2000T 19840 . 91 1347
MIR3NG 15873 . 74 1261
MIR4000 42770 1.21 1318
MIR5DD 13670 . 61 1261
MIR5DR 13670 . 62 1261
MIR5D1 13670 . 73 1270
MIR5D1E 13670 . 72 1270
MIR5D2 13670 . 62 1261
OV10D 2500 .26 250
PRCA5 14330 . 73 774
PRCFT6 14330 . 99 720
PRCF6 14330 . 96 720
PRCF7 12677 .83 1031
PRCF7E 12677 .83 1031
RF4C 34000 . 92 1275
RF5E 10000 . 76 894
SF260MW 475 . 20 235
SF260TP 505 . 23 235
SUPETEN 11265 .59 573
SU20 24700 .81 1220
SU22 25350 . 78 1220
SU25 18000 . 68 475
SU27 60000 1. 23 1350
SU7BMKL 19841 .81 896
SU7U 19841 .82 896
TA4EH 8500 . 50 596
TA4KU 9300
. 52 561
TORADV 33600 .81 1301
TORIDS 32000 . 67 1261
TU16AG 41900 . 32 535



































































































































































































































































































































































ACFT LIMG WLOAD TURATE PSFL100 SSPD
ALPHAMS1 9. 00 62. 66 21. 79 175. 86 116
ALPHAMS2 9. 00 65. 44 21. 76 163. 64 116
AMX 7. 33 73. 76 17. 76 243. 53 90
A10A 7. 33 67. 32 20. 86 208. 15 unk
A37B 7. 33 58. 59 17. 72 168. 65 75
A4H 7. 33 65. 85 17. 74 193. 08 unk
A4KU 7. 33 65. 85 17. 74 193. 08 unk
A4N 7. 33 70. 21 17. 82 252. 49 unk
A7E 6. 50 84. 61 15. 62 183. 59 unk
A7P 6. 50 85. 35 15. 52 108. 45 unk
BAC167 6. 00 41. 16 16. 52 10. 06 99
CM170 7. 33 32. 97 20. 97 -66. 22 unk
CM170I 7. 33 32. 97 20. 97 -66. 22 unk
C101BB 7. 50 56. 74 21. 76 -4. 70 88
C101CC 7. 50 56. 74 21. 76 63. 19 88
C101DD 7. 50 56. 74 21. 76 63. 19 88
FA18L 8. 00 68. 58 20. 24 736. 43 100
F104GCF 7. 33 105. 77 18. 00 442. 56 unk
F14AC 7. 33 89. 09 18. 09 485. 08 115
F15A 7. 33 61. 20 18. 67 821. 32 110
F15B 7. 33 62. 52 18. 63 801. 67 110
F15C 9. 00 62. 70 22. 95 799. 04 110
F15CFP 9. 00 70. 72 22. 72 695. 66 110
F15D 9. 00 64. 02 22. 90 780. 31 110
F15E 9. 00 60. 96 23. 31 980. 80 110
F16A 9. 00 66. 08 22. 96 810. 37 unk
F16B 9. 00 66. 34 22. 95 806. 69 unk
F16C 9. 00 77. 09 22. 67 678. 63 unk
F16CSC 9. 00 74. 78 22. 72 703. 09 unk
F16D 9. 00 79. 76 22. 61 652. 19 unk
F16J79 9. 00 73. 18 22. 26 456. 42 unk
F20 9. 00 77. 60 22. 82 759. 66 unk
F20A 9. 00 81. 33 22. 74 719. 67 unk
F4CD 7. 00 70. 00 17. 36 531. 41 unk
F4EF 7. 00 74. 58 17. 35 529. 72 148
F4M0D 7. 00 78. 79 17. 44 602. 60 148
F5A 7. 33 58. 89 18. 07 425. 33 unk
F5B 7. 33 60. 37 18. 04 412. 18 unk
F5E 7. 33 65. 05 18. 08 447. 99 124
F5F 7. 33 71. 08 18. 00 400. 42 136
F86F 6. 00 44. 82 14. 37 80. 59 unk
G91Y 7. 33 63. 86 17. 87 303. 04 125
HARMK80 7. 80 80. 96 19. 94 882. 33 na
HAWK200 8. 00 59. 16 19. 38 194. 89 unk
HAWK50T 8. 00 57. 43 19. 36 175. 20 unk
HAWK60A 8. 00 72. 08 19. 26 139. 90 unk
HAWK60T 8. 00 57. 43 19. 40 204. 14 unk
HUNTER 7. 33 42. 61 17. 89 228. 74 unk
HUNTERT 7. 33 44. 90 17. 85 211. 91 unk
IL28 4. 00 64. 56 9. 30 -4. 11 119
JAGI04 8. 60 93. 94 21. 07 370. 89 115
JAGI11 8. 60 93. 94 21. 17 429. 91 115
JASTREB 8. 00 41. 74 19. 13 -19. 13 85
KFIRC2 7. 33 52. 63 18. 18 485. 90 unk
KFIRC7 7. 33 52. 58 18. 25 528. 62 unk
KFIRTC2 7. 33 53. 67 18. 16 474. 30 unk
LAVI 9. 00 55. 17 22. 65 626. 13 unk
LIGHTNG 7. 33 91. 19 18. 22 520. 67 unk
L29 6. 00 21. 93 19. 45 -188. 71 71
L39ZA 5. 20 51. 05 16. 39 27. 56 90
MB326K 6. 00 41. 78 14. 30 13. 25 unk
MB326L 6. 00 41. 78 14. 30 13. 25 unk
MB339A 6. 00 48. 64 14. 31 48. 54 80
MB339C 6. 00 52. 78 14. 32 69. 97 82
MB339K 6. 00 52. 78 14. 32 69. 97 82




























MIG15UTI 6. 50 40. 62 15. 75 160. 43 unk
MIG17F 6. 50 40. 38 15. 85 220. 46 114
MIG19C 8. 00 55. 54 19. 93 449. 88 unk
MIG21C 8. 00 61. 80 19. 77 398. 72 unk
MIG21F 8. 00 61. 43 19. 87 451. 33 unk
MIG21JKL 8. 00 62. 17 19. 93 486. 52 146
MIG21R 8. 00 62. 96 19. 84 437. 87 unk
MIG21UM 8. 00 64. 66 19. 88 463. 92 146
MIG23B 7. 33 75. 08 18. 19 480. 38 unk
MIG23E 7. 33 70. 04 18. 27 522. 25 unk
MIG23F 6. 00 81. 13 14. 62 344. 34 unk
MIG23G 7. 33 72. 96 18. 23 501. 80 unk
MIG23UM 7. 33 73. 30 18. 01 370. 79 unk
MIG25 6. 00 104. 40 14. 69 413. 46 146
MIG25R 6. 00 100. 66 14. 73 441. 29 146
MIG25U 6. 00 104, 38 14. 69 413. 54 146
MIG27DJ 6. 00 82. 74 14. 67 380. 69 unk
MIG29 9. 00 84. 85 22. 82 769. 26 unk 1
MIG31 6. 00 111. 13 14. 87 608. 80 unk
MIRF1A 7. 33 80. 68 17. 97 393. 17 unk 1
MIRF1B 7. 33 80. 68 17. 97 393. 17 unk 1
MIRF1C 7. 33 79. 90 17. 97 398. 07 unk 1
MIRF1E 7. 33 85. 64 17. 91 363. 91 unk 1
MIRIIIC 7. 33 47. 44 17. 98 299. 23 unk
MIRIIIE 7. 33 48. 89 17. 98 305. 51 unk
MIRIIIEI 7. 33 48. 92 17. 98 305. 20 unk
MIR2000C 9. 00 48. 04 22. 44 494. 71 90 1
MIR2000R 7. 33 45. 56 18. 28 527. 85 90 1
MIR2000T 9. 00 49. 63 22. 40 475. 30 90 1
MIR3NG 7. 33 57. 27 17. 97 358. 40 unk 1
MIR4000 9. 00 45. 02 22. 87 709. 13 90 1
MIR5DD 7. 33 59. 39 17. 82 233. 63 unk
MIR5DR 7. 33 58. 35 17. 84 239. 61 unk
MIR5D1 7. 33 49. 90 17. 96 297. 22 unk
MIR5D1E 7. 33 50. 31 17. 96 293. 98 unk
MIR5D2 7. 33 58. 94 17. 83 236. 21 unk
OV10D 4. 40 32. 82 18. 71 -122. 09 unk
PRCA5 6. 00 65. 49 14. 63 311. 63 114
PRCFT6 6. 00 53. 57 14. 90 476. 03 126
PRCF6 6. 00 55. 53 14. 87 536. 35 126
PRCF7 8. 00 61. 80 19. 77 398. 72 unk
PRCF7E 8. 00 61. 65 19. 77 444. 33 unk
RF4C 7. 00 69. 40 17. 37 536. 99 unk
RF5E 7. 33 71. 10 18. 00 400. 31 124 1
SF260MW 4. 40 21. 59 28. 35 -322. 22 72
SF260TP 4. 40 20. 11 21. 66 -326. 29 68
SUPETEN 6. 50 62. 97 15. 73 243. 70 104
SU20 6. 50 70. 76 15. 97 399. 07 124 1
SU22 6. 50 74. 84 15. 95 386. 80 124 1
SU25 7. 50 59. 24 21. 35 279. 14 unk
SU27 9. 00 97. 90 22. 90 821. 23 unk
SU7BMKL 6. 50 82. 09 15. 98 393. 95 195
SU7U 6. 50 81. 95 15. 98 394. 76 195
TA4EH 7. 33 65. 02 17. 69 179. 45 unk
TA4KU 7. 33 68. 15 17. 72 203. 47 unk
TORADV 7. 50 103. 48 18. 49 482. 32 100 1
TORIDS 7. 50 119. 96 18. 31 373. 00 104 1
TU16AG 4. 00 73. 50 9. 32 37. 16 unk
TU22BD 4. 00 101. 76 9. 38 131. 64 unk
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ACFT AIRAD GARAD FRANGE FUFRAC CRANGE
ALPHAMS1 na 315 2160 . 31 na
ALPHAMS2 na 315 2160 . 32 unk
AMX na 480 1600 .25 unk
A10A na 300 2131 . 33 unk
A37B na 216 878 . 36 399
A4H na 375 3000 . 35 1741
A4KU na 291 1740 . 35 unk
A4N na 355 1788 . 33 800
A7E na 622 2431 . 35 unk
A7P na 622 2431 . 34 unk
BAC167 na 255 1404 .26 630
CM170 na 251 755 .26 unk
CM170I na 251 755 .26 unk
C101BB na 205 2000 . 36 unk
C101CC na 280 2000 . 36 unk
C101DD na 280 2000 . 36 unk
FA18L 575 450 2500 . 33 unk
F104GCF na 150 1566 .29 unk
F14AC 590 na 3409 . 29 1735
F15A 600 450 2604 . 29 unk
F15B 550 380 2604 . 29 unk
F15C 600 450 3005 . 32 unk
F15CFP 720 550 3450 .45 unk
F15D 550 400 3005 . 32 unk
F15E 670 490 3005 . 32 unk
F16A 550 440 2100 . 31 unk
F16B 500 400 2100 .26 unk
F16C 500 440 2100 .28 unk
F16CSC 500 440 2100 .28 unk
F16D 460 410 2100 .27 unk
F16J79 375 255 1575 .28 unk
F20 410 385 1620 . 31 unk
F20A 410 385 1620 . 31 unk
F4CD 350 270 2000 . 36 unk
F4EF 375 275 1610 . 34 unk
F4M0D 685 500 1610 .40 unk
F5A 290 187 1205 . 28 unk
F5B 290 187 1205 .27 unk
F5E 360 275 1345 .29 unk
F5F 300 225 1105 . 30 unk
F86F 310 220 1250 . 26 unk
G91Y na 305 1890 . 30 unk
HARMK80 400 250 2340 .28 unk
HAWK200 540 325 2200 .26 1950
HAWK50T na 275 1675 .28 unk
HAWK60A 440 275 2200 .28 unk
HAWK60T 440 275 2200 .28 unk
HUNTER 490 290 1840 . 19 unk
HUNTERT 525 300 1840 . 19 unk
IL28 na 538 2431 . 34 1176
JAGI04 na 451 1902 . 33 unk
JAGI11 na 451 1902 . 33 unk
JASTREB na 170 820 .29 669
KFIRC2 470 415 2100 . 26 unk
KFIRC7 540 420 2100 . 26 unk
KFIRTC2 400 365 1900 . 25 unk
LAV I 470 325 1050 . 28 unk
LIGHTNG 432 260 1600 . 30 unk
L29 na 175 480 . 27 344
L39ZA 250 200 944 . 21 540
MB326K na 145 1151 .21 unk
MB326L na 145 1151 .21 unk
MB339A 320 201 1140 . 26 950
MB339C na 330 1140 . 33 950
MB339K na 330 1140 . 33 950
MIG15BIS 300 200 1006 . 24 719
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MIG15UTI 250 150 725 .25 513
MIG17F 310 220 1070 .24 444
MIG19C 371 210 1188 . 23 600
MIG21C 400 na 971 .25 unk
MIG21F 372 217 1147 . 26 unk
MIG21JKL 400 200 971 .28 unk
MIG21R na 280 1147 .26 unk
MIG21UM 360 210 1147 .25 unk
MIG23B 470 385 1514 . 36 unk
MIG23E 470 385 1514 . 36 unk
MIG23F na 350 1514 . 33 unk
MIG23G 470 385 1514 . 36 unk
MIG23UM 420 330 1314 . 32 unk
MIG25 610 na 1392 . 38 unk
MIG25R na 487 1392 . 38 unk
MIG25U 590 450 1392 . 38 unk
MIG27DJ na 460 1350 . 34 unk
MIG29 360 325 1500 .26 unk
MIG31 810 na 1392 . 36 unk
MIRF1A 670 406 1748 . 31 unk
MIRF1B 640 376 1748 .31 unk
MIRF1C 670 446 1748 . 31 unk
MIRF1E 700 450 2036 .29 unk
MIRIIIC 416 na 2162 .27 870
MIRIIIE 648 348 2162 .26 870
MIRIIIEI 648 348 2162 .26 870
MIR2000C 378 280 2100
. 28 800
MIR2000R na 465 2100 .26 800
MIR2000T 358 260 2100 .27 740
MIR3NG 700 650 2200 .26 unk
MIR4000 870 465 2100 .45 unk
MIR5DD na 640 1950 .28 unk
MIR5DR na 700 2158 .29 unk
MIR5D1 600 na 2158 . 29 unk
MIR5D1E 600 na 2158 .29 unk
MIR5D2 na 700 2158 .29 unk
OV10D na 198 1243 . 20 270
PRCA5 na 348 1080 . 31 unk
PRCFT6 370 200 1187 .21 750
PRCF6 370 249 1187 .23 750
PRCF7 400 200 971 .25 unk
PRCF7E 400 200 971 .25 unk
RF4C na 306 2000 . 34 unk
RF5E na 285 1545 . 30 unk
SF260MW na 260 926 . 17 unk
SF260TP na 260 925 . 20 512
SUPETEN na 351 1782 .28 unk
SU20 na 340 1220 .27 unk
SU22 na 378 1480 .28 unk
SU25 na 300 1500 . 37 unk
SU27 810 350 1500 .28 900
SU7BMKL na 261 783
. 21 436
SU7U na 187 780 .21 436
TA4EH na 250 2500 . 35 unk
TA4KU na 255 1500 . 33 1500
TORADV 750 na 2100 . 33 unk
TORIDS na 751 2100 . 31 unk
TU16AG na 1565 3000 .41 2605





































































MAXORD STNS NGUN CAL ROUNDS
5510 5
5510 5 1 30 125
8377 5 1 20 350
14341 10 1 30 1174
5680 6 1 8 200
8600 5 2 20 400
8600 5 2 20 400
9470 7 2 30 300
15000 6 1 20 1032
14250 6 1 20 1032
3000 4 2 8 200
330 2 2 8 360
330 2 2 8 360
4960 6 1 30 200
4960 6 2 13 200
4960 6 2 13 200
17000 8 1 20 570
7500 7 1 20 725
14500 8 1 20 675
15500 5 1 20 940
15500 5 1 20 940
15500 5 1 20 940
16000 7 1 20 940
15500 5 1 20 940
23500 9 1 20 940
15200 7 1 20 515
15200 7 1 20 515
15200 7 1 20 515
15200 7 1 20 515
15200 7 1 20 515
11950 7 1 20 515
8300 7 2 20 900
8300 7 2 20 900
16000 6
19080 6 1 20 639
23080 9 1 20 639
6200 5 2 20 280
6200 5 2 20 280
7000 5 2 20 280
7000 5 1 20 280
2000 2 6 13 200
4000 4 2 30 200
8000 5 2 30 250
6800 5 2 30 300
1540 3 1 30 120
6800 5 1 30 120
1540 5 1 30 120
7100 4 2 30 200
7100 4 2 30 200
6614 6 4 23 650
10500 6 2 30 300
10500 6 2 30 300
2420 6 3 . 5 405
8500 7 2 30 280
12250 7 2 30 280
8500 7 2 30 280
6000 10 2 30 280
6000 6 2 30 240
440 2 2 8 200
2425 4 1 23 150
4000 6 2 30 200
4000 6 30 200
4000 6
4270 6 2 30 280
4270 6 2 30 280
2000 2 2 23 160
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MIG15UTI 2 23 200
MIG17F 1650 2 3 23 200
MIG19C 2900 2 3 30 200
MIG21C 2000 2 1 23 200
MIG21F 4400 3 1 23 200
MIG21JKL 4400 3 1 23 200
MIG21R 2000 2 1 23 200
MIG21UM 4400 3 1 23 200
MIG23B 4400 4 1 23 200
MIG23E 4400 4 1 23 200
MIG23F 4400 4 1 23 200
MIG23G 4400 4 1 23 200




MIG27DJ 6615 5 1 23 500
MIG29 8800 6 1 23 200
MIG31 12000 6 1 30 360
MIRF1A 8820 5 2 30 270
MIRF1B 8820 5 2 30 270
MIRF1C 8820 5 2 30 270
MIRF1E 8820 5 2 30 270
MIRIIIC 3000 3 2 30 250
MIRIIIE 8818 5 2 30 250
MIRIIIEI 8818 7 2 30 250
MIR2000C 13890 7 2 30 250
MIR2000R 1250 4 2 30 200
MIR2000T 13890 7 2 30 250
MIR3NG 9260 7 2 30 250
MIR4000 17635 9 2 30 200
MIR5DD 8000 5 2 30 250
MIR5DR 8818 2 2 30 250
MIR5D1 400 2 2 30 250
MIR5D1E 400 2 2 30 250
MIR5D2 9260 5 2 30 250
OV10D 3600 5 2 8 1000
PRCA5 4410 5 2 23 500
PRCFT6 1 30 200
PRCF6 2 23 200
PRCF7 2000 2 1 23 200
PRCF7E 2000 2 1 23 200
RF4C 400 2
RF5E 400 2 1 20 280
SF260MW 661 4 2 8
SF260TP 661 4
SUPETEN 4630 6 2 30 250
SU20 8820 8 2 30 140
SU22 11023 8 2 30 140
SU25 8820 10 1 30 200
SU27 13225 6 1 23 200
SU7BMKL 5500 4 2 30 140
SU7U 5500 4 2 30 140
TA4EH 8200 5 2 20 400
TA4KU 8200 5 2 20 400
TORADV 18000 6 1 27 200
TORIDS 19840 9 2 27 200
TU16AG 19800 8 7 23 200
TU22BD 26450 10 1 23 200
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B.2 Target Acquisition Systems
NAME CODE PWR CONE UPRNG DWNRNG DATAPTS
AGAVE RAMU 100 140 10 2
AIDAII RAGA 80 18 10 2
AIRPASSI RAAI 900 90 80
IANTILOPE RAMU 500 120 50 40
APG63 RAMU 1300 120 100 37 4
APG64 RAMU 1300 120 120 47 4
APG65 RAMU 500 120 45 34 4
APG66 RAMU 400 120 38 29 3
APG67 RAMU 330 160 47 38 4
APG68 RAMU 400 120 51 47 4
APG69 RAMU 80 90 20 14 4
APG70 RAMU 1300 120 120 50 4
APN153V RAGA 80 90 10 2
APQ109 RAMU 150 90 20 3
APQ120 RAMU 200 90 25 3
APQ159 RAAI 80 90 10 3
AWG9 RAAI 1300 120 110 80 4
BLUEFOX RAMU 200 120 30 15 4
CYRI RAAI 100 120 14 3
CYRII RAMU 200 120 30 3
CYRIV RAAI 200 120 30 4
CYRIVM3 RAMU 200 120 30 15 4
CYRIV2 RAMU 200 120 30 15 4
ELM2001B RAMU 200 90 30 2
ELM2021B RAMU 200 90 35 25 4
ELTAFIAR RAGA 200 90 30 2
FLANRAD RAMU 1200 120 130 40 4
FOXFIRE RAAI 600 120 50 4
FOXHUNT RAMU 1200 120 97 70 4
FULRAD RAMU 400 90 40 30 3
HIFIX RAMU 80 40 4 2
HILARKI RAMU 200 90 25 4
HILARKII RAMU 300 90 35 15 4
HILARKX RAAI 400 120 40 20 4
HOUNDRAD RAAI 1200 120 100 50 4
IRSTSB IRAI 80 40 15 10 2
IRSTSG IRAI 100 60 20 15 2
JAYBIRD RAAI 150 90 18 3
LASDES LAGA 80 30 2 2
LASRNG LAGA 80 20 2 2
RDAL2 RAGA 200 90 20
RDI RAAI 600 120 54 20 4
RDM RAMU 600 120 60 20 4
SCANFIX RAAI 80 60 4 2
SCANODD RAAI 80 60 6 2
SHRTHRN RAGA 200 90 30 2
SKYRNGR RAAI 80 90 9 2
SPNSCNA RAAI 100 60 11 2
SPNSCNB RAAI 100 60 11 2
TI-ATA RAMU 300 120 30 20 4
TI-ATG RAMU 300 120 80 20 4
VISUAL VIMU 40 30 10 3 1
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NAME TWS ILLUM MAP DBS ECCM
AGAVE 1 1 1 . 7
AIDAII . 7
AIRPASSI . 9
ANTILOPE 1 1 1 1.
1
APG63 1 1 1 1.
APG64 1 1 1 1.
APG65 1 1 1 1 1.0
APG66 1 1 1.0
APG67 1 1 1 1.
APG68 1 1 1 1 1.
APG69 1 1 1 1.0
APG70 1 1 1 1 1.
APN153V .8
APQ109 1 . 7
APQ120 1 1 .8
APQ159 .8
AWG9 1 1 1 1 1.0
BLUEFOX 1 . 9
CYRI 1 . 7
CYRII 1 1 .8
CYRIV . 9
CYRIVM3 1 1 1 1 1.
CYRIV2 1 1 1.0
ELM2001B . 9
ELM2021B 1 1 1 1. 1
ELTAFIAR . 9
FLANRAD 1 1 1 1.0
FOXFIRE 1 1 .8
FOXHUNT 1 1 1.
FULRAD 1 1 1 1.
HIFIX . 7
HILARKI 1 . 8
HILARKII 1 1.0
HILARKX 1 1 1 1 1.0







RDI 1 1 1 1 1. 1
RDM 1 1 1 1 1. 1
SCANFIX 1 . 7
SCANODD . 7
SHRTHRN 1 . 8
SKYRNGR . 8
SPNSCNA 1 . 8
SPNSCNB 1 . 8
TI-ATA 1 1 1. 1




MSL CODE DIAM LENGTH MSLWGHT WHWGHT
AA2B AAMI 4. 7 110.0 190. 13. 2
AA2C AAMR 4. 7 114.0 190. 13. 2
AA2D AAMI 4. 7 110. 190. 13. 2
AA6A AAMR 15. 7 232. 1565 88.
AA6B AAMI 15. 7 248. 1565 88.
AA7A AAMR 8.8 181.0 705. 88.
AA7B AAMI 8.8 177. 660. 88.
AA8B AAMI 4. 7 84. 6 121. 17.
AA9A AAMR 8. 8 170.0 650. 100.
AIM120A AAMR 7.0 145. 7 326.0 50.
AA10A AAMR 7.0 145. 7 326.0 50.
AIM9D AAMI 4.0 113.0 195.0 22. 4
AIM9E AAMI 4. 118. 1 164.0 10.
AIM9G AAMI 4.0 113. 191.0 22. 4
AIM9H AAMI 4.0 113.0 186.0 22. 4
AIM9J AAMI 4.0 120. 9 172. 10.
AIM9L AAMI 4.0 112.2 188.0 25.
AIM9M AAMI 4.0 112.2 190. 25.
AIM9PN AAMI 4.0 120. 9 172.0 10.
SKYFLASH AAMR 9.0 145. 425.0 66.
AIM7C AAMR 8.0 144.0 380. 66.
AIM7D AAMR 8.0 144.0 440.0 66.
AIM7E AAMR 8. 144.0 452.0 66.
AIM7F AAMR 8. 144.0 503. 88.
AIM7M AAMR 8. 145.0 503.0 88.
KUKRI AAMI 5. 115. 9 161.5 10.
ASPIDE AAMR 8. 145. 5 485.0 72. 8
FIRESTRK AAMI 8. 8 125. 5 300.0 50.
R550 AAMI 6.2 109.0 198. 27. 6
STINGER AAMI 2.8 60.0 22. 3 6. 6
AIM54 AAMR 15.0 157. 8 985.0 132.
PIRANHA AAMI 6.0 105. 190.0 26. 5
PYTHON3 AAMI 6. 3 97. 200.0 24.
R530R AAMR 10.4 129. 3 423. 3 60.
R530I AAMI 10.4 125. 9 426. 6 60.
SUP530F AAMR 10.4 139.4 551. 66.
RBS70 AAMI 4. 2 52. 33. 2. 2
REDTOP AAMI 8.8 130. 6 330.0 68. 3
SHAFRIR AAMI 6. 3 97.0 205. 24. 3
R550MK2 AAMI 6.2 109.0 198. 27. 6
SUP530D AAMR 10.4 139.4 500. 66.
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MSL GUIDTYP GUIDSC MODE MSPD LIMG ECCM
AA2B IR • 9 VR 2. 5 25 1. 1
AA2C SARH . 8 VR 2. 5 30 . 9
AA2D IR . 9 VR 2. 5 30 . 9
AA6A SARH 1. BVR 2. 2 16 . 9
AA6B IR 1. VR 2. 2 16 . 8
AA7A SARH 1. BVR 3. 15 . 9
AA7B IR 1. VR 3. 15 . 9
AA8B IR 1. VR 3. 30 . 8
AA9A SARH 1. BVR 4. 15 . 7
AIM120A ARH 1. 2 BVR 4. 30 . 7
AA10A SARH • 8 BVR 4, 30 . 7
AIM9D IR • 9 VR 2. 5 25 1.0
AIM9E IR 9 VR 2. 5 25 . 9
AIM9G IR 1. VR 2. 5 25 . 9
AIM9H IR 1. VR 2. 5 25 . 9
AIM9J IR 1. VR 2. 5 30 . 8
AIM9L IR 1. VR 2. 5 30 . 8
AIM9M IR 1. VR 2. 5 30 . 7
AIM9PN IR 1. VR 2. 5 30 . 9
SKYFLASH SARH 1. BVR 4. 16 . 8
AIM7C SARH 8 VR 3. 5 16 1.0
AIM7D SARH • 8 VR 3. 5 16 1.
AIM7E SARH • 8 VR 3. 7 20 . 9
AIM7F SARH 1. BVR 4. 20 . 8
AIM7M SARH 1. BVR 4. 20 . 7
KUKRI IR 1. VR 1. 8 35 . 9
ASPIDE SARH 1. BVR 4. 15 .8
FIRESTRK IR . 9 VR 3. 20 1.
R550 IR 1. VR 3. 25 1.0
STINGER IR 1. VR 1. 5 20 . 9
AIM54 ARH 1. 2 BVR 5. 20 . 8
PIRANHA IR 1. VR 2. 2 25 . 9
PYTHON3 IR 1. VR 2. 5 30 .8
R530R SARH , 8 VR 2. 7 25 . 9
R530I IR 1. VR 2. 7 25 1.0
SUP530F SARH • 8 VR 4. 6 25 .8
RBS70 LASR • 7 VR 1. 5 25 . 9
REDTOP IR 1. VR 3. 2 20 1.0
SHAFRIR IR 1. VR 2. 5 25 . 8
R550MK2 IR 1. VR 3. 30 . 7



















































































































































































































































































































GUN CODE CAL MRNG DISP MVEL RATE
ADENMK4 ACCI 30. 1. 000 5. 2600 1400
ADENMK5 ACCI 30. 1. 100 4. 5 3100 1700
CB. 50 ACCI 7. 6 593 5. 2750 550
DEFA552A ACCI 30. 500 2. 5 2400 1300
DEFA553 ACCI 30. , 750 2. 2 2400 1300
DEFA554 ACCI 30. 1. 000 2. 2700 1800
FN7. 62 ACCI 7. 6 , 593 5. 2750 550
GAU12U ACCI 25. 1. 100 6. 3600 4200
GAU13A ACCE 30. 1. 200 2. 3400 2400
GAU2BA ACCE 7. 6 • 806 6. 5 2700 4000
GAU8A ACCI 30. 1. 187 5. 3500 4200
GPU5A ACCE 30. 1. 000 2. 3000 2400
GSH23 ACCI 23. 243 4. 5 2350 3000
HGS55 ACCE 7. 6 , 560 5. 2800 570
HIS404 ACCI 20. 863 2. 5 2800 640
KCA30 ACCE 30. 1. 079 2. 5 3380 1350
MAU27 ACCI 27. 1. 000 2. 3380 2400
MKIIMOD5 ACCE 20. 513 2. 3380 4200
M16 ACCE 7. 6 , 539 5. 2700 2600
M197 ACCE 20. • 500 2. 2 3400 3000
M230 ACCE 30. 1. 100 5. 2600 625
M28 ACCE 7. 7 , 806 6. 5 2700 4000
M39 ACCI 20. , 500 2. 2 2800 3000
M5 ACCE 40. , 806 5. 790 230
M61A1 ACCI 20. • 539 2. 2 3380 4000
M621 ACCE 20. • 809 2. 3380 740
NR23 ACCI 23. , 197 4. 1200 850
NR23HS ACCI 23. , 197 4. 1250 900
NR30 ACCI 30. • 248 3. 5 2550 850
NR30GAT ACCI 30. • 329 4. 2700 5150
N37 ACCI 37. • 197 4. 1200 400
N37D ACCI 37. • 197 4. 2250 400
UBK ACCE 12. 7 • 809 4. 5 2900 700
US12.
7
ACCI 12. 7 • 800 5. 2900 700
XM188E30 ACCE 30. 1. 150 5. 2600 2000
XM27E1 ACCE 7. 6 • 592 5. 2850 4000
XM8 ACCE 40. 1. 187 5. 790 400
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B.5 Air Weapon System Configuration




1 1 INS 18
2 TAC 16
1 1 INS 30
1 DOP 29
1 1 INS 30








1 1 INS 24
1 1 INS 45
2 1 INS 60
1 1 INS 41
2 1 INS 41
1 1 INS 34
1 1 INS 34
1 1 INS 34
2 1 INS 34
1 1 INS 30
2 1 INS 30
1 1 INS 25
1 1 INS 23
2 1 INS 25
1 1 INS 25
1 1 INS 15
1 1 INS 17
2 1 INS 38
2 1 INS 38















1 1 INS 38














































































MB339K IT 1 TAC 20
MIG15BIS UR 1 DR 18
MIG15UTI UR 2 DR 16
MIG17F UR 1 DR 17
MIG19C UR 1 DR 17
MIG21C UR 1 DR 18
MIG21F UR 1 DR 18
MIG21JKL UR 1 DOP 18
MIG21R UR 1 DOP 22
MIG21UM UR 2 DR 18
MIG23B UR 1 DOP 38
MIG23E UR 1 DOP 36
MIG23F UR 1 DOP 40
MIG23G UR 1 DOP 38
MIG23UM UR 2 DOP 36
MIG25 UR 1 DOP 32
MIG25R UR 1 DOP 32
MIG25U UR 1 DOP 32
MIG27DJ UR 1 DOP 42
MIG29 UR 1 INS 25
MIG31 UR 2 INS 50
MIRF1A FR 1 INS 38
MIRF1B FR 2 INS 38
MIRF1C FR 1 INS 34
MIRF1E FR 1 INS 34
MIRIIIC FR 1 DOP 38
MIRIIIE FR 1 DOP 38
MIRIIIEI FR 1 INS 38
MIR2000C FR 1 INS 28
MIR2000R FR 1 INS 30
MIR2000T FR 2 INS 28
MIR3NG FR 1 DOP 33
MIR4000 FR 1 1 INS 30
MIR5DD FR 2 DOP 36
MIR5DR FR 1 DOP 40
MIR5D1 FR 1 DOP 38
MIR5D1E FR 1 DOP 38
MIR5D2 FR 1 DOP 40
OV10D US 2 TAC 16
PRCA5 CH 1 TAC 22
PRCFT6 CH 2 DR 16
PRCF6 CH 1 DR 16
PRCF7 CH 1 TAC 18
PRCF7E EG 1 TAC 18
RF4C US 2 1 INS 42
RF5E US 1 INS 22
SF260MW IT 3 DR 16
SF260TP IT 3 DR 16
SUPETEN FR 1 1 INS 33
SU20 UR 1 DOP 26
SU22 UR 1 DOP 26
SU25 UR 1 TAC 18
SU27 UR 1 INS 41
SU7BMKL UR 1 DR 18
SU7U UR 2 DR 16
TA4EH US 2 1 DOP 29
TA4KU US 2 DOP 29
TORADV UK 2 1 INS 30
TORIDS UK 2 1 INS 34
TU16AG UR 6 1 DR 70
TU22BD UR 3 DR 70
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ACFT TARAD TAOTH RWR PECM AECM
ALPHAMS1
ALPHAMS2 LASRNG 1
AMX ELTAFIAR LASRNG 1 1
A10A LASRNG 1 1 1
A37B 1
A4H APN153V 1 1
A4KU APN153V 1
A4N APN153V 1 1
A7E APQ126
APQ126








FA18L APG65 LASRNG 1 1 1
F104GCF
F14AC AWG9 1 1 1
F15A APG63 1 1 1
F15B APG63 1 1 1
F15C APG64 1 1 1
F15CFP APG64 1 1 1
F15D APG64 1 1 1
F15E APG70 LASDES 1 1 1
F16A APG66 LASRNG 1 1 1
F16B APG66 LASRNG 1 1 1
F16C APG68 LASRNG 1 1 1
F16CSC APG66 1 1
F16D APG68 LASRNG 1 1 1
F16J79 APG66 1 1
F20 APG67 1 1
F20A APG67 1 1 1
F4CD APQ109 1 1 1
F4EF APQ120 LASDES 1 1 1
F4M0D APG65 LASDES 1 1 1
F5A 1
F5B 1
F5E APQ159 1 1 1
F5F APQ159 LASDES 1 1 1
F86F
G91Y RDA12
HARMK80 LASDES 1 1 1







JAGI04 LASRNG 1 1
JAGI11 LASRNG 1 1
JASTREB
KFIRC2 ELM2001B 1 1 1
KFIRC7 ELM2021B 1 1 1
KFIRTC2 1 1 1


























MIG25 FOXFIRE 1 1
MIG25R FOXFIRE 1 1
MIG25U FOXFIRE 1 1
MIG27DJ LASRNG 1 1 1
MIG29 FULRAD LASRNG 1 1 1
MIG31 HOUNDRAD 1 1 1
MIRF1A AIDAII LASRNG 1 1
MIRF1B AIDAII 1 1
MIRF1C CYRIV2 LASRNG 1 1
MIRF1E CYRIVM3 LASRNG 1 1
MIRIIIC CYRII 1
MIRIIIE CYRIV 1
MIRIIIEI CYRIV 1 1 1
MIR2000C RDM LASDES 1 1 1
MIR2000R RDM 1 1 1
MIR2000T RDM LASDES 1 1 1
MIR3NG CYRIVM3 1 1















RF5E 1 1 1
SF260MW
SF260TP
SUPETEN AGAVE 1 1
SU20 HIFIX 1 1 1
SU22 HIFIX LASDES 1 1 1
SU25 LASRNG 1 1
SU27 FLANRAD 1 1 1
SU7BMKL HIFIX 1 1
SU7U 1 1
TA4EH APN15 3V 1
TA4KU APN153V 1
TORADV FOXHUNT 1 1
TORIDS TI-ATG LASDES 1 1 1
TU16AG SHRTHRN 1 1
TU22BD SHRTHRN 1 1
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ACFT NAAMR AAMR NAAMI AAMI GUN PGMC SA HUD CR
ALPHAMS1 2 R550 1 1
ALPHAMS2 2 R550 DEFA553 1 1 1
AMX 2 AIM9PN M61A1 1 1 1 1
A10A GAU8A 1 1 1
A37B GAU2BA
A4H 2 SHAFRIR DEFA552A 1 1 1 1
A4KU 2 AIM9PN DEFA55 3 1 1 1
A4N 2 AIM9L DEFA554 1 1 1 1
A7E 2 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1 1






C101DD DEFA553 1 1 1 1
FA18L 2 AIM7M 2 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1 1
F104GCF 2 AIM9E M61A1
F14AC 2 AIM54 2 AIM9J M61A1 1 1
F15A 6 AIM7F 2 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1
F15B 6 AIM7F 2 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1
F15C 6 AIM7F 2 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1
F15CFP 6 AIM7M 2 AIM9M M61A1 1 1 1
F15D 6 AIM7F 2 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1
F15E 6 AIM120A 2 AIM9M M61A1 1 1 1 1
F16A 4 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1 1
F16B 4 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1 1
F16C 2 AIM7F 2 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1 1
F16CSC 4 AIM9PN M61A1 1 1 1
F16D 2 AIM7F 2 AIM9L M61A1 1 I 1 1
F16J79 4 AIM9PN M61A1 1 1 1
F20 4 AIM9PN M39 1 1 1
F20A 2 AIM7F 2 AIM9L M39 1 1 1
F4CD 2 AIM7E 2 AIM9D 1 1
F4EF 2 AIM7F 2 AIM9L M61A1 1 1 1
F4M0D 2 AIM7M 2 AIM9M M61A1 1 1 1 1
F5A 2 AIM9J M39 1
F5B 2 AIM9J M39 1
F5E 2 AIM9PN M39 1 1
F5F 2 AIM9PN M39 1 1
F86F US12.
7
G91Y DEFA552A 1 1 1
HARMK80 4 AIM9L ADENMK5 1 1 1 1
HAWK200 2 AIM9L ADENMK4 1 1 1 1
HAWK50T 2 AIM9PN ADENMK4 1 1
HAWK60A 4 AIM9PN ADENMK4 1 1




JAGI04 2 AIM9PN ADENMK5 1 1 1
JAGI11 2 AIM9PN ADENMK5 1 1 1
JASTREB CB. 50
KFIRC2 4 SHAFRIR DEFA553 1 1 1 1
KFIRC7 4 PYTHON
3
DEFA554 1 1 1 1
KFIRTC2 2 SHAFRIR DEFA553 1 1 1 1
LAVI 4 PYTHON3 DEFA554 1 1 1 1
LIGHTNG 2 REDTOP ADENMK4 1
L29
L39ZA 2 AA2B GSH23
MB326K 2 R550 DEFA552A
MB326L 2 R550
MB339A 2 AIM9PN 1
MB339C 2 AIM9PN DEFA553 1 1 1





MIG19C 2 AA2B NR30
MIG21C 2 AA2C 2 AA2B NR23
MIG21F 2 AA2C 2 AA2B NR23HS
MIG21JKL 2 AA2C 2 AA2D GSH23 1
MIG21R 2 AA2D GSH23 1
MIG21UM 2 AA2C 2 AA2B NR23HS
MIG23B 2 AA7A 2 AA7B GSH23 1 1 1
MIG23E 2 AA2C 2 AA2D GSH23 1 1
MIG23F 2 AA2D GSH23 1 1
MIG23G 2 AA7A 2 AA8B GSH23 1 1 1
MIG23UM 2 AA2C 2 AA2D GSH23 1 1 1
MIG25 2 AA6A 2 AA6B
MIG25R 2 AA6B 1
MIG25U 2 AA6A 2 AA6B
MIG27DJ 2 AA8B NR30 1 1 1
MIG29 4 AA9A 2 AA8B NR30GAT 1 1 1 1
MI631 4 AA9A 2 AA8B NR30GAT 1 1
MIRF1A 4 R530I DEFA553 1 1
MIRF1B 4 R530I DEFA553 1 1
MIRF1C 2 SUP530F 2 R550 DEFA55 3 1 1
MIRF1E 2 SUP530F 2 R550 DEFA55 3 1 1
MIRIIIC 2 R530R 2 R530I DEFA552A 1 1
MIRIIIE 2 R530R 2 R550 DEFA552A 1 1 1
MIRIIIEI 2 R530R 2 SHAFRIR DEFA552A 1 1 1 1
MIR2000C 2 SUP530D 2 R550MK2 DEFA5 54 1 1 1 1
MIR2000R 2 R550MK2 DEFA554 1 1 1 1
MIR2000T 2 SUP530D 2 R550MK2 DEFA554 1 1 1
MIR3NG 2 SUP530F 2 R550MK2 DEFA552A 1 1 2
MIR4000 2 SUP530D 2 R550MK2 DEFA554 1 1 1 1
MIR5DD 2 R550 DEFA552A 1 1
MIR5DR 2 R550 DEFA552A 1 1
MIR5D1 2 R530R 2 R550 DEFA552A 1 1
MIR5D1E 2 SUP530D 2 R550MK2 DEFA552A 1 1
MIR5D2 2 R550 DEFA552A 1 1 1
OV10D M197 1
PRCA5 NR30 1 1
PRCFT6 GSH23
PRCF6 2 AA2B GSH23
PRCF7 2 AA2C 2 AA2B GSH23
PRCF7E 2 AA2C 2 AIM9PN GSH23
RF4C 1 1
RF5E M39 1 1
SF260MW
SF260TP
SUPETEN 2 R550 DEFA553 1 1 1
SU20 2 AA2D NR30 1 1
SU22 2 AA2D NR30 1 1 • 1
SU25 NR30GAT 1 1 1
SU27 6 AA10A NR30GAT 1 1 1 1
SU7BMKL 2 AA2B NR30
SU7U NR30
TA4EH 2 SHAFRIR DEFA552A 1 1 1
TA4KU 2 AIM9E DEFA552A 1 1 1
TORADV 4 SKYFLASH 4 AIM9L MAU27 1





AIRCREW SURVEY AND RELATIVE UTILITY VARIABLES
C.l Aircrew Survey
AIRFRAME COMPONENT
1. What is the relative utility of the following airframe performance






Top Useful + Maneuver- + Combat = 100%
Airspeed ability- Endurance
PAYLOAD COMPONENT
2. What is the relative utility of each of the listed weapons types ir




Infrared + Radar Guided + GUN = 100%
AAM AAM
3. What is the relative utility of each of the listed weapons types ir
achieving success in interdiction and CAS missions respectively?
Mission
Interdiction
Close Air Spt. !
Freefall
Munitions




4. What is the relative utility of each of the listed target
acquisition methods in achieving success in the mission areas liste
Assume that no more than 10% of the operations will be conducted at
night, and that weather will not play a limiting role. Judge the





Close Air Spt !
Visual + Radar + Other = 100%
(IRSTS, LASER)
VULNERABILITY TO ENGAGEMENT
5. What is the utility of each of the following factors in reducir
aircraft s susceptibility to engagement during each of the mission






Close Air Spt !







6. What is the relative utility of each of the listed components in





Close Air Spt I
Airframe + Target + Payload = 100%
Acquisition
EMPLOYMENT FACTORS
7. What is the relative utility of each of the following factors in





Close Air Spt I
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MIDDLE EAST AIR ORDERS OF BATTLE 1984-1990
ALGERIA
ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 199
CM170 CIN 24 20 20 20 20 20 20
MIG15BIS OCG 4
MIG15UTI TNG 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
MIG17F FGA 60 60 50 40 30 20
MIG17F TNG 10 10 10 10 5 5
MIG21F FIN 95 95 95 95 84 72 60
MIG21UM OCA
*8
10 10 10 10 10 10
MIG23F FGA 60 60 60 60 60 60
MIG23UM OCG 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
MIG25 FIN 18 15 15 15 15
MIG25R REC 4 6 6 6 6 6 6
MIG25U OCA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
MIG29 FIN 12 24 36
MIG31 FIN 18 18
SU20 FGA 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
SU25 FGA 12 12 12 12




ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 199
F5E FMR 4 6 8 8 8 8 8

















































ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
ALPHAMS1 TNG 8 20ALPHAMS2 FGA 15 19 26F16A FIN 34 32 32F16B OCA 6 6 6F16C FIN
F16D OCA 6F4EF FMR 33 33 33
IL28 REC 10 5
L29 TNG 59 50 30MIG15UTI TNG
MIG17F FGA 50 24 12MIG19C FIN 23 16 16MIG21F FIN 60 48 32MIG21JKL FIN 62 62 54MIG21R REC 15 15 15MIG21UM OCA 21 21 21MIG23E FIN
MIR2000C FGA
MIR2000T OCA
MIR5DD OCA 6 6 6MIR5DR REC 6 6 6MIR5D1E FIN 6MIR5D2 FGA 46 50 54PRCFT6 OCA 4 4 4PRCF6 FGA 32 70 78PRCF6 FIN 12 12 12PRCF7 FIN 10 20 36SU20 FGA
SU7BMKL FGA 20 20
TU16AG BMR 111OAR= .6
MXRAT= 4. 68
ETHIOPIA
ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
F5B OCG 2 2
F5E FGA 6 6





ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
F14AC FIN 25 20
F4CD FMR 5 3
F4EF FMR 30 20
F5E FGA 40 32




















15 10 6 6 6
20 15 10 10 10
24 16 16 16 16
5 3 3 3 3
12 12 12 12 12
3 3 3 3 3
IRAQ
ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 199
HUNTER TNG 12 12 12 12 6
HUNTERT TNG 5 5 5
IL28 REC
L29 TNG 12 12 6
L39ZA TNG 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
MIG15UTI TNG 30 30 30 20 10
MIG17F FIN
l°0MIG19C FIN 40 20
MIG21F FIN 60 60 36 24
MIG21JKL FIN 120 140 120 108 72 60 48
MIG21UM OCA 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
MIG23E FIN 48 48 60 72 84 84 84
MIG23F FGA 16 18 36 36 36 36 36
MIG23UM OCA 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
MIG25 FIN 10 17 17 17 17 17 17
MIG25R REC 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
MIG27DJ FGA 6 18 36 54 54 54 54
MIG29 FIN 12 24 36
MIRF1B OCA 4 6 8 8 8 8 8
MIRF1C FGA 8 20 20 20 20 20
MIRF1E FIN 6 8 12 24 24 24 24
PRCF7 FIN 25 50 75 100 100 100
SUPETEN FGA 5 5 5
SU20 FGA 45 50 60 70 80 80 80
SU25 FGA 12 24 24 24
SU7BMKL FGA 40 40 36 18
TU16AG BMR 8 6 6 6 6 6 6




ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 199
A4H FGA 80 80 60 36 18
A4N FGA 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
CM170I TNG 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
F15A FMR 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
F15B OCM 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
F15C FMR 20 20 32 32 32 32 32
F16A FMR 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
F16B OCM 8 8 8 8 8 8
F16C FMR 36 54 67 67
F16D OCM 8 8 8 8 8
F4EF FMR 131 131 131 115 100 84 68
KFIRC2 FMR 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
KFIRC7 FMR 18 36 54 72 72 72
KFIRTC2 TNG 20 30 50 60 60 60 60
MIRIIIEI FIN
RF4C REC 13 13 13 13 13 13 13


































































































































































































































































































































EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990








































































































































































































1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
40 40 40 20
46 54 54 54 54 54 54
15 16 17 17 17 17 17
16 16 16 16 16 16 16
65 65 70 70 54 36 36
24 24 25 25 25 25 25
15 30 30 30
17 17 16
10 10 10 10 10
12 24 24
20 36 48 48
180-
SOMALIA
ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 199
HUNTER FGA 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
HUNTERT OCG 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
MIG15UTI TNG 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
MIG17F FGA 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
MIG21F FMR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
PRCF6 FMR 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
SF260MW TNG 4 4 4 4 4 4 4




ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 199
BAC167 CIN 3 3 7 10 10 10 10
F5E FMR 2 2 6 10 10 10 10
F5F FMR 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
MIG17F FGA 10 10 10 6 3
MIG21F FMR 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
MIG21UM OCM 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
PRCFT6 OCA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2




ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 199
IL28 BMR
L29 TNG 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
L39ZA TNG 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
MIG15UTI TNG 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
MIG17F FGA 85 85 67 49 36 18
MIG21F FIN 92 92 92 84 72 36
MIG21JKL FIN 100 108 108 96 84 72 36
MIG21UM OCA 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
MIG23B FIN 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
MIG23E FIN 24 24 24 36 48 60 72
MIG23F FGA 50 50 60 70 70 70 70
MIG23G FIN 36 36 36 36 36 36
MIG23UM OCG 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
MIG25 FIN 25 25 30 38 38 38 38
MIG25R REC 3 6 10 12 12 12 12
MIG29 FIN 12 24 36 72
SU22 FGA 40 42 42 42 42 42 42
SU25 FGA 12 24 36 36
SU27 FIN 24
SU7BMKL FGA 36 36 24 12













































































































1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
3 3 6 6 6 6 6
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
8 16 16 16
8 8 8 8 8
5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5
I I
5
2 2 4 4 4
12 24 32 32
3 3 3 3






6 6 6 6 6 6 6
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
4 4 4 4 4 4 4
10 8 8 8 8 8 8
I I4 4 4 4 4
10 10 10 10 10 10 10
40 40 40 40 40 40 40
15 15 15 15 15 15 15
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
30 30 30 30 18
36 36 36 24 12
12 12 12 12
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 24 36 36
12 24 36




AIR WEAPON SUBSYSTEM FACTOR SCORES
E.l Airframes
Glossary
NFSS = Speed/Energy Factor Score
NFSM = Maneuverability Factor Score
NFSRA = Air-to-Air Range /Endurance Factor Score
NFSRG = Air-to-Ground Range /Endurance Factor Score
NFSO = Air-to-Ground Ordnance Factor Score
NRND = Indexed Gun Ordnance Capacity
NFSV = Size/ Signature Factor Score
ACFT ROLE NFSS NFSM NFSRA NFSRG NFSO NRND NFSV
ALPHAMS1 FTTC • 601 1. 041 000 1. 115 « 834 000 689
ALPHAMS2 FTAT • 601 1. 034 000 1. 115 . 834 382 694
AMX FTAT • 783 • 927 000 1. 087 959 1. 069 813
A10A FTAT • 356 1. 023 000 1. 088 1. 813 3. 587 l! 546
A37B FTAT 413 . 890 • 000 • 546 , 960 611 761
A4H FTAT . 604 , 902 , 000 1. 482 , 969 L 222 763
A4KU FTAT • 595 , 902 • 000 937 • 969 1. 222 763
A4N FTAT • 636 • 934 • 000 1. 022 1. 244 917 773
A7E FTAT • 742 . 821 , 000 1. 537 1. 367 3! 153 l! 151
A7P FTAT 637 • 782 000 1. 537 1. 335 3. 153 l. 153
BAC167 FTAT • 375 « 771 , 000 • 778 • 605 611 759
CM170 FTTC • 311 , 896 . 000 , 539 , 252 1. 100 776
CM170I FTTC • 311 . 896 , 000 , 539 , 252 1. 100 776
C101BB FTAT . 353 , 953 . 000 941 , 928 , 611 784
C101CC FTAT • 377 . 986 • 000 1. 020 , 928 611 784
C101DD FTTA , 377 986 000 1. 020 928 611 784
FA18L FTMR 1. 466 1. 252 l! 303 1. 381 1. 692 1. 741 l! 114
F104GCF FTAT 1. 373 1. 031 000 , 725 1. 158 2. 215 664
F14AC FTIN 1. 257 1. 054 l! 563 000 000 2. 062 l! 469
F15A FTMR 1. 506 1. 236 l. 358 1. 418 1. 271 2. 872 i. 451
F15B FTTM 1. 506 1. 225 l. 303 1. 344 1. 271 2. 872 l. 459
F15C FTMR 1. 506 1. 380 l. 466 1. 563 1. 271 2. 872 l. 460
F15CFP FTMR 1. 261 1. 322 l. 717 1. 830 1. 530 2. 872 i. 504
F15D FTTM 1. 506 1. 370 l. 411 1. 511 1. 271 2. 872 i. 467
F15E FTMR 1. 468 1. 480 l. 542 1. 606 2. 095 2. 872 l. 450
F16A FTMR 1. 462 1. 386 l. 168 1. 225 1. 495 1. 573 , 870
F16B FTTM 1. 462 1. 384 l. 113 1. 183 1. 495 1. 573 , 871
F16C FTMR 1. 462 1. 312 l. 113 1. 225 1. 495 1. 573 900
F16CSC FTMR 1. 462 1. 326 l. 113 1. 225 1. 495 1. 573 894
F16D FTTM 1. 462 1. 298 l. 069 1. 194 1. 495 1. 573 907
F16J79 FTMR 1. 302 1. 192 . 835 840 1. 353 1. 573 . 889
F20 FTMR 1. 355 1. 357 885 • 993 1. 193 2. 750 667
F20A FTMR 1. 355 1. 334 885 993 1. 193 2. 750 673
F4CD FTMR 1- 323 1. 050 921 1. 009 1. 411 000 l! 323
F4EF FTMR 1. 350 1. 049 844 • 873 1. 546 l! 952 i. 346
F4M0D FTMR 1. 350 1. 087 l! 185 1. 111 2. 077 l. 952 i. 366
F5A FTMR , 940 1. 025 642 634 864 855 592
F5B FTMR • 931 1. 018 , 642 . 634 . 864 # 855 . 594
184
F5E FTMR 1.065 1. 036 756 778 , 899 . 855 644
F5F FTMR 1. 035 1. Oil i 626 638 , 899 . 855 , 654
F86F FTMR .837 727 t 676 685 , 325 . 611 884
G91Y FTAT . 699 960 000 1. 007 , 649 . 611
, 695
HARMK80 FTMR . 856 l! 311 1. 067 1. 111 , 943 . 764 , 675
HAWK200 FTMR . 584 963 1. 184 1. 140 , 890 . 917
, 684
HAWK50T FTTA . 625 952 000 897 ,423 . 367
, 681
HAWK60A FTAT . 651 932 l! 074 l! 087 , 890 . 367 , 705
HAWK60T FTTA . 651 , 968 l. 074 l. 087 , 660 . 367 681
HUNTER FTMR . 798 925 l. 032 973
,
785 . 611 904
HUNTERT FTTM . 798 , 915 l. 071 983 785 . 611 912
IL28 BMAT . 392 , 503 000 l! 449 1, , 001 1. 986 L 927
JAGI04 FTAT 1. 108 l. 108 000 l. 165 1. , 171 . 917 843
JAGI11 FTAT 1. 124 l. 140 000 l. 165 1. 171 . 917 843
JASTREB FTAT . 378 • 852 000 , 477 817 1. 237 742
KFIRC2 FTMR 1.457 l. 058 l! 080 l. 199 l! 202 . 855 875
KFIRC7 FTMR 1.457 l. 081 l. 157 i. 204 l. 366 . 855 874
KFIRTC2 FTTM 1.457 i. 052 949 l. 074 i. , 202 . 855 878
LAVI FTMR 1.026 l. 287 • 798 , 724 l. 448 . 855 873
LIGHTNG FTIN 1.432 l. 076 904 , 000 , 000 . 733 L 125
L29 FTTA .267 • 782 i 000 359 256 . 611 856
L39ZA FTTC . 310 774 528 553 580 .458 i , 703
MB326K FTAT .447 692 000 570 886 . 611 721
MB326L FTTA .447 • 692 • 000 , 570 886 . 611 721
MB339A FTTC .501 709 • 657 625 886 . 000 770
MB339C FTAT .495 720 • 000 • 761 , 898 . 855
,
787
MB339K FTAT .495 • 720 « 000 , 761 898 . 855 787





MIG15UTI FTTC . 629 . 815 469 421 , 000 . 611 735
MIG17F FTMR . 619 , 847 628 , 620 , 309 . 611 829
MIG19C FTMR .837 l. 104 , 726 , 652 364 . 611 790
MIG21C FTIN . 931 l. 074 700 000 000 . 611 681
MIG21F FTMR 1.081 l. 103 • 716 m 645 548 . 611 680
MIG21JKL FTMR 1. 161 l. 122 700 , 563 548 . 611 681
MIG21R FTRE 1.081 l. 095 • 000 • 711 000 . 611 683
MIG21UM FTTM 1. 155 l. 109 703 , 637 i 548 . 611 687
MIG23B FTMR 1.459 l. 056 , 923 . 955 667 . 611 l! 270
MIG23E FTMR 1.455 l. 079 • 923 • 955 i 667 . 611 l. 252
MIG23F FTAT 1. 206 • 862 • 000 • 918 667 . 611 l. 293
MIG23G FTMR 1.468 l. 067 • 923 955 667 . 611 l. 262
MIG23UM FTTC 1. 369 . 997 814 . 824 667 . 611 l. 264
MIG25 FTIN 1. 520 . 897 1. 044 000 000 . 000 l. 738
MIG25R FTRE 1. 554 • 912 000 1. 019 000 . 000 l. 676
MIG25U FTTI 1. 520 . 897 1. 022 . 000 000 . 000 l. 737
MIG27DJ FTAT 1.090 . 881 . 000 . 975 882 1. 528 l. 299
MIG29 FTMR 1.582 l. 361 , 798 . 887 L 096 . 611 l. 097
MIG31 FTIN 1. 566 . 997 1. 263 000 000 1. 100 l. 697
MIRF1A FTMR 1.400 l. 006 1. 205 l! 062 979 . 825 812
MIRF1B FTTI 1.400 l. 006 1. 172 000 000 . 825 812
MIRF1C FTMR 1.400 l. 009 1. 205 l! 104 979 . 825 810
MIRF1E FTMR 1. 734 . 990 1. 315 l. 213 979 . 825 824
MIRIIIC FTIN 1. 144 • 962 1. 037 000 000 . 764 858
MIRIIIE FTMR 1. 172 • 965 1. 292 l! 150 978 . 764 862
MIRIIIEI FTMR 1. 172 965 1. 292 l. 150 l! 216 . 764 863
MIR2000C FTMR 1. 563 l. 217 , 979 l. 056 1. 437 . 764 979
MIR2000R FTRE 1. 513 l. 082 , 000 l. 252 000 . 611 969
MIR2000T FTTM 1. 563 l. 206 , 957 l. 035 l! 437 . 764 985
MIR3NG FTMR 1. 169 990 1. 359 l. 483 l. 235 . 764 891
MIR4000 FTMR 1.467 l. 334 1. 519 l. 252 l. 838 . 611 l! 535
MIR5DD FTTA 1.240 . 925 . 000 l. 382 943 . 764 898
MIR5DR FTRE 1. 240 928 000 l. 521 000 . 764 894
MIR5D1 FTIN 1.244 • 960 l! 238 000 000 . 764 866
MIR5D1E FTIN 1. 244 • 958 l. 238 000 000 . 764 867
MIR5D2 FTAT 1. 240 . 926 • 000 l! 521 998 . 764 896
OV10D MIAT .213 787 000 659 • 750 3. 055 897
PRCA5 FTAT . 920 . 846 . 000 , 759 , 786 1. 528 881
PRCFT6 FTTM . 967 935 • 725 641 • 000 . 611 784
PRCF6 FTMR . 943 # 962 # 725 • 693 f 000 . 611 , 789
185
PRCF7 FTIN . 861 1.074 . 700 . 000 .000 . 611 . 681
PRCF7E FTIN . 861 1.096 . 700 . 000 .000 . 611 . 680
RF4C FTRE 1. 318 1.053 . 000 1.047 . 000 . 000 1. 320
RF5E FTRE 1.052 1.011 . 000 . 861 . 000 . 855 . 654
SF260MW MITA . 104 1.041 . 000 . 610 . 503 . 000 . 502
SF260TP MITA . 182 . 796 .000 . 610 . 503 . 000 . 500
SUPETEN FTAT .842 . 854 . 000 1. 016 . 914 . 764 . 878
SU20 FTAT 1. 318 . 937 . 000 . 801 1. 334 .428 1. 289
SU22 FTAT 1. 318 . 930 . 000 . 935 1.431 .428 1. 305
SU25 FTAT . 369 1.074 .000 .860 1. 571 . 611 1. 338
SU27 FTMR 1.480 1. 389 1. 292 . 913 1.290 . 611 1. 534
SU7BMKL FTAT . 781 . 934 .000 .559 . 715 .428 . 885
SU7U FTTA . 784 . 935 . 000 .480 . 715 .428 . 884
TA4EH FTTA . 612 . 894 . 000 1. 169 . 951 1.222 . 761
TA4KU FTTA .595 . 907 . 000 .813 . 951 1.222 . 768
TORADV FTIN 1. 342 1. 068 1. 387 .000 .000 . 611 1. 355
TORIDS FTAT 1. 308 1.009 . 000 1.554 1. 935 . 611 1.415
TU16AG BMAT . 586 . 523 . 000 2. 740 1. 814 . 611 4. 187
TU22BD BMAT .877 .571 .000 2. 924 2. 342 . 611 3. 834
186
E.2 Target Acquisition Systems
Glossary
NFSTA = Target Acquisition Effectiveness Factor Score
NAME CODE NFSTA
AGAVE RAMU • 742
AIDAII RAGA • 360
AIRPASSI RAAI 1. 124
ANTILOPE RAMU 1. 432
APG63 RAMU 1. 880
APG64 RAMU 2. 021
APG65 RAMU 1. 374
APG66 RAMU 1. 176
APG67 RAMU 1. 480
APG68 RAMU 1. 445
APG69 RAMU 910
APG70 RAMU 2. 039
APN153V RAGA • 596
APQ109 RAMU • 740
APQ120 RAMU • 777
APQ159 RAAI • 678
AWG9 RAAI 2. 189
BLUEFOX RAMU 1. 094
CYRI RAAI 798
CYRII RAMU • 894
CYRIV RAAI 1. 000





ELM2021B RAMU 1. 079
ELTAFIAR RAGA • 762
FLANRAD RAMU 1. 982
FOXFIRE RAAI 1. 214
FOXHUNT RAMU 2. 042
FULRAD RAMU 1. 092
HIFIX RAMU • 385
HILARKI RAMU • 882
HILARKII RAMU 1. 050
HILARKX RAAI 1. 233
HOUNDRAD RAAI 1. 928
IRSTSB IRAI 491
IRSTSG IRAI « 614
JAYBIRD RAAI • 733
LASDES LAGA 349
LASRNG LAGA * 316
RDA12 RAGA , 488
RDI RAAI 1. 355
RDM RAMU 1. 379
SCANFIX RAAI • 450
SCANODD RAAI • 458
SHRTHRN RAGA • 762
SKYRNGR RAAI • 568
SPNSCNA RAAI 4 484
SPNSCNB RAAI . 484
TI-ATA RAMU 1. 160





NFSPERF = Missile Performance Factor Score
NFSVUL = Vulnerability to Detection/Avoidance Factor Score
MSL CODE NFSPERF NFSVUL
AA10A AAMR 1. 28 .86
AA2B AAMI • 54 . 75
AA2C AAMR • 65 . 68
AA2D AAMI 65 . 68
AA6A AAMR 1. 23 2.21
AA6B AAMI 1. 14 2.21
AA7A AAMR 1. 33 1.49
AA7B AAMI 1. 25 1.47
AA8B AAMI ( 63 . 65
AA9A AAMR 1. 68 1.46
AIM120A AAMR 1. 35 .86
AIM54 AAMR 3. 21 1. 76
AIM7C AAMR 1. 28 1.24
AIM7D AAMR 1. 28 1.27
AIM7E AAMR 1. 36 1. 15
AIM7F AAMR 1. 94 1. 17
AIM7M AAMR 1. 94 1. 17
AIM9D AAMI * 74 . 72
AIM9E AAMI • 49 . 70
AIM9G AAMI • 74 . 71
AIM9H AAMI • 74 . 71
AIM9J AAMI • 64 . 63
AIM9L AAMI • 86 . 64
AIM9M AAMI • 86 . 64
AIM9PN AAMI 69 . 63
ASPIDE AAMR 1. 48 1. 34
FIRESTRK AAMI • 81 1. 11
KUKRI AAMI 39 . 63
PIRANHA AAMI • 55 .81
PYTH0N3 AAMI • 65 . 76
RBS70 AAMI • 28 . 65
REDTOP AAMI • 92 1. 12
R530I AAMI • 80 1. 15
R530R AAMR 80 1. 15
R550 AAMI • 74 . 83
R550MK2 AAMI • 80 . 76
SHAFRIR AAMI • 57 .84
SKYFLASH AAMR 1. 30 1. 32
STINGER AAMI • 33 . 68
SUP530D AAMR 1. 72 1. 18




NFSRAT = Rate/Volume of Fire Factor Score































































































































































































COMBAT POTENTIAL SCORES MIDEAST AIR WEAPON
SYSTEMS
F.l Air Defense Mission
Glossary
AWSADX = Air Weapon System Potential - Air Defense
AFADX = Air Frame Potential - Air Defense
TAADX = Target Acquisition Potential - Air Defense
PLADX = Payload Potential - Air Defense
VADX = Vulnerability to Detection and Engagement - Air Defense
ACFT PRODCC ROLE AWSADX AFADX TAADX PLADX VADX
FA18L US FTMR 2. 523 1. 505 1. 262 2. 440 . 672
F14AC US FTIN 2. 459 1. 439 1. 674 2. 991 . 820
F15A US FTMR 3. 746 1. 464 1. 706 5. 264 . 732
F15B US FTTM 3. 731 1. 441 1. 723 5. 264 . 735
F15C US FTMR 4. 058 1. 543 2. 007 5. 264 . 711
F15CFP US FTMR 3. 985 1. 510 2. 007 5. 953 . 776
F15D US FTTM 4. 034 1. 521 2. 007 5. 264 . 714
F15E us FTMR 5. 242 1. 582 2. 042 7. 762 . 703
F16A us FTMR 1. 972 1. 502 , 916 1. 287 . 606
F16B us FTTM 1. 972 1. 483 • 932 1. 287 . 607
F16C us FTMR 2. 715 1. 458 1. 452 2. 213 . 622
F16CSC us FTMR 1. 541 1. 463 916 991 . 709
F16D us FTTM 2. 701 1. 437 1. 468 2. 213 . 626
F16J79 us FTMR 1. 357 1. 252 916 , 991 . 761
F20 us FTMR 1. 933 1. 349 1. 485 1. 065 . 681
F20A us FTMR 2. 843 1. 342 1. 485 2. 287 . 596
F4CD us FTMR 978 1. 181 , 388 , 878 . 779
F4EF us FTMR 1. 579 1. 226 451 2. 259 . 778
F4M0D us FTMR 2. 187 1. 358 1. 279 2. 535 . 773
F5A us FTMR . 470 , 841 . 055 , 525 . 895
F5B us FTMR , 473 835 , 071 . 525 . 901
F5E us FTMR • 855 1. 071 , 386 . 510 . 721
F5F us FTMR • 800 1. 004 . 402 , 469 . 739
F86F us FTMR • 208 680 . 055 083 1. 148
HARMK80 UK FTMR , 923 1. 125 • 055 1. 170 . 759
HAWK200 UK FTMR , 693 . 992 . 656 , 646 1. 079
HUNTER UK FTMR . 250 . 783 . 055 . 103 1. 097
HUNTERT UK FTTM 256 787 . 071 , 103 1. 101
KFIRC2 IS FTMR 1. 116 1. 294 434 . 654 . 666
KFIRC7 IS FTMR 1. 646 1. 390 1. 097 . 800 . 661
KFIRTC2 IS FTTM 748 1. 247 071 . 390 . 668
LAVI IS FTMR 1. 402 1. 15 6 1. 097 . 800 . 729
LIGHTNG UK FTIN • 771 1. 071 672 . 366 . 894
MIG15BIS UR FTMR , 177 . 615 . 055 . 065 1. 212
MIG17F UR FTMR . 242 . 615 . 251 . 083 1. 242
MIG19C UR FTMR • 424 . 798 . 247 . 269 . 963
MIG21C UR FTIN > 635 , 824 . 291 . 721 . 904
MIG21F UR FTMR , 706 898 . 291 . 722 . 842
MIG21JKL UR FTMR • 887 l! 016 , 412 • 868 . 815
190 -
MIG21UM UR FTTM .744 929 308 722 . 820
MIG23B UR FTMR 1. 103 1. 187 486 l! 083 . 786
MIG23E UR FTMR . 889 1. 192 412 868 . 868
MIG23G UR FTMR 1.258 1. 194 695 l! 168 . 780
MIG25 UR FTIN .879 1. 201 648 , 634 . 908
MIG25U UR FTTI . 877 1. 195 648 634 . 908
MIG29 UR FTMR 2. 554 1. 416 854 2. 808 . 633
MIG31 UR FTIN 2. 370 1. 386 l! 624 2. 867 . 820
MIRF1A FR FTMR .884 1. 358 209 556 . 722
MIRF1B FR FTTI .889 1. 346 225 . 556 . 722
MIRF1C FR FTMR 1.457 1. 359 856 1. 029 . 721
MIRF1E FR FTMR 1. 776 1. 531 l! 112 1. 029 . 677
MIRIIIC FR FTIN . 793 1. 060 4 491 , 674 . 892
MIRIIIE FR FTMR . 902 1. 147 , 604 • 737 .884
MIRIIIEI FR FTMR 1.086 1. 222 604 723 . 749
MIR2000C FR FTMR 2. 522 1. 421 l! 387 1. 058 . 636
MIR2000T FR FTTM 2. 515 1. 409 l. 404 2. 058 . 639
MIR3NG FR FTMR 1.480 1. 230 l. 112 1. 205 . 794
MIR4000 FR FTMR 2. 104 1. 609 l. 146 2. 046 . 739
MIR5D1 FR FTIN .843 1. 160 , 435 737 . 868
MIR5D1E FR FTIN 1. 624 1. 159 l. 112 2. 032 .869
PRCFT6 CH FTTM . 365 • 803 264 . 091 . 990
PRCF6 CH FTMR .413 • 801 , 247 • 273 . 993
PRCF7 CH FTIN . 626 • 836 291 • 751 . 936
PRCF7E EG FTIN . 695 • 842 • 291 • 943 . 931
SU27 UR FTMR 3. 148 1. 474 l. 796 3. 692 . 729




AWSFTR = Ai:r Weapon System Potential Fight er
AFFTR = Air Frame Potential - Fd.enter
TAFTR = Tanset Acquisition Potent:Lai -• F: er
PLFTR = Pay load Potential - Fight*»r
VFTR = Vulnerability to Detection and Engagement
ACFT PRODCC ROLE AWSFTR AFFTR TAFTR PLFTR VFTR
FA18L US FTMR 2. 185 1. 508 1. 097 2. 026 . 692
F14AC US FTIN 2. 045 1. 427 1. 454 2. 426 . 849
F15A us FTMR 2. 800 1. 423 1. 469 3. 754 . 764
F15B us FTTM 2. 789 1. 401 1. 495 3. 754 . 768
F15C us FTMR 3. 065 1. 520 1. 720 3. 754 . 739
F15CFP us FTMR 3. 005 1. 503 1. 720 4. 186 . 795
F15D us FTTM 3. 041 1. 498 1. 720 3. 754 . 742
F15E us FTMR 3. 934 1. 576 1. 762 5. 612 . 726
F16A us FTMR 2. 153 1. 532 , 808 1. 726 . 614
F16B us FTTM 2. 158 1. 513 834 1. 726 . 614
F16C us FTMR 2. 392 1. 476 1. 256 1. 877 . 633
F16CSC us FTMR 1. 734 1. 483 808 1. 354 . 689
F16D us FTTM 2. 379 1. 454 l! 282 1. 877 . 638
F16J79 us FTMR 1. 525 1. 276 808 1. 354 . 739
F20 us FTMR 2. 125 1. 393 l. 284 1. 478 . 649
F20A us FTMR 2. 576 1. 382 i. 284 2. 001 . 594
F4CD us FTMR « 968 1. 147 , 379 875 . 807
F4EF us FTMR 1. 420 1. 220 , 431 1. 954 .809
F4MOD us FTMR 1. 880 1. 350 l. 124 2. 156 . 802
F5A us FTMR • 579 , 861 , , 088 • 720 . 920
F5B us FTMR 584 856
, ,
114 720 . 926
F5E us FTMR • 993 1. 099 364 • 701 . 713
F5F us FTMR • 924 1. 035
,
, 391 , 632 . 731
F86F us FTMR • 258 . 673 , 088 141 1. 149
HARMK80 UK FTMR 1. 242 1. 221 , 088 1. 528 . 720
HAWK200 UK FTMR • 859 1. 055 , 590 • 868 . 962
HUNTER UK FTMR 326 • 804 088 175 1. 076
HUNTERT UK FTTM • 334 • 806 , 114 , 175 1. 081
KFIRC2 IS FTMR 1. 198 1. 242 , 405 878 . 687
KFIRC7 IS FTMR 1. 657 1. 370 • 959 1. 070 . 681
KFIRTC2 IS FTTM • 871 1. 197 , 114 546 . 690
LAVI IS FTMR 1. 516 1. 230 , 959 L 070 . 714
LIGHTNG UK FTIN • 781 1. 039 , 604 . 509 . 920
MIG15BIS UR FTMR • 238 • 644 088 • 111 1. 170
MIG17F UR FTMR • 294 • 652 , 252 . 140 1. 193
MIG19C UR FTMR • 564 . 844 , 249 . 376 . 858
MIG21C UR FTIN , 757 . 854 , 286 . 748 . 808
MIG21F UR FTMR 834 914
,
286 , 750 . 758
MIG21JKL UR FTMR 1. 038 1. 020 , 387 , 946 . 736
MIG21UM UR FTTM 876 937 312 . 750 . 742
MIG23B UR FTMR 1. 054 l! 141 , 448 . 912 . 774
MIG23E UR FTMR , 979 l. 150 , 387 946 . 824
MIG23G UR FTMR 1. 192 l. 148 623 1. 020 . 768
MIG25 UR FTIN . 796 l. 124 583 , 494 . 923
MIG25U UR FTTI 794 l. 118 583 494 . 923
MIG29 UR FTMR 2. 057 l. 436 756 l! 968 . 653
MIG31 UR FTIN 1. 803 l. 308 l. 412 2. 067 . 873
MIRF1A FR FTMR 1. 069 l. 330 . 217 . 753 . 697
MIRF1B FR FTTI 1. 078 l. 319 243 753 . 697
MIRF1C FR FTMR 1. 512 l. 331 , 758 1. 105 . 695
MIRF1E FR FTMR 1. 760 l. 457 . 972 1. 105 . 666
MIRIIIC FR FTIN 895 i. 037 . 453 . 762 . 825
MIRIIIE FR FTMR 1. 004 l. 115 , 547 . 841 . 820
- Fighter
- 192
MIRIIIEI FR FTMR 1. 105 1. 185 547 823 . 760
MIR2000C FR FTMR 2. 130 1.414 l! 202 1. 631 . 657
MIR2000T FR FTTM 2. 127 1.401 l. 228 1. 631 . 661
MIR3NG FR FTMR 1. 531 1. 228 972 1. 322 . 759
MIR4000 FR FTMR 1. 806 1. 621 l! 000 1. 611 . 768
MIR5D1 FR FTIN . 955 1. 120 406 841 . 808
MIR5D1E FR FTIN 1.489 1. 120 , 972 l! 586 . 809
PRCFT6 CH FTTM .422 . 810 , 275 154 . 984
PRCF6 CH FTMR .484 . 814 , 249 382 . 983
PRCF7 CH FTIN . 761 . 871 • 286 , 799 . 832
PRCF7E EG FTIN .857 .881 , 286 1. 040 . 826
SU27 UR FTMR 2. 260 1.460 l. 543 2. 194 . 757




AWSINT = Air Weapon System Potential - Interdiction
AFINT = Air Frame Potential - Interdiction
TAINT = Target Acquisition Potential - Interdiction
PLINT = Payload Potential - Interdiction
VINT = Vulnerability to Detection and Engagement - Interdiction
ACFT PRODCC ROLE AWSINT AFINT TAINT PLINT VINT
ALPHAMS2 FR FTAT • 538 • 784 .222 • 789 1.074
AMX IT FTAT • 895 . 922 .430 1. 208 . 942
A10A US FTAT • 670 • 737 . 190 2. 047 1. 501
A37B US FTAT • 282 - 501 . 139 , 603 1.434
A4H US FTAT 753 • 922 . 274 1. 172 1.025
A4KU US FTAT 565 • 702 .274 961 1. 126
A4N US FTAT • 855 • 800 . 274 1. 470 . 990
A7E US FTAT 1. 061 1. 012 . 190 1. 908 . 971
A7P US FTAT 730 • 881 . 107 1. 569 1. 155
BAC167 UK FTAT , 204 • 503 . 139 , 390 1. 605
C101BB SP FTAT , 270 . 575 . 139 , 634 1. 613
C101CC SP FTAT • 288 • 609 . 139 634 1.541
C101DD SP FTTA • 396 • 609 . 139 1. 095 1.541
FA18L US FTMR 2. 272 1. 374 . 882 2. 066 . 634
F104GCF US FTAT . 785 1. 014 . 107 • 948 .834
F15A US FTMR 1. 848 1. 331 1.055 1. 480 . 694
F15B US FTTM 1. 847 1. 306 1. 087 1. 480 . 697
F15C US FTMR 2. 024 1. 414 1.227 1. 480 . 676
F15CFP us FTMR 1. 951 1. 388 1. 227 1. 694 . 737
F15D us FTTM 2. 008 1. 395 1. 227 1. 480 . 679
F15E us FTMR 2. 760 1. 438 1. 379 2. 637 . 669
F16A us FTMR 2. 248 1. 366 . 683 1. 837 . 571
F16B us FTTM 2. 261 1. 352 . 716 1. 837 . 571
F16C us FTMR 2. 374 1. 343 . 991 1. 837 . 586
F16CSC us FTMR 1. 667 1. 347 . 601 1. 496 . 675
F16D us FTTM 2. 374 1. 329 1.023 1. 837 . 589
F16J79 us FTMR 1. 415 1. 126 . 601 1. 379 . 723
F20 us FTMR 1. 790 1. 245 . 928 1. 327 . 646
F20A us FTMR 2. 068 1. 238 . 928 1. 327 . 559
F4CD us FTMR 1. 078 1. 087 . 321 1. 056 . 735
F4EF us FTMR 1. 536 1. 110 .466 1. 822 . 734
F4M0D us FTMR 2. 150 1. 195 . 941 2. 498 . 730
F5A us FTMR , 526 . 754 . 107 , 628 . 893
F5B us FTMR , 534 a 749 . 139 . 628 . 899
F5E us FTMR . 990 . 968 .297 , 820 . 673
F5F us FTMR • 994 , 906 .438 . 776 . 690
F86F us FTMR 263 . 613 . 107 . 258 1. 132
G91Y IT FTAT 469 722 .244 644 1. 103
HARMK80 UK FTMR 1. 070 1. 020 .216 1. 131 . 713
HAWK200 UK FTMR , 808 , 874 . 534 1. 072 1. 014
HAWK50T UK FTTA . 312 . 670 . 139 360 1. 161
HAWK60A UK FTAT , 446 . 762 . 190 . 655 1. 148
HAWK60T UK FTTA 381 . 773 . 107 . 510 1. 135
HUNTER UK FTMR 380 694 . 107 , 518 1. 089
HUNTERT UK FTTM . 389 693 . 139 518 1. 093
IL28 UR BMAT 236 578 . 139 637 1. 854
JAGI04 UK FTAT 1. 001 1. 126 . 190 1. 118 . 776
JAGI11 UK FTAT 1. 020 1. 142 . 190 1. 118 . 765
JASTREB YU FTAT , 230 . 463 . 107 544 1. 567
KFIRC2 IS FTMR 1. 519 1. 199 . 325 l! 400 . 624
KFIRC7 IS FTMR 1. 898 1. 262 . 705 l. 593 . 619
KFIRTC2 IS FTTM 1. 387 1. 158 . 139 l. 400 . 626
LAVI IS FTMR 1. 662 1. 015 . 705 i. 679 . 686
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L29 CZ FTTA .098 i 360 . 139 133 1. 998
MB326K IT FTAT . 244 438 . 107 568 1.482
MB326L IT FTTA . 226 438 . 139 i 459 1.482
MB339C IT FTAT .443 « 610 . 190 908 1. 268
MB339K IT FTAT . 325 532 . 107 635 1. 268
MIG15BIS UR FTMR . 229 549 . 107 239 1. 195
MIG17F UR FTMR . 261 i 551 .219 249 1. 225
MIG19C UR FTMR .408 706 . 218 283 . 915
MIG21F UR FTMR . 539 i 797 .243 350 . 800
MIG21JKL UR FTMR . 643 878 . 312 403 . 774
MIG21UM UR FTTM . 579 , 825 . 275 350 . 779
MIG23B UR FTMR . 878 1. 075 . 354 647 . 745
MIG23E UR FTMR . 749 1. 079 . 312 597 .830
MIG23F UR FTAT . 566 g 918 . 190 i 597 . 941
MIG23G UR FTMR . 947 1. 081 .475 647 . 740
MIG27DJ UR FTAT . 760 , 894 . 190 885 .829
MIG29 UR FTMR 1. 759 1. 300 . 648 l! 284 . 599
MIRF1A FR FTMR 1. 077 1. 174 .278 866 . 679
MIRF1C FR FTMR 1. 287 1. 188 . 649 , 866 . 678
MIRF1E FR FTMR 1. 521 1. 342 . 796 866 . 637
MIRIIIE FR FTMR . 903 , 992 .422 , 926 .839
MIRIIIEI FR FTMR 1. 346 1. 051 .422 1. 399 . 701
MIR2000C FR FTMR 2. 190 1. 300 . 981 1. 660 . 599
MIR2000T FR FTTM 1. 999 1. 290 1.013 1. 333 . 602
MIR3NG FR FTMR 1. 357 1. 134 . 714 1. 231 . 747
MIR4000 FR FTMR 2.026 1. 360 .842 2. 069 . 703
MIR5DD FR FTTA . 750 1. 067 .228 , 716 .840
MIR5D2 FR FTAT . 903 1. 103 . 325 , 942 . 839
PRCA5 CH FTAT .492 726 . 107 • 654 . 958
PRCFT6 CH FTTM . 323 709 . 250 , 098 . 987
PRCF6 CH FTMR . 312 , 715 . 218 , 098 . 990
SUPETEN FR FTAT . 745 856 . 325 882 .898
SU20 UR FTAT . 992 • 999 . 202 l! 127 . 756
SU22 UR FTAT 1.216 1. 031 . 311 l. 478 . 761
SU25 UR FTAT .493 596 . 190 l. 425 1.510
SU27 UR FTMR 1. 831 1. 205 1. 106 l. 487 . 693
SU7BMKL UR FTAT .425 • 626 .202 452 . 955
SU7U UR FTTA . 399 . 615 . 139 , 452 . 952
TA4EH US FTTA . 602 • 766 . 306 971 1. 112
TA4KU US FTTA . 561 . 671 . 306 . 937 1. 126
TORIDS UK FTAT 1. 897 1. 291 . 874 2. 160 . 764
TU16AG UR BMAT .441 • 781 . 353 1. 354 1. 878
TU22BD UR BMAT . 637 • 933 . 353 1. 728 1. 577
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F.4 Close Air Support Mission (CAS)
Glossary
AWSCAS = Ai:r Weapon System Potential • CAS
AFCAS = Air Frame Potential - CAS
TACAS = Tar;?et Acquisition Potential - CA
PLCAS = Pay load Potential - CAS
VCAS = Vulnerability to Detection and Engagement
ACFT PRODCC ROLE AWSCAS AFCAS TACAS PLCAS VCAS
ALPHAMS1 FR FTTC • 531 • 827 .204 432 . 868
ALPHAMS2 FR FTAT • 805 • 900 . 299 776 .804
AMX IT FTAT 1. 250 1. 033 . 341 1. 268 . 711
A10A US FTAT 1. 302 910 .252 2. 661 1.052
A37B US FTAT • 484 • 574 . 204 661 . 997
A4H US FTAT 1. 037 1. 077 .219 1. 139 . 780
A4KU US FTAT . 810 . 788 . 219 1. 031 . 851
A4N US FTAT 1. 121 _ 908 .219 1. 361 . 758
A7E US FTAT 1. 743 1. 160 . 252 2. 351 . 755
A7P US FTAT 1. 325 1. 016 . 157 2. 141 . 877
BAC167 UK FTAT . 349 • 584 .204 . 446 1. 149
CM170 FR FTTC • 314 , 553 .204 • 419 1.215
CM170I IS FTTC • 314 , 553 .204 • 419 1. 215
C101BB SP FTAT • 473 693 .204 • 712 1. 129
C101CC SP FTAT • 501 • 733 .204 712 1.087
C101DD SP FTTA • 608 733 .204 1. 009 1.087
FA18L US FTMR 2. 593 1. 445 .509 2. 046 .525
F104GCF US FTAT 1. 279 , 977 . 157 1. 442 . 688
F15A US FTMR 2. 247 1. 367 . 509 1. 998 . 588
F15B US FTTM 2. 247 1. 333 . 556 1. 998 . 591
F15C us FTMR 2. 410 1. 482 . 573 1. 998 . 570
F15CFP us FTMR 2. 362 1. 518 . 573 2. 146 . 610
F15D us FTTM 2. 387 1. 456 . 573 1. 998 . 573
F15E us FTMR 3. 115 1. 529 . 749 2. 764 . 560
F16A us FTMR 2. 721 1. 441 .435 1. 842 .461
F16B us FTTM 2. 743 1. 423 .482 1. 842 .462
F16C us FTMR 2. 699 1. 408 .549 1. 842 .476
F16CSC us FTMR 2. 103 1. 414 . 340 1. 632 . 539
F16D us FTTM 2. 702 1. 388 . 596 1. 842 .480
F16J79 us FTMR 1. 802 1. 161 . 340 1. 551 . 574
F20 us FTMR 2. 329 1. 310 .462 1. 691 . 502
F20A us FTMR 2. 651 1. 300 .462 1. 691 .440
F4CD us FTMR 1. 094 1. 091 . 271 731 . 614
F4EF us FTMR 1. 944 1. 120 .410 1. 936 . 616
F4M0D us FTMR 2. 401 1. 235 . 587 2. 401 . 612
F5A us FTMR , 832 , 760 . 157 . 773 . 673
F5B us FTMR 849 756 .204 . 773 . 677
F5E us FTMR 1. 342 1. 015 .227 . 898 . 523
F5F us FTMR 1. 288 . 940 .400 . 769 . 535
F86F us FTMR t 397 , 592 . 157 . 381 . 911
G91Y IT FTAT 655 786 . 208 691 . 844
HARMK80 UK FTMR 1. 578 1. 157 .282 L. 080 . 526
HAWK200 UK FTMR 1. 065 1. 029 . 380 1. 032 . 760
HAWK50T UK FTTA , 513 , 738 . 204 . 461 . 875
HAWK60A UK FTAT 664 . 859 . 252 . 671 . 873
HAWK60T UK FTTA . 595 , 875 . 157 . 568 . 859
HUNTER UK FTMR . 567 . 718 . 157 . 614 . 859
HUNTERT UK FTTM 582 717 . 204 614 . 863
JAGI04 UK FTAT 1. 405 1. 216 . 252 1. 120 . 605
JAGI11 UK FTAT 1. 433 1. 234 . 252 1. 120 . 597
JASTREB YU FTAT 405 533 . 157 652 1. 114
KFIRC2 IS FTMR l! 740 l! 199 . 238 1. 256 . 514
KFIRC7 IS FTMR 2. 035 l. 292 . 379 1. 432 . 509
- CAS
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KFIRTC2 IS FTTM 1. 683 1. 146 . 204 1. 256 . 516
LAVI IS FTMR 1. 901 1. 099 . 379 1. 491 . 530
L29 CZ FTTA . 162 427 . 204 094 1. 369
L39ZA CZ FTTC . 310 511 . 204 457 1. 243
MB326K IT FTAT . 395 474 . 157 643 1. 094
MB326L IT FTTA .296 474 .204 324 1. 094
MB339A IT FTTC . 385 546 . 204 349 . 916
MB339C IT FTAT . 690 690 .252 928 . 919
MB339K IT FTAT . 549 586 . 157 i 751 . 919
MIG15BIS UR FTMR . 362 565 . 157 325 . 919
MIG15UTI UR FTTC . 321 • 528 . 204 218 . 924
MIG17F UR FTMR . 395 • 579 . 198 374 . 936
MIG19C UR FTMR .590 • 729 . 198 409 . 717
MIG21F UR FTMR . 673 • 778 .207 i 395 . 646
MIG21JKL UR FTMR .806 , 862 . 233 • 503 . 630
MIG21UM UR FTTM . 717 795 . 254 4 395 . 634
MIG23B UR FTMR . 953 1. 034 . 249 669 . 655
MIG23E UR FTMR .851 1. 042 .233 a 632 . 714
MIG23F UR FTAT . 715 , 894 . 252 632 . 802
MIG23G UR FTMR . 986 1. 040 . 293 I 669 . 651
MIG23UM UR FTTC .825 * 948 . 280 669 . 742
MIG27DJ UR FTAT 1.034 . 897 . 252 968 . 682
MIG29 UR FTMR 1. 916 1. 316 .422 l! 164 .497
MIRF1A FR FTMR 1. 314 1. 188 .284 898 . 585
MIRF1C FR FTMR 1.405 1. 207 .422 , 898 . 584
MIRF1E FR FTMR 1.536 1. 313 .477 • 898 . 564
MIRIIIE FR FTMR 1.035 1. 006 . 274 912 . 696
MIRIIIEI FR FTMR 1. 526 1. 084 .274 l! 219 . 564
MIR2000C FR FTMR 2.251 1. 316 . 566 l. 461 .497
MIR2000T FR FTTM 2. 105 1. 302 . 613 l. 259 .499
MIR3NG FR FTMR 1.420 1. 204 . 382 l. 129 . 630
MIR4000 FR FTMR 2. 068 1. 430 . 515 l. 709 . 594
MIR5DD FR FTTA . 959 1. 084 . 237 , 775 . 705
MIR5D2 FR FTAT 1.061 1. 132 . 238 924 . 704
OV10D US MIAT .596 • 524 . 329 l! 517 1.419
PRCA5 CH FTAT . 728 • 722 . 157 815 . 778
PRCFT6 CH FTTM .482 , 690 .245 , 287 . 791
PRCF6 CH FTMR .468 706 . 198 287 . 790
SF260MW IT MITA . 122 • 542 . 204 184 2. 349
SF260TP IT MITA . 164 • 466 .204 184 1. 627
SUPETEN FR FTAT . 935 918 . 238 , 903 . 728
SU20 UR FTAT 1. 103 . 978 . 192 . 951 . 635
SU22 UR FTAT 1. 319 1. 020 . 317 l. 179 . 639
SU25 UR FTAT . 744 • 721 . 252 l. 284 1. 050
SU27 UR FTMR 1. 734 1. 213 . 528 l. 303 . 585
SU7BMKL UR FTAT . 596 . 634 . 192 , 500 . 724
SU7U UR FTTA .597 , 618 . 204 500 . 722
TA4EH US FTTA .850 . 868 . 266 l! 009 .844
TA4KU US FTTA . 799 . 747 . 266 , 994 . 851
TORIDS UK FTAT 1. 935 1. 372 . 562 l. 746 . 642
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Appendix G
MIDDLE EASTERN AIR COMBAT POTENTIAL 1984-1990
NOTE: Depicted in Air Combat Potential Units undepreciated for
maintenance force quality.
YEAR INVENTORY AIR FIGHTER INTERDICTI CAS
DEFENSE
Algeria
1984 294 59. 28 46. 89 17. 87 68. 70
1985 295 58. 12 46. 18 18. 43 68. 12
1986 285 58. 12 46. 18 17. 47 64. 83
1987 275 58. 12 46. 18 16. 80 62. 97
1988 266 69. 17 50. 88 15. 85 59. 68
1989 259 86. 69 58. 17 14. 90 56. 38
1990 239 97. 25 62. 47 12. 99 49. 80
Bahrain
1984 6 • 97 77 58 1. 86
1985 8 1. 29 l! 03 • 77 2.49
1986 12 1. 93 i. 53 1. 16 3. 72
1987 12 1. 93 l. 53 1. 16 3. 72
1988 12 1. 93 l. 53 1. 16 3. 72
1989 12 1. 93 l. 53 1. 16 3. 72
1990 12 1. 93 l. 53 1. 16 3. 72
Egypt
1984 441 165. 00 130. 90 31. 66 98. 93
1985 450 158. 57 125. 61 35. 66 111. 72
1986 441 166. 56 129. 34 34. 16 107. 05
1987 437 189. 81 140. 44 31. 15 97. 86
1988 419 202. 51 145. 21 36. 58 107. 27
1989 399 194. 81 138. 86 43. 00 120. 75
1990 399 • 194. 81 138. 86 43. 00 120. 75
Ethiopia
1984 138 00 00 12. 31 37. 72
1985 153
,
00 . 00 13. 01 39. 94
1986 148 00 , 00 12. 06 36. 73
1987 148 . 00 00 12. 06 36. 73
1988 150 . 00 00 12. 59 38. 62
1989 150 • 00 00 12. 49 38. 95
1990 150 • 00 • 00 12. 40 39. 29
Iran
1984 110 97. 55 59. 59 62. 16 156. 85
1985 94 73. 23 44. 52 49. 98 127. 16
1986 76 58. 68 35. 72 39. 97 102. 35
1987 56 40. 85 24. 94 28. 43 73. 08
1988 47 25. 55 15. 63 25. 80 66. 35
1989 47 25. 55 15. 63 25. 80 66. 35





1984 457 222. 64
1985 508 256.49
1986 541 240. 82
1987 563 249. 18
1988 556 247. 39
1989 556 261. 72
1990 556 276. 05
Israel
1984 491 427. 70
1985 509 452.25
1986 527 534. 31
1987 541 612. 34
1988 544 658. 01
1989 523 669. 14
1990 499 646.84
Jordan
1984 125 41. 81
1985 126 46. 34
1986 126 46. 34
1987 132 46. 34
1988 130 46. 34
1989 134 46. 34
1990 134 46. 34
Kuwait
1984 64 7.22
1985 80 12. 87
1986 89 16. 37
1987 89 16. 37
1988 89 16. 37
1989 89 16. 37


















































































































YEAR INVENTORY AIR FIGHTER INTERDICTI CAS
DEFENSE
Libya
1984 460 17. 70 12. 51 8. 82 29. 65
1985 505 19. 66 13. 91 9. 11 30. 60
1986 528 21. 75 15. 18 9. 11 30. 60
1987 527 22. 22 15. 29 9. 11 30. 60
1988 530 25. 86 17. 22 8. 99 30. 49
1989 530 28. 95 18. 64 8. 99 30. 49
1990 518 28. 83 18. 31 8. 99 30. 49
Morocco
1984 94 • 00 • 00 34. 85 115. 83
1985 93 * 00 • 00 34. 25 114.47
1986 93 a 00 • 00 34. 25 114.47
1987 93 • 00 00 34. 25 114.47
1988 93 00 • 00 34. 25 114.47
1989 93 00 • 00 34. 25 114.47
1990 93 • 00 i 00 34. 25 114.47
Oman
1984 52 • 00 • 00 9. 60 41. 91
1985 52 , 00 « 00 9. 60 41. 91
1986 50 00 , 00 9. 36 41. 06
1987 46 7. 13 4. 45 8. 48 37. 89
1988 50 14. 26 8. 90 8. 48 37. 89
1989 50 14. 26 8. 90 8. 48 37. 89
1990 50 14. 26 8. 90 8. 48 37.89
Qatar
1984 15 e 00 00 1. 14 3. 75
1985 21 , 00 • 00 1. 84 5. 82
1986 24 • 00 00 2. 04 6. 35
1987 22 • 00 e 00 1. 99 6. 14
1988 22 , 00 , 00 1. 99 6. 14
1989 22 , 00 , 00 1. 99 6. 14
1990 22 • 00 • 00 1. 99 6. 14
Saudi Arab ia
1984 183 183. 85 97. 20 52. 11 156. 09
1985 192 209. 79 110. 72 52. 11 156. 09
1986 198 212. 17 111. 87 55. 27 165. 45
1987 202 204. 45 106. 49 68. 98 198. 08
1988 214 226. 56 120. 31 71. 53 199. 05
1989 220 248. 66 134. 13 70. 29 190. 36
1990 220 248. 66 134. 13 70. 29 190. 36
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YEAR INVENTORY AIR FIGHT] INTERDIC CAS
DEFENSE
Somalia
1984 64 3. 45 2. 79 2. 20 8.35
1985 64 3. 45 2. 79 2. 20 8. 35
1986 64 3. 45 2. 79 2. 20 8. 35
1987 64 3. 45 2. 79 2. 20 8. 25
1988 64 3. 45 2. 79 2, 20 8. 35
1989 64 3. 45 2. 79 2. 20 8. 35
1990 64 3. 45 2. 79 2. 20 8. 35
Sudan
1984 35 4. 60 3. 84 3. 74 12.51
1985 35 4. 60 3. 84 3. 74 12.51
1986 46 5. 86 4. 88 4. 90 18.13
1987 52 7. 11 5. 91 5. 61 21.83
1988 49 7. 11 5. 91 5. 29 20.8.
1989 46 7. 11 5. 91 4. 96 19.7?
1990 46 7. 11 5. 91 4. 96 19.73
Syria
1984 508 326. 11 264. 16 75. 27 210.51
1985 554 380. 97 302. 42 76, 82 214.16
1986 539 385. 76 305. 47 71. 75 198.81
1987 541 418. 42 320. 09 70. 66 195.83
1988 528 439. 14 326. 21 68. 55 190.29
1989 498 434. 23 310. 59 69. 40 192.93
1990 480 544. 74 347. 32 65. 60 181.34
Tunisia
1984 8 • 00 • 00 00 5.65
1985 20 • 00 , 00 5! 20 21.06
1986 22 • 00 • 00 6. 07 23.56
1987 22 • 00 • 00 6. 07 23.56
1988 22 • 00 • 00 6. 07 23.56
1989 22 • 00 00 6. 07 23.56
1990 22 • 00 00 6. 07 23.56
United Arab Emirates
1984 40 6. 25 4. 80 • 42 5.89
1985 39 6. 00 4. 61 . 42 5.89
1986 53 8. 92 6. 29 1. 62 10.31
1987 59 17. 61 10. 71 2. 42 13.17
1988 67 26. 30 15. 14 3. 21 16.03
1989 75 34. 10 19. 63 3. 21 16.03
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